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ABSTRACT 
In the mid-twentieth century Jewish society in Iran emerged from political 
disenfranchisement and social and economic marginalization to become a well 
assimilated community with thriving institutions and an active participation in nation 
building. The turning point came in the wake of the Allied Armies’ 1941 invasion of Iran 
and Reza Shah’s abdication, which opened unprecedented opportunities for the Jewish 
community to become an actor in the rebuilding project of a new Iran.  Between 1941 
and 1979, the Jewish community was institutionally transformed. It was also a period of 
assimilation and Iranianization.  Thus, when faced by the strident patriotism of the 1970s, 
communal loyalty and identity was poised to be replaced by a new Jewish claim to the 
right to participate in the struggle for Iranian democracy, and to define the boundaries of 
a new nationalism 
 ix 
            This research argues that the re-socialization process that led to this change was 
nurtured under Mohammad Reza Shah’s nation building project that aimed to create a 
modern-secular Iranian society that emphasized Iranian civilizational foundations rooted 
both in ancient Persian culture and Western European civilization.  Although this new 
cultural focus de-emphasized religious affiliations, its driving idea, the Aryan 
Hypothesis, paradoxically created both opportunities and difficulties for Jews, as many 
Iranians viewed them as an ethnic minority outside of Aryan-Persian-Shi’i ideals. 
This dissertation charts the challenges and achievements of the Jewish 
communities in Iran from 1941 to the early post-revolutionary period.  By mapping 
structural transformations in the Jewish community, and by positioning its changing 
institutions and ideologies in the larger social and political climate of Iran, it reassesses 
both Iranian and Jewish-Iranian historiographies, which have posited Jewish Iranian 
history as an insular narrative, detached from general trends in Iranian society or other 
communities in the country.  In doing so, it also provides a model by which to reassess 
the position of other minority communities. Through the use of archives that scholars of 
Jewish Iranian history have overlooked as well as new interviews, this dissertation brings 
these histories back into the broader context of national history and writes Jewish Iranian 
history back into Iranian national historiography. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation tells the story of the development of the Jewish communities in Iran in 
the twentieth century, and especially since the beginning of the 1940s. When the 
emissaries of the American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee arrived in Tehran in 
1941, they reported to the organization’s headquarters in NYC that about eighty percent 
of the Jewish community in Iran were impoverished members of the lower and lower 
middle classes. Many lived in rural areas or on the outskirts of the big cities. They were 
generally literate but unable to break professional and social glass ceilings that affected 
many Iranians in a hierarchical society, regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation, but 
which were even more applicable to them. Ten percent, according to this report, belonged 
to the urban middle class, and 10 percent were well-to-do Iranian industrialists and 
bankers.1 By the late 1970s the reports of the same organization offered a radically 
different picture. This time about 80 percent belonged to the upper middle class, 10 
percent to the economic elite and upper class, and only 10 percent belonged to the 
impoverished lower class. This change occurred in the course of less than four decades, 
which is especially astounding in a community of 100,000 individuals. This 
                                                
1 Amnon Netzer added that compared to Jews that came from other Middle Eastern 
countries, the Iranian Jews were significantly less literate and poorly trained. Amnon 
Netzer, “Ha’aretz ve’yehudiy’ha,” in Iran, ed. Haim. Saadoun (Yerushalayim: Misrad ha-
hinukh, ha-tarbut veha-sport, ha-Mazkirut ha-pedagogit, ha-Merkaz le-shiluv moreshet 
Yahadut ha-Mizrah  : Mekhon Ben-Tsevi le-heker kehilot Yisrael ba-Mizrah shel Yad 
Ben-Tsevi veha-Universitah ha-`Ivrit, 2005), 9–26. 
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transformation can be attributed to many factors, however this dissertation seeks to find 
what roles the state and Iranian society played in creating the condition which allowed 
this transformation to take place? In addition, what was the place of Jewish institutions in 
facilitating the socialization process of this period? The story of this transformation 
involves many communal institutions and practices but is not bound to them; there was 
also a willingness of the government and the “nation” to include them in the new nation-
building project. Was this growth the effect of the new political atmosphere? What 
enabled Jews to shift between identities, and constantly redefine them? This dissertation 
examines the developments of the Jewish communities in Iran through several crucial 
periods and institutions, such as the expansion of the Jewish population following 
domestic and transregional migrations, the politicization of the Iranian Jewish population, 
and eventually the institutions that the community established following these 
transformations.  This dissertation also explores diverse trends in the emergent 
nationalism in Iran and the complexity of national identity.  
 This dissertation argues that the invasion of the Allied Armies in 1941 created 
unprecedented opportunities for all of Iranian society. Along with the military occupation 
came freedoms that had yet to be seen in Iran, in terms of political activism, personal and 
communal affairs, and removal of harsh regulations that were placed by Reza Shah to 
facilitate his idea of nation building. Many groups entered into this artificially made 
vacuum in attempts to take advantage of this opportunity. Iranian Jews, that prior to 1941 
were mostly a marginalized religious minority, began a socialization process that 
mirrored the one that the broader Iranian society had undergone, and this process in 
 3 
turned changed the traditional structure of loyalties and created a situation in which the 
Jewish population founds new ways to relate to the broader Iranian national community. 
This research differentiates the Iranian case from other Middle Eastern studies 
analyses by comparing it with the emerging revisionist historiography of the Arab world. 
It exemplifies how minorities may be part of the national arena, not secluded in ghettos. 
Despite focusing on the Jewish population of Iran, I see this research as fine-tuning 
Iranian history. Iran is—to a large extent—a country of minorities, a thing that rarely 
comes across from reading Iranian national historiography. Although overwhelmingly 
most of the minorities are ethnic minorities, some of them are both ethnic and religious 
minorities and are insufficiently treated in the narratives of Iranian history. By writing the 
story of Iran’s Jewry more fully into the Iranian national story, this study will contribute 





Three intertwined historiographical problems obscure Iranian Jewish history: first, the 
writing of Jewish history is a field that has traditionally been characterized by a 
lachrymose historical narrative. This narrative presents Jewish history as homogenously 
tragic regardless of geographical or socio-political context. The second, much-amplified 
approach to Jewish historiography appeared after the Holocaust and related to the 
eventual dominance of Zionist historiography in the writing of Jewish history. The third, 
the literature about Iranian Jews and other minorities has been highly problematic and has 
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not always reflected the complexities that accompany their identity politics and their 
changing circumstances. In his seminal 1928 article “Ghetto and Emancipation,” Salo 
Baron called scholars of Jewish history to revisit the lachrymose view of Jewish history.2 
Baron wrote this article amidst scholarly debates about the period of emancipation for the 
European Jews. He critiqued overestimations of emancipation and the absence of context 
in other Jewish histories. For example, scholars of Jewish history examined the 
emancipation period in Europe solely through the prism of the Jewish communities. 
Baron argued that claiming that at that time Jews did not have rights is ahistorical, as no 
European subject, Jewish or not, enjoyed citizenship rights. He also criticized these 
historians for not sufficiently covering neutral or positive aspects  (albeit limited) Jews 
experienced from the ghetto and the social structure in making their way in a given 
situation. While not claiming in any way that the Jews’ position was ideal, or even 
overall positive, failing to see the ways in which the communal and social structure 
simultaneously hurt and benefitted the Jews (vis-à-vis the government and/or regimes) 
leads to missing the complexity of Jewish life in Europe. The same theoretical and 
methodological symptoms appear in scholarship concerning Middle Eastern Jewish 
history as well. These shortcomings stem from many causes, some of which go back to 
scholars being trained as Jewish researchers studying specifically Jewish History, rather 
than historians trained to study a particular region or country, who then treated Jews as 
just another specific minority group (hence preserving the “ghetto approach” which 
prevented them from seeing the larger picture of Jews as part of broader society). Baron’s 
                                                
2 Salo Baron, “Ghetto and Emancipation: Shall We Revise the Traditional View?,” The 
Menorah Journal 14, no. 6 (1928): 515–26. 
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harshest criticism targeted historians “anxious to assist the completion of the process of 
emancipation with their learning,”3 which here includes historians who aimed to use the 
lessons of the Holocaust or otherwise- Zionism, to draw on millennia of Jewish existence 
in the Middle East. Moreover, excluding the most recent period (especially after the 
1940s), in which Middle Eastern Jews lived in a relatively more peaceful and tranquil 
context than their coreligionists in Europe.4 Taking into account the structure of relative 
tolerance that characterized the Ottoman Empire, scholars must carefully revisit the ever-
changing nature of the co-existence Jews and Muslims in the Middle East.  
Baron wrote his article before the Holocaust, a trauma that introduced a 
historiographical mold that viewed Jews as passive and insecure subjects of whimsical 
states and populations. Forever calling into question their status vis-à-vis the majority of 
the population and the state. According to this approach, Jews lived in a perpetual 
existential crisis. This essentially European experience was then extended, by historians 
of Jewish history, everywhere, and to the Jews of the Middle East and  Muslim world 
                                                
3 Ibid., 524–5. 
4 There is a continuous debate about this topic. While Stillman and Rodrigue present the 
critical approach that find a history of intolerance, to certain degree, Mark R. Cohen 
compares social and religious influences on the emergence of the myth (Jewish- Islamic 
harmony) or the counter-myth. Mark R. Cohen, “Islam and the Jews: Myth, Counter-
Myth, History,” Jerusalem Quarterly XXXVIII (1986): 125–37; Norman A Stillman, The 
Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2003); 
Aron Rodrigue, Jews and Muslims: Images of Sephardi and Eastern Jewries in Modern 
Times (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003). 
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specifically, without sufficient regard for how closely these cases resembled this 
European experience. Concomitantly, Zionism became the prescribed remedy for all 
Jewish communities and the ultimate measure for all things past. Long before the 
realization of political Zionism Baron identified the inevitable historiographical 
challenges it had already imposed in 1928. He maintained that, “Zionism wished to reject 
the Diaspora in toto, on the grounds that a “normal life” could not be led by Jewry 
elsewhere than on its own soil.”5 
Thus, Iranian Jewish history was no exception to this trend of writing Jewish 
history from a narrow Zionist perspective. According to this approach, when Jews in Iran 
were politically active, they exclusively supported the shah’s government because of its 
close relations with Israel. Moreover, it was argued that Iranian Jews largely abstained 
from participating in national political events, such as the 1979 revolution, hence their 
absence from Iranian national historiography. In fact, Iranian Jewish communities 
underwent tremendous transformations over the course of the 20th century, ones that both 
Iranian and non-Iranian scholarship have  insufficiently address.  
This historiographical reality also applies to 19th century Iran. In his important 
book Between Foreigners and Shi’is: Nineteenth Century-Iran and Its Jewish Minority, 
Daniel Tsadik convincingly asserts that “one can hardly speak of diverse approaches, 
different schools of historiography, or even major debates among the few scholars who 
address Iranian Jewry’s recent past.”6 This is the justification to any new scholarship on 
                                                
5 Baron, “Ghetto and Emancipation: Shall We Revise the Traditional View?,” 525. 
6 Daniel Tsadik, Between Foreigners and Shi’is  : Nineteenth-Century Iran and Its Jewish 
Minority (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007), 1. 
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Iranian Jewish history. Tsadik addresses this void in the context of the nineteenth 
century, and in this work, it is hoped to address the same gap regarding the twentieth 
century. The most comprehensive book about Iranian Jewry, written in 1960 by Habib 
Levy, depicts Jewish life in Iran from the pre-Islamic period (1300 BCE) to 1960.7 Some 
flaws seem inevitably inherent to such a broad period of focus. Second, Levy was a 
dentist, and not a professional, trained historian. The book therefore, lacks a strong 
disciplinary methodology and engagement with the dominant historiographical and 
theoretical debates of the discipline of history. Levy was also a self-proclaimed Zionist, 
which creates a potential historiographical issue; as Haggai Ram explains, the Zionist 
paradigm consistently narrates Jewish Iranian history. Much of the scholarship on Iranian 
Jewry, with some notable exceptions, was written by Israelis or by Jews of Iranian 
descent with connections to Israel. Some wrote from their personal experiences, and most 
did not write from within Iran.8 While this scholarship provides important information 
about some aspects of Jewish life in Iran, it provides an incomplete picture by treating the 
community as an isolated entity within Iranian society. The Zionist perceptions 
embedded in much of this scholarship presume that “the Jewish state is the only place 
                                                
7 This book was originally published in Persian as a three-volume comprehensive history 
of the Jews of Iran, and was translated to English in 1999 in Los Angeles, where Levy 
lived until his passing. Ḥabib Levy, Comprehensive History of the Jews of Iran: The 
Outset of the Diaspora (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1999); Habib Lavi, Tarikh-i 
Yahud-i Iran. (Tihran: Barukhim, 1956). 
8 Haggai Ram, Iranophobia: The Logic of an Israeli Obsession (Stanford  Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2009), 101. 
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where non-European Jews could escape a bitter fate.”9 Zionist-leaning historiographies, 
in a sense, deny Jews historical agency by portraying them as passive victims for 
millennia until their encounter with modern Zionism. For example, Meir Ezri, who 
served as the Israeli ambassador to Iran in the early 1970s, celebrates in his memoir the 
relations between Iran and Israel and depicts Jewish life in Iran. According to Ezri, 
however, only the existence of Israel guarantees good treatment of Jews in Iran or healthy 
relations.10 Similarly, Haim Tsadok, the Jewish Agency’s emissary in Iran in 1969-73, 
hails the Pahlavi dynasty for succeeding in “modernizing” and “secularizing” Iran, albeit 
mentioning the harsh price Iranian citizens had to pay.11 Tsadok overemphasizes the role 
of his organization and the Zionist movement as a whole, but fails to understand any 
patriotic feelings of Iranian Jews to a country other than Israel, despite acknowledging 
the fact that Iran was their homeland for over 2,000 years. This approach ignores things 
like the common cultural and ethnic traits they shared with other Iranians; thereby failing 
to understand the possibility that Iranian Jews (like religious minorities in other nations) 
might have felt an affinity toward the dominant nationalism of the nation in which they 
lived. This approach contradicts general trends in the study of nationalism by ignoring 
how modern nationalisms compete (more often than not, successfully) with other 
religious or ethnic communal identities, even in cases in which the minority groups are 
not treated by the dominant group as fully equal members of the nation in question. 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Meir Ezri, Mi va-Khem Mi-Kol ’Amo (Or Yehuda: Hed Arzi: Sifriyat Ma’ariv, 2001). 
11 Hayim Tsadok, Yahadut Iran bi-tekufat ha-shoshelet ha-Pahlavit  : Yehude Iran ve-
Erets Yisrael (1935-1978) (Tel Aviv: Meyatseg, 1991), 48–51. 
 9 
Moreover, leaving Israel aside, Tsadok believes that “the Jews [of Iran] have, at all times 
and under all different regimes, been subject to murder, robbery, and plunder.”12   
In recent years Jewish histories of the Middle East have received increasing 
scholarly attention. A new generation of historians, trained predominantly in the field of 
Middle East History rather than Jewish Studies or Jewish History, have revisited modern 
and early modern histories of Middle Eastern Jewish communities, making extensive use 
of scholarship and knowledge of Middle Eastern societies and not only their Jewish 
populations.13 This trend, to a large extent, departs from the way Jewish (and other 
minorities’) histories have been previously written. Historians such as Daniel Tsadik, 
David Yeroushalmi, and Mehrdad Amanat have spearheaded a revisionist wave of 
research on the Jewish communities of Iran in the 19th century.14 They have all 
                                                
12 Ibid., 13 See also: 13-22,318-60, 521-24. 
13 Notably in this category are these book that contextualize Jewish local histories with 
modern Middle Eastern history: Orit Bashkin, New Babylonians: A History of Jews in 
Modern Iraq (Stanford  Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012); Rami Ginat, A History 
of Egyptian Communism: Jews and Their Compatriots in Quest of Revolution (Boulder, 
Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011); Joel Beinin, The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: 
Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a Modern Diaspora, Contraversions 11 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
14 David Yeroushalmi, The Jews of Iran in the Nineteenth Century Aspects of History, 
Community, and Culture (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009), Mehrdad Amanat, Jewish 
Identities in Iran: Resistance and Conversion to Islam and the Baha’i Faith, Library of 
Modern Religion 9 (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 
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challenged common narratives regarding Jewish existence in Shiʿi-dominated Iran (going 
beyond the practices of impurity and religious tensions) and have revealed the rich and 
nuanced histories of these communities. These books notably consider Jewish 
communities of Iran (rather than a single “unified” Jewish community) as part of broader 
society. Within this context, Tsadik eschews the laboratory-like, supposedly isolated 
conditions under which this Iranian Jewry has been studied; as he rightly observes, “the 
Jews did not exist in their own universe, separated from Iranian soil and society.”15 In 
addition, Avraham Cohen explores mutual influence. He points out that the basic form of 
religious schooling was “maktab khanah” or “khanah-i mullah”, thus borrowing from the 
Iranian-Muslim vernacular. The teacher in these institutions was interchangeably 
“mullah,” “khalifah,” or “hakham.”16 This usage of Islamic titles, names, and terms is an 
indication of the problem of claims about social or cultural isolation of Iranian Jews. The 
Muslim culture of Iran inspired the Jews in many other ways, as well. Jews had first 
names that otherwise would be recognized as exclusively Muslim, such as Habib, 
Abdullah, or even Ruhullah—as was Dr. Sapir’s first name. Moreover, Jews that 
conducted pilgrimage to Jerusalem add the prefix Hajji, borrowing from the honorific 
title from Muslims who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca.  
The insufficient writing on more recent histories of Jews in Iran and the Zionist –
centered historiographies created scholarship that has focused on certain aspects of 
                                                
15 Tsadik, Between Foreigners and Shi’is, 3. 
16 I want to thank Haggai Ram for directing me to this anecdote, and to Avraham Cohen 
for giving me all his publications to use for this research. Ram, Iranophobia: The Logic 
of an Israeli Obsession, 119 see notes: 36 and 37. 
 11 
Jewish history in Iran, such as continuous persecution, issues of impurity, and Zionist 
activism, while ignoring major trends characterizing this population in the 20th century, 
like Jewish communist participation, Iranian patriotism, and non-traditional 
interpretations of Zionism. Another obstacle in writing an integrative account of Iranian 
Jews is that scholarship written on national organizations and other agencies, in which 
Jews were active or dominant, have tended to focus more on the political legacy of those 
organizations and less on the social, ethnic or religious tapestry of the people involved.17  
Iranian Jewish history also relies on two contradictory historiographical 
narratives. The first sees Iranian historiography entirely through such historical categories 
as the “Jews of Islam” and lumps together Sunni and Shiʿi communities. By doing so, the 
methodology wrongly conflates the histories of the Jews in the Arab lands and the 
radically different recent history of Iranian Jewry. Misperceptions of communal 
stagnation also distort the nuanced social tapestry of the Jewish population in Iran. While 
other countries in the region saw their Jewish populations diminishing, especially since 
the 1940s, Iran witnessed the onset of a period in which Jews thrived more than ever 
before. Not only did the majority of Jews remain in Iran in the 1940s, but the Jewish 
community even grew and became more diverse than any other Jewish community of the 
Middle East outside Palestine during this time. Iran and its Jewish population were part 
                                                
17 For example see Maziar Behrooz important and illuminating book on the Tudeh party, 
but again, leaves much of the discussion on the ethnic and religious elements of the party 
out of the conversation. Maziar Behrooz, Rebels with a Cause  : The Failure of the Left in 
Iran (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999). 
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of global and trans-regional trajectories of displaced persons that found short- and long-
term sanctuaries in countries not their own. The trans-regional nature of the Iranian 
community, and the fact that the meaning of being Iranian and Jewish changed in 20th-
century Iran, was the result of encounters with other Jewish communities—including 
European, Arab, and Sephardi communities—during the years of World War II and after 
the creation of the State of Israel.  
This trans-regional point of view seeks to highlight Iran’s role and historical 
agency in global events. For example, during the war years many Europeans—among 
them Jews—came to Iran and found there a shelter from the upheavals in Europe. 
Another significant group of Jews immigrating to Iran in those years came from Iraq. 
Following an earlier 1914-1918 wave, comprised primarily of Iraqi Jews avoiding 
conscription into the Ottoman army; the second wave fled Iraq due to persecution and 
pogroms, most famously the Farhud in June 1941. Thousands of Jews came from Iraq to 
Iran on their way to Israel/Palestine because the Jewish relief organizations operated 
transition camps there. Jewish immigrants stayed in the transition camps for long periods 
of time, depending on the efficiency of the agencies’ collaboration with the British 
Mandate government in Palestine. Many of the Iraqi Jews chose to stay in Iran with their 
relatives who had already settled, mainly in the borderland between Basra and Abadan. 
Another group of Jewish Iraqi immigrants were those who had gone to Israel but decided 





Notes on Sources 
This study draws on various types of primary evidentiary sources. The first type of source 
I used extensively for this research consisted of the archives of relief organizations such 
as the American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee (JDC) in New York, the 
Presbyterian Historical Society in Philadelphia (PHS), and the International Red Cross 
(IRC). The JDC had been involved in Jewish affairs in Iran since the interwar period but 
intensified its activity to unprecedented levels in 1941. The committee cared for the 
refugees, facilitated the inner-migration to the major urban centers, established the 
education system, organized the community, and connected Iranian Jews with the world 
Jewry. JDC’s archives illustrate the astonishingly rapid transformation the community 
underwent. However, when dealing with such organizations it is important to understand 
the transnational framework in which it functioned. The JDC was simultaneously 
invested in helping establish Israel and providing help and support to Jews remaining in 
Iran. Also, different JDC emissaries wrote the reports I read, and at different times, under 
very different geo-political circumstances. I contextualize the documents, but there was 
no single policy executed by all the organization’s envoys or one that encompassed all 
the organization’s activity. Finally among the many JDC officials, there were people with 
varying levels of commitment to Zionism, which affected their interpretations of fact, 
trends, and events.18 
                                                
18 In 1948 significant segments of the American Jewish communities were skeptical 
regarding Zionism and the State of Israel. They were more interested in promoting 
universal values and ideals they saw as correlating with Judaism. Caring for distant 
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The Presbyterian archive provided a glimpse into the missionary world in Iran. 
Although the missionaries’ primary target audience was not the Jews, they reached out to 
the Jewish population as well, and their institutions, such as schools, colleges, 
professional training programs, etc. indiscriminately served all the Iranians who wished 
to enroll. In addition, during WWII the mission in Iran facilitated the rescue operation 
and treated the refugees and migrants. The same was true for the International Red Cross; 
this organization was present in Bandar-i Pahlavi as the refugees arrived and stayed there 
for as long as the Allied forces needed them to be present. 
The second type of source I used in conducting this research is state archives and 
document collections published by these archives. I have worked with documents at the 
Israeli, British, and American national archives, in addition to collections of documents 
published by the Iranian National Archive. Those documents depict the international 
relations aspects of minorities’ affairs in Iran.  
Another source consisted of Iranian journals and newspapers. These public and 
communal materials relay what the community activists told their co-religionist, 
compatriots, and themselves. They also reflect the ideological diversity in those 
communities. Along with a series of memoirs we get multiple personal and narrower 
narratives that help us come up with alternative histories to the “big history,” which has 
been told thus far. 
The most intriguing source was the oral history component. I have conducted 25 
interviews with Iranian Jews that participated in, or witnessed, the events under study 
                                                                                                                                            
communities fitted this definition, even at the cost of possible conflict with the new 
Israeli leadership.  
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here. The interviews took place over a period of three years and in different locations: the 
U.S., England, France, Israel, and Iran. Interviews in France and Iran took place over 
Skype and in some cases, where I needed to follow up on some of the points, additional 
Skype, phone or email correspondence occurred. Many of the interviewees brought to my 
attention events that were historiographically marginalized at the time those events took 
place. In some cases interviewees provided supporting evidence, such as photos, 
documents, or old newspaper stories. In each case I juxtapose the oral account with other 
types of documentary evidence. All the interviews were recorded and stored with the 
informed consent of the interviewees.  
In analyzing these interviews I relied on methodologies developed in the works of 
Leyla Neyzi. She explains the origins of the field of oral history, which I find very much 
applicable to the Iranian case, as “it often examines events and experiences not recorded 
(or differently recorded) by written history, and shows that historical events may be 
alternately interpreted by individuals who embody the past in the present.”19 She then 
explains that oral history practices emerged especially following the Holocaust and in 
concert with the appearance of trauma studies. In historical writing, oral history is “used 
as a means of giving voice to the silenced or subaltern, and oral history methodology 
resembled anthropological fieldwork in providing a bottom-up view of society.”20 In the 
context of this research, giving a voice to Jews who were not part of the Iranian-Jewish 
                                                
19 Leyla Neyzi, “Oral History and Memory Studies in Turkey,” in Turkey’s Engagement 
with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century, ed. Celia Kerslake, 
Kerem Oktem, and Philip Robins (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 443. 
20 Ibid., 443–4. 
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mainstream narrative gives them agency and bring them back to history; both Iranian and 
Jewish. 
For several reasons, all the interviewees cited in this research are referred to using 
pseudonyms. First, many of the informants for this study still live in Iranian diaspora 
communities. Over the years these communities have embraced a certain distinctive 
identity that reflects their ambiguous relationship with their longtime homeland. 
Participation in movements or events that led to the 1979 revolution may not be looked 
upon fondly in their communities. In order to protect their current lives and identities, and 
reduce the significance of personal rivalries I have changed details that are not essential 
to the story and to leave only relevant details in the text. Secondly, it has been over thirty-
five years since the most recent events took place, in other cases over six decades have 
passed. Given the distance from Iran and the distance in time, people could be tempted to 
romanticize their role in the event, or see the interviews as a means to achieve a sense of 
historical justice. I found that when the informants knew that no real names would be 
mentioned, they seemed more relaxed and frank, thus reducing the risk of either avoiding 
difficult topics or glorifying details, and in some cases kept old personal rivalries out of 
the narrative. 
Besides the interviews that I conducted, I made extensive use of the oral history 
trove that exists in the Center for Iranian Jewish Oral History at UCLA (CIJOH). CIJOH 
has published numerous collections of articles and selected interviews, which are unique 
in the field of Iranian Jewish studies. The interviews recorded there are with Iranian Jews 
from all walks of life, and reveal much of the unwritten modern history of Iranian Jewry. 
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When using the transcribed interviews, I use the full name of the interviewee as it appears 
in CIJOH’s records. 
 
Historical Review of Jewish History in Iran 
Jewish presence in Iran usually dates back to the Assyrian exile in 722 B.C. While being 
relatively incorporated into the society, Jews routinely suffered harassment from the 
Zoroastrian clergy. As a result, scholars argue that Jews welcomed the Arab-Muslim 
conquerors with mixed fillings, hoping it would put an end to the institutional 
discrimination and persecution, which at that time included forced conversions to 
Zoroastrianism.21 The rule of Islam, at least nominally, protected Jews as “People of the 
Book,” in exchange for additional taxes and maintaining a type of inferior socio-political 
status vis-à-vis Muslims. For the following millennium Jews were not singled out more 
than other religious minorities, either positively or negatively. During the Mongolian-
Ilkhanid period they of course suffered, but it must also be kept in mind that this period 
was devastating to the entire region of Iran.  
 A major turning point for Iran and its Jewish population was the establishment of 
the Safavid dynasty by Shah Isma’il I, who unified Iran and instituted Twelver Shi’ism as 
the state religion. He did so, at least in part, to distinguish his kingdom from the major 
                                                
21 Amnon Netzer, “Ha-Kehila Ha-Yehudit Be-Iran,” in Yehudei Iran: Avaram, 
Morashtam ve-Zikatam Le-Eretz Ha-Kodesh, ed. Amnon Netzer (Jerusalem: Beit Koresh, 
1988), 3–4. 
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Sunni forces bordering Iran (namely the Ottoman Empire).22 The power behind the 
Safavid project was formation of “religious unity as a source of solidarity,” wrote Habib 
Levy, and on these foundations hatred was spread towards anything that was not Shi’i.23 
Very little has been written about Jewish history in the Safavid and early Qajar eras. A 
number of documents, mostly written in Judeo-Persian, survive from that period and tell 
about persecution and forced conversions, especially during the reign of Shah Abbas I (r. 
1571-1629), Shah Safi I (r. 1629-1642), and Shah Abbas II (1642-1666).24 Vera Moreen 
argues that “despite the events described in the Judeo-Persian chronicles just mentioned, 
the Safavid era cannot be considered a period of total disaster for Iran Jewry. On the 
contrary, there were numerous Jewish communities throughout the kingdom and most of 
them thrived under fairly vigorous and autonomous communal structure.”25 
As Daniel Tsadik shows in his book, the Qajar period brought mixed experiences 
to the different Jewish communities in Iran rather than one galvanizing event. It means 
that while some communities endured persecution, others enjoyed a period of relative 
tranquility. Most importantly, Jews did not live primarily in isolation from the broader 
                                                
22 Vera B. Moreen, “The Safavid Era,” in Esther’s Children  : A Portrait of Iranian Jews, 
ed. Houman Sarshar (Beverly Hills  Calif.: Center for Iranian Jewish Oral History; 
Jewish Publication Society, 2002), 63. 
23 Habib Levy, Comprehensive History of the Jews of Iran: The Outset of the Diaspora 
(Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1999), 260. 
24 Moreen, “The Safavid Era,” 64. 
25 Ibid., 73. 
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Iranian society. Therefore, times of hardships for the Jews tended to be times of hardships 
for other religious minorities as well.  
The nineteenth century brought about significant social transformations to the 
minority communities. One of the interesting phenomena of that period was a fluidity of 
religious identity.  Vast numbers of Jews voluntarily converted to Islam, Christianity, and 
Baha’ism. Conversion became socially acceptable despite some negative connotations, 
and the emergence of Baha’ism in that period attracted many Jews.26 Under Naser al-Din 
Shah and Mozaffar al-Din Shah, Jews enjoyed more comprehensive legal protection and 
advancement. With European Jewry’s support, they also opened and expanded the 
network of Alliance Israelite Universalle (AIU) and other Jewish educational 
institutions.27  
The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 introduced a new civil discourse in 
which minorities became legally equal to Muslim citizens. A parliament formed and after 
a power struggle with the palace, the governing body wrote and ratified a constitution. 
                                                
26 Mehrdad Amanat explains the enchantment of Baha’ism as an opportunity to convert 
to a sort of indigenous religion, without being labeled as a “new convert” (jadid ul-
Islam), and preserve family history as part of the individual identity. Mehrdad Amanat, 
Jewish Identities in Iran: Resistance and Conversion to Islam and the Baha’i Faith, 
Library of Modern Religion 9 (London  ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 3–6. 
27 Janet Afary, “From Outcastes to Citizens: Jews in Qajar Iran,” in Esther’s Children  : 
A Portrait of Iranian Jews, ed. Houman Sarshar (Beverly Hills  Calif.: Center for Iranian 
Jewish Oral History; Jewish Publication Society, 2002), 154. 
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Not without pains, Jews (and other minorities) had representatives on a national level, 
and the political sphere slowly opened for them.28  
The next turning point arrived after Reza Khan’s ascendance to throne in the 
1920’s. Reza established the last dynasty to rule over Iran, the Pahlavi dynasty. He led a 
fierce fight against the religious establishment in his attempt to establish a secular 
society. In the first years of his rule the Jewish institutions enjoyed unprecedented 
freedoms. However, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Reza Shah sought to reform and 
unify Iran’s education systems and he closed Jewish schools. Overall, the Pahlavi period, 
with its emphasis on a secular society, brought a relief to the Jews of Iran. The periodical 
recurrences of anti-Jewish attacks tended to be local and isolated. 
In addition to education reform, Reza Shah’s modernization project included 
many infrastructural projects like railroads and industry, in which foreign consortiums 
took part. Germany became one of Iran’s major partners, a relationship that led Reza 
Shah to announce Iran’s neutral position when World War II broke out. Nazi propaganda 
appeared in the public discourse in Iran in the late 1930s and early 1940s, but probably 
not to the extent Britain and the Soviet Union estimated when they justified a military 




This dissertation consists of five core chapters organized in both chronological and 
thematic order. Chapter One explores the sociological and demographic transformation 
                                                
28 Ibid., 164–173. 
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that the Jewish population—and by extension other religious minorities—underwent 
during the Second World War. This chapter argues that the 1941 invasion, and the 
subsequent collapse of the rigid state structure, facilitated social mobility and 
redefinition, along with the reshaping of urban centers in Iran, which was accompanied 
by the growing visibility of minorities. Agencies operating on behalf of Jews increased 
their involvement and investments and addressed the needs of the community more 
efficiently than any state mechanism could do at the time. Moreover, during that period, 
no state regulation stood in these agencies’ way, which made an enormous difference 
when attending to the needs of the communities. This chapter examines how Iranian 
history appears in the war historiography, usually in an insufficiently complex or nuanced 
way, and how the war and its aftermath shaped Iran. Contrary to the stagnant or rather 
declining analysis of Iranian Jewry (as part of the general Middle Eastern Jewish 
population), the Jewish population in Iran witnessed its golden age, insofar as it relates to 
“becoming Iranian citizens.” This chapter incorporates archival work from relief 
organizations, religious organizations, former Ally countries’ archives, memoirs, and 
Iranian Foreign Office papers. 
Chapter Two examines the politicization of the Jews in the WWII period and 
immediately afterward. Traditional historiography distances Jews from politics in Iran. 
Only a handful of articles and books suggest any political agency of Jews in 
contemporary Iran. When mentioned at all, Jewish political activity usually refers to 
supporting the shah in relation to his intimate relations with Israel. However, this chapter 
argues that political activism became a means for Iranian Jews to impact their future and 
place in Iran. Many Jews were adamant supporters and members of the communist Tudeh 
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party and later on engaged in many other political initiatives (such as student movements 
and intellectual associations). The Tudeh was the most vocal opponent of fascism in the 
1940s. For years the group published articles and editorials denouncing fascist 
inclinations of nationalist groups in Iranian society, openly opposing the prevailing anti-
Semitic climate in Iran. The Tudeh’s enduring defense of the Jewish community and 
message of equality attracted many young Jews from the Iranian middle and lower-
middle classes. Their political activism continued well into the 1970s, and Jews were part 
of a few revolutionary movements, which will be explored in chapters Four and Five. 
Chapter Three centralizes the educational institutions and community structures in 
minorities’ strategies for seeking interconnectedness with broader Iranian society. 
Communal institutions run by Jews, with Jews as their main constituency, sometimes 
played pivotal roles in advancing the social and economic place of Iranian Jews and 
encouraging them to leave the virtual ghettos and seek general education that could 
facilitate a successful career in serving the state and the society, and bringing financial 
stability. Alliance Israelite Universelle and ORT, two of the networks that operated in 
Iran, as well as in other countries in the region, trained Jews (and later others, as this 
chapter shows) in useful languages, and equipped their graduates with knowledge and 
professional skills. Moreover, the communal school system articulated a version of 
Iranian national identity among those students and encouraged them to define and 
prioritize the different components of their identity. This chapter argues that regardless of 
the time they began to operate, community schools, their curriculum, and their self-
perception were products of the socialization that happened since 1941. Moreover, these 
same institutions created and educated the generation that came of age in the late 1960s 
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and 1970s to participate in various national Iranian activities. This chapter also examines 
the apparent conflict or tension between Zionism, Judaism, and Iranian nationalism.  
Chapter Four argues that the ultimate success of the nation building project, led 
by the shah, was evident in the decade leading to the revolution, when the Jewish society 
in Iran finally completed its release from traditional loyalties and viewed itself, first and 
foremost, as Iranian. This chapter explores the first manifestations of Jewish 
revolutionary discourse and actions. Jewish students were already active in students’ 
organizations and fostered an inclusive Iranian-Jewish identity. They assumed leadership 
roles in the movements and strove to end the shah’s dictatorship in order to create an 
Iranian republic. During the protests of the 1970s, while the communist Tudeh party had 
been outlawed, two Jewish activists were jailed for antimonarchical activity. After 
serving their time, they turned to political activity within the Jewish community.29 Loyal 
to their leftist tendencies and religious identity, they gathered a dozen like-minded 
comrades and established the most significant Jewish organization of the late 1970s in 
Iran: jami'ah-i rawshanfikran-i yahudi-yi Iran (The Association of Jewish Iranian 
Intellectuals). This organization was instrumental in involving Jews in revolutionary 
events. The existence of this enterprise has appeared only in a handful of scholarly 
works; the late scholar of Iranian history, Amnon Netzer, wrote about this association 
briefly in 1981, following a growing curiosity regarding Iranian Jews after the 
                                                
29 David Menashri, “The Jews in Iran: Between the Shah and Khomeini,” in Anti-
Semitism in Times of Crisis, ed. Sander Gilman (New York: New York University Press, 
1991), 360. 
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revolution,30 and David Menashari wrote about it in his article cited above. This chapter 
takes on the challenge of elaborating on this movement in order to understand and 
historicize the Jewish involvement in revolutionary movements of the 1970s. Rewriting 
the history of the left in Iran is essential to understanding the paradigms and worldviews 
that attracted so many people of minority communities to support and assume leadership 
positions in these movements. Studying the Jewish experience in the Tudeh party, for 
example, presents the radical options available to Jews from the1940s through the 1970s, 
other than Zionism. Moreover, while contemporaneous movements from around the 
globe tried to instigate revolutions or instill revolutionary ideas with only limited success, 
be it American students that protested against the American involvement in Vietnam, or 
French students against the colonization of Algeria, to name a few, their Iranian 
counterparts were able to fulfill the mission and start a revolution.  
Chapter Five argues that the achievements of Jews in the past 30 years are not to 
be erased even by a revolution that shortly after its victory was declared Islamic. This 
chapter discusses post-revolutionary Iran and the new nation-building project the Jews 
faced following the ultimate success of the revolution. The fruits of those achievements 
were seen on multiple occasions, despite their rising falling fortunes; an especially 
interesting one was the Constitution Drafting Committee. The committee had 73 
                                                
30 Amnon Netzer, Yehude Iran Be-yamenu (Jerusalem: HUJI Press, 1981); Amnon 
Netzer, “Yehudei Iran, Yisrael, Ve-ha-republiqah Ha-islamit Shel Iran,” Gesher 26 
(Spring-Summer 1980): 45–57; Amnon Netzer, “Ha-yehudim Ba-republica Ha-islamit 
Shel Iran: Chronologiya Shel Ke’ev U-metsuka,” Gesher 611 (1987): 38–47. 
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members, 4 of them were non-Muslim religious minorities, which while hardly a 
dominant political force, nevertheless greatly exceeded their proportion in the population. 
This chapter further examines the Jewish debates regarding the shaping of post-
revolutionary Iran. What place did the Jewish leadership seek for Jews in Iran? Did they 
participate in forming the new constitution? What was the role of the communist legacy 
and activism, or, conversely, how did alternative Jewish identities (such as Zionism or 
religionist) propose forming of new communities? This chapter follows the Jewish 
adjustment and reaction to the rapidly unfolding events from the overthrow of the shah’s 
regime, through redefining the Iranian national identity, to the Iran-Iraq war.  
 
The following story encapsulates the social and political transformations Iranian Jews 
had experienced in the twentieth century. In 1940 Dr. Ruhollah Sapir, an Iranian Jewish 
physician, was working in a government hospital in Tehran when he witnessed a life-
changing event. He saw a pregnant Jewish patient treated badly and insulted for her faith; 
as a result, he decided to open his own hospital that would not turn away or discriminate 
against a patient for any reason. The following year Sapir opened a small clinic in a side 
room in Mula Hanina synagogue on Sirus street in the Mahallah (the Jewish quarter). He 
named the hospital after Cyrus the Great, Kurush Kabir, known in the Jewish tradition as 
the ancient Persian monarch who liberated the Jews from Babylonian captivity. The 
hospital, sustained by Sapir family funds and contributions from other Jewish donors, 
treated patients for free. Over the years, the hospital admitted growing numbers of 
patients and subsequently moved to a larger building. Dr. Sapir repeatedly announced to 
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all that this was not exclusively a Jewish hospital, and indeed many Muslim patients 
came there to receive free and good medical treatment.  
In August of the same year, the World War II allies invaded Iran, in part due to 
Iran’s neutrality, and overthrew Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Iranian monarch and founder of 
the last dynasty to rule Iran, was exiled, first to Madagascar and then to South Africa, 
where he died shortly thereafter. His son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was declared the 
new king, or shah, of Iran. One of the immediate consequences of this invasion was the 
opening of Iran’s gates to an influx of migrants and refugees from all over Europe and the 
Soviet Union, many Jews among them. With the assistance of some Jewish relief 
organizations, many of the Jewish refugees were sent to Tehran for treatment and 
temporary settlement in camps.  
Epidemics like Typhus and Cholera spread among the European refugees and Dr. 
Sapir promptly offered his help in hospitalizing and treating them. In an unfortunate turn 
of events, Dr. Sapir contracted Typhus himself and died in 1942. His legacy, though, 
remained very much alive for a long time after his passing. After his death, his hospital 
was run by the Jewish community and preserved Sapir’s legacy, giving good care 
indiscriminately and free of charge. The sign at the entrance to the hospital captures its 
philosophy. In two languages, Hebrew and Persian, the guest is welcomed with the 
biblical verse: “Love your neighbor as yourself” (‘Ve’ahavta le’reacha kamocha’, 
‘hamnaw’at ra misl-i khudat dust bidar’). This legacy proved crucial later, when the 
hospital offered treatment and sanctuary for the revolutionaries in the heat of the events 
in 1978-79 that eventually led to the overthrow of the shah and the ultimate victory of the 
revolution.  
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 Involvement in the revolution such as the role played by this hospital could hardly 
be imagined during the lifetime of Dr. Sapir. Let us now examine the situation in Iran 





Chapter 2: Minorities in the Liberal Age (1941-1953)  
Iran Entering World War II 
In the late summer of 1939 the Second World War erupted in Europe. Nazi Germany 
colluded with the USSR to reorganize Europe, and the two powers signed the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact of non-aggression. Winds of war blew all over the world. The Middle 
East became a war theatre, as well, albeit a peripheral one. Fascist movements allied with 
Nazi Germany appeared across the Middle East and gave a localized voice to European 
fascism. Both fascist and anti-fascist movements gained significant support among the 
publics. The political field was heated, as the propaganda machines of both sides engaged 
in a mini war through myriad publications, newspapers, and pamphlets. A major turning 
point in the war came in June 1941, when Germany violated the non-aggression pact and 
attacked the Soviet Union. This move re-shaped the power balance between the sides 
around the world and in the Middle East. The USSR switched sides and fought with the 
Allies against the Axis powers, which included Germany, Italy, and Japan, and needed to 
open lines of supply of oil, produce, and transportation from Iran. Britain, of course, 
already had a significant presence in the region. Egypt was under heavy British influence, 
and especially in the Suez Canal area, the British Mandate was still governing Palestine, 
Britain had military pacts and presence in Iraq and Jordan, and the British government 
controlled one of the most important assets in the war: the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 
based in Abadan, on the coast of the Persian Gulf.  
 Reza Shah, the monarch of Iran at the time and the founder of the Pahlavi 
dynasty, maintained neutrality in the war from its earliest moments. Germany traded in 
increasing volume with Iran and was involved in many projects involving industry and 
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infrastructure, such as the expansive railroad projects. Losing this contact would have 
hurt Iran’s rapid modernization projects. German consortia conducted many of Reza 
Shah’s most grandiose projects, such as the trans-Iranian railroad. Interestingly, many of 
the German engineers were in fact German-Jews, who sought sanctuary in Iran.31 Reza 
also adhered to the Aryan hypothesis, which—in short—argued that modern Iranians 
were descendants of ancient Indo-European tribes, thus making them genetically Aryans 
and genetically closer to Europeans than to Middle Easterners. Iran’s neutrality was at 
odds with Britain’s plans following the addition of the USSR to the Allied armies. Iran, 
so the new allies decided, had to lean towards the Allies and end the neutrality policy. 
They overthrew Reza Shah, and replaced him with his son, Mohammad Reza. In August 
1941 the British and Soviet armies invaded Iran, occupied it with very little resistance, 
and divided the country into two spheres of influence. The British established their zone 
mainly in the south, controlling the oil industry, and the Soviets were in the north. 
 After almost two decades of the iron-fisted rule of Reza Shah, Iranians 
experienced new freedoms, which, ironically, were contingent upon a military occupation 
                                                
31 Documents show evidence of German Jewish presence in Iran since the early 1930’s. 
Dr. Curt Eric Neumann, The founder of Iran’s biggest pharmaceutical companies as well 
as Reza Shah’s personal physician, was a German Jew. Fariborz L Mokhtari, In the 
Lion’s Shadow  : The Iranian Schindler and His Homeland in the Second World War 
(Stroud, UK: The History Press, 2011), 69 (n.220); Ahmad Mahrad, “Sarnivisht-i 
iraniyan-i yahudi tay-yi jang-i jahani-yi duvvum dar urupa,” in Yahudiyan-i Irani Dar 
Tarikh-i Muasir, ed. Homa Sarshar, vol. 3 (Beverly Hills  Calif.: Center for Iranian 
Jewish Oral History, 1999), 59–108. 
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of the country. This occupation, along with the war, contributed to many other 
developments in Iran at that time as well. Refugees from different war zones came to Iran 
and found there a safe haven and sanctuary for the wartime. Together with the soldiers 
and administrators of the occupation, Iran hosted almost a million recent arrivals, most 
concentrated in the major urban centers. According to existing statistics, in 1941 there 
were almost 14 million Iranians citizens living in the country;32 if another million came 
following the war, then Iran hosted an increase of roughly 7 percent of its population, and 
this percentage would have been much higher  the big cities.  
Historiography of World War II presents a very partial picture regarding Iran. As 
is the case usually, the focus of such historiography is on the Western powers and the 
European theatre. These narratives relegate Iran to a sub-plot with anecdotes about the 
Allied occupation and division, or the Tehran conference, which hosted Churchill, Stalin, 
and Roosevelt as they strengthened their agreement. Admittedly, there are two main 
exceptions to this trend: Iranian literature and Polish war historiography. Two Iranian 
masterpieces, brought this period to the fore: Iraj Pizishkzad’s My Uncle Napoleon 
(1973) and Simin Daneshvar’s Savushun (1969). My Uncle Napoleon humorously 
discusses Iranian anxieties about the British occupation of Tehran. Savushun takes place 
in Iran under the influence of British, Soviet, and American occupation and shows the 
German presence as well. Another major contribution to the conversation about this 
period came with the publication of In the Lion’s Shadow.33 Fariborz Mokhtari tells the 
                                                
32 Julian Bharier, “A Note on the Population of Iran, 1900-1966,” Population Studies 22, 
no. 2 (July 1, 1968): 273–79, doi:10.2307/2173024. 
33 Mokhtari, In the Lion’s Shadow. 
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story of Iranian Abdol Hossein Sardari, who rescued thousands of Jews in Europe and 
received no recognition, unlike Oscar Schindler, the German industrialist who rescued a 
smaller number of Jews and began his operation for much less noble and more dubious 
purposes, but who nevertheless was acknowledged and honored. Mokhtari’s point, 
besides telling a compelling story, was that Sardari could only execute this operation with 
the silent consent of the Iranian government. Also, Mokhtari argues that the inherent 
acceptance or tolerance of Jews in Iran allowed Sardari to openly use his diplomatic 
connections. 
Polish war literature also acknowledges the Iranian episode in the Polish story. 
Memoirs, documents, and scholarly works illuminate different aspects of this history. It is 
noteworthy that historians of Poland and Polish history can tell much more about this 
period in Iran than historians of the Middle East.34 Many of these publications, though, 
                                                
34 While many of the books about Poland and Polish deportees discuss even briefly the 
Iranian episode, books on the Middle East in that period tend to focus on Fascist 
inclinations, or the greater war schemes, and rarely mention these stories. See for 
example: Halik Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second 
World War, First Harvard University Press edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2012); Irena Beaupré-Stankiewicz, Danuta Waszczuk-Kamieniecka, 
and Jadwiga Lewicka-Howells, eds., Isfahan- City of Polish Children (Sussex: 
Association of Former Pupils of Polish Schools, Isfahan and Lebanon, 1989); The Polish 
Deportees of World War II: Recollections of Removal to the Soviet Union and Dispersal 
Throughout the World (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland, 2004); Kenneth K. Koskodan, No 
 32 
remain written in Polish and have never been translated. The disconnect between the 
fields harmed one more than another. 
This chapter examines the tremendous changes following Iran’s involuntary 
entrance into WWII. Iran and its minority communities underwent social and political 
transformations following the deposing of Reza Shah, which in turn led to greater 
integration of minorities into the modern sectors of Iranian society and increased 
participation of minorities in the public sphere. This chapter further examines the role of 
the immigrants and refugees in developing the Iranian middle-class and increasing its 
cosmopolitan nature, and how their identity was shaped and contested by groups inside 
the community and the surrounding society. The geo-political impact of World War II in 
the Middle East made Iran an especially interesting theatre of the war. The role it played 
for the Allies in terms of war infrastructure and supplies, and the making of Iran into a 
sanctuary for hundreds of thousands of refugees, forced Iran into a rapid urbanization 
process that in turn reshaped the political scene for years to come. In addition to the 
refugees and recent migrants, there were about 500 thousand allied soldiers from the 
British, Soviet, and American armed forces. Due to these massive, though largely 
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Changing Demography: Jewish Immigration from Iraq 
Jewish migration to Iran started long before WWII and had different attributes. During 
World War I, many Iraqi Jews who sought to avoid forced conscription into the Ottoman 
army fled the empire, and many of them went to Iran.35 Relations between the Jewish 
communities in the two countries were long established and revolved around Talmudic 
centers of religious training—Iranian rabbis were trained in the seminaries in Baghdad—
as well as commercial ties. Between 1914 and 1918 the first major wave of migrants 
arriving in Iran settled mainly in Abadan because of the proximity to the Iraqi city of 
Basra, which had a large concentration of Jews. There, they established community 
institutions such as a synagogue and a youth club. These institutions facilitated the 
second wave of immigration between 1941 and 1951.36 The Jewish community of Iraq 
was generally affluent, overwhelmingly urban, educated, and very much integrated. They 
excelled in commerce and in the financial sectors, and at its peak they constituted a third 
                                                
35 Nir Shohet, Sipurah Shel Golah  : Perakim Be-Toldot Yahadut Bavel Le-Doroteha 
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36 For more about the cultural ties between Iran and Iraq, with emphasis on minority 
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Nationalisms,” in Iran Facing Others: Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective 
(New York; London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 191–216; more on the Iraqi-Jewish 
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of Baghdad’s population.37 Hence, upon arrival to Iran they practiced their skills and had 
a profound impact. The influence of the Jewish presence in Abadan was so strong that it 
is still visible today. For example, one of the most central city squares in Abadan is 
named Maydan-i Alfi, after the Alfi family’s department store. The Alfi family came to 
Abadan from Basra in the early 1940s and subsequently opened this department store, 
which excelled in the commercial life of the region.  
The second wave of immigrants fled Iraq due to outright persecution and pogroms 
(most famously the Farhud).38 Hayyim’s family was part of this wave and arrived to Iran 
from Iraq: “in 1944 and after the Jewish Agency and other Zionist organizations wanted 
to create a mass movement from Iraq to Israel, and they operated openly. This created 
tensions between the Iraqis and the Jewish community. When the time was right for 
them, especially after 1948 and the establishment of Israel, Iraqi authorities started to 
persecute anyone they suspected was related to the Zionist movement, and many Jews 
had to flee. Where would they go? For many of them there was one option, and that was 
Iran,” says Hayyim, whose life story explains much of the connection between the 
Iranian and Iraqi communities. “We were Iraqis for many generations, maybe four or 
more, but before that, my family came from Iran. My dad had a Persian passport, which 
                                                
37 See especially tables 2,5: Abbas Shiblak, Iraqi Jews: A History of the Mass Exodus 
(London: Saqi, 2005), 33–54. 
38 For a fascinating account of the Farhud and occurrences that followed it, see: Orit 
Bashkin, New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq, 2012, 112–140; Dallalfar, 
“Iraqi Jews in Iran”; David Sitton, Sephardi Communities Today (Jerusalem: Council of 
Sephardi and Oriental Communities, 1985), 42–45. 
 35 
later got us into trouble in Iraq.”39 Interestingly, Hayyim’s father carried a Persian 
[Iranian] passport as a memento of the long Iranian-Iraqi Jewish connection. Hayyim’s 
story tells us about a circular movement between Iran and Iraq that had happened for 
many generations. In the nineteenth century, Iranian Jews migrated to Iraq for many 
reasons, including seminary studies and the pursuit of business opportunities living 
among the most flourishing and dominant Jewish community in the Middle East. 
Passports had just been instituted at that time, and their significance was much less than 
would be the case in later decades. However, the Jews of Iranian descent kept their 
Iranian passports and maintained ties with the communities across the border.  
The wave of immigrants from Iraq was far from homogeneous. Thousands of 
Jews came from Iraq to Iran on their way to Israel/Palestine because of the transition 
camps in Iran operated by the Jewish Agency, the American Joint Jewish Distribution 
Committee (the JDC) and other Jewish relief organizations. Jewish immigrants stayed in 
the transition camps for long periods of time, sometimes up to two years, depending on 
the efficiency of the agencies’ collaboration with the British mandate government in 
Palestine.40. For some Jews, this was the second migration in their lifetimes. Between 
1924 and 1928 Russian Jewish refugees arrived in Iraq, seeking relief from persecution in 
Europe. Some of them fled to Iran after the 1941 pogroms in Baghdad.41 Mania Fanahi, 
for example, was a Russian Jew who migrated to Iraq in the 1920s and then to Iran in the 
                                                
39 Interview with Hayyim, 25 June 2013. Hayyim is in his 70s today, and lives in North 
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40 Documents from JDC Archives show the story of the Iraqi refugees in Iran 
41 Shohet, Sipurah Shel Golah  : Perakim Be-Toldot Yahadut Bavel Le-Doroteha, 141. 
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1940s. In Iran she settled and married an Iranian man. She carried a bottle of poison 
ready to use in case she was forced to return to Iraq.42 In any case, many Iraqi Jews chose 
to stay in Iran with their relatives, mainly in the borderland between Basra and Abadan. 
Another group of the Jewish Iraqi immigrants was made up of Jews who had immigrated 
to Israel, failed to adjust, and returned to Iran.  
One example of this wave is Hayyim’s family: “Many Jews left [Iraq] in 1941, 
but most of them left later, around 1948 as part of an agreement between Israel, Britain, 
and Iraq. They were free to leave but had to leave all their belongings behind,” says 
Hayyim. The Iraqi and Iranian Jewish communities were intertwined for so long that 
many Jews of Iranian descent had lived in Iraq for generations: 
We stayed in Baghdad until 1952, when we first moved to Israel. My father did 
not succeed in business and he said: ‘I have a Persian passport, and I just want to 
get out.’ He renewed his passport in the Iranian embassy in Istanbul; he then left 
for Tehran and felt like it was Baghdad. There was already a large Jewish Iraqi 
community. The first night he went to a hotel, and the next morning he went to 
the bazaar where he met a Jewish Iraqi. He immediately invited my father to stay 
with him in his apartment and after a few months we joined him.43 
  
Daud also arrived with his family in Iran, but came earlier, following the Farhud:  
My family moved to Iran in 1942. Most of them were from Baghdad and some 
were from Basra. We first arrived in Khurramshahr [in the Persian Gulf]. My 
                                                
42 Ibid., 91. 
43 Interview with Hayyim, 25 June 2013. 
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great grandfather (on my mother’s side) arrived in the region in the 1920s when it 
was ruled by Shaykh Khaz'al, and he became friends with him. In Basra we had 
an import/export business so we knew the area well, and then we settled in 
Abadan.44  
 
The circumstances under which the Iraqi immigrants came to Iran left a profound mark 
on their behavior, as individuals and as a community. The representation of Iran as a 
temporary shelter recurred during interviews with the Iraqi migrants to Iran. While they 
appreciated their situations and flourished in Iran, the gravity of the circumstances under 
which they arrived in Iran remained evident in their lives, especially among the first-
generation migrants and the parents’ generation, as Hayyim recounts:  
We never felt this is our country. Because we got hurt in our homeland, Iraq, we 
always lived for the moment. We didn’t invest in property, because we saw that in 
a case of emergency it gets stuck, and may leave us behind or been left behind. 
Many of us lived lavishly [spent money on parties, travels abroad, tuition to the 
best schools], and wired every extra penny to London. The Persians were the 
exact opposite. They didn’t care for London or America. They cared only for Iran 
and kept all their money there.45    
 
                                                
44 Interview with Daud, 25 June 2013. 
45 Interview with Hayyim, 25 June 2013. 
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This observation of Hayyim is essential to understanding the dominant mindset among 
the native Iranian Jews. They viewed Iran as the facilitator of their amassing of wealth. 
Iranian Jews felt deeply for Iran and did not want to leave it, or to invest elsewhere.46  
 
By 1951 the Iraqi Jewish population in Iran comprised 15,000 people and was a 
“minority within a minority.”47 The Iraqi Jews in Iran developed a hybrid identity that 
was a result of preserving their Arab culture and language and taking advantage of skills, 
education, and vocations they brought from Iraq, especially in the commercial realm. 
There were cultural tensions between the native Jewish Iranians and the Iraqi immigrants. 
The Iranian Jews addressed the Iraqis as the “Arabs,”48 and the Iraqis called their Iranian 
coreligionists the “’Ajams,”49 as was the long-held tradition. Despite the labeling of 
Ajams versus Arabs, the distinction was not as clear for individual families. During the 
interview something interesting happened. To verify a few facts Daud called his father. 
As I overheard the conversation I realized they used Arabic and Persian interchangeably, 
pronouncing Arabic words in an Iraqi accent, and the Persian ones in a flawless Persian 
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accent. This conversation exemplifies the cultural hybridism in which they lived and 
created. “We had much more in common with the Arabs in Abadan than with the Persian 
Jews,” says Daud. “We spoke Arabic at home, we shared the same background, the same 
language, and we bonded on that basis. They [the Arabs] too suffered from the 
chauvinistic nationalist Persian approach and were ill-treated.”50 This problematic 
relationship with the Iranian Jewish community prompted the Iraqis to develop more 
separate community institutions in the post-war years.  
 
Safe Havens: WWII Migrants and Refugees in Iran 
A significant and much larger influx of Christian and Jewish migrants arrived in Iran 
between 1941 and 1943. In 1939 the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed a non-
aggression accord, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.51 This agreement marks the 
beginning of WWII in Europe and had tremendous influence on Europe and specifically 
on Poland, and, as we soon will see, the Middle East. One of this agreement’s clauses 
divided Poland into two spheres of influence: a German zone and a Soviet zone. 
Following the invasion of Poland, the Soviets sought to politically transform the local 
population; the first step toward “Sovietization” was the expulsion of “Anti-Soviet 
elements,” such as political opponents, the bourgeoisie, and the economic elite, from the 
                                                
50 Interview with Daud, 25 June 2013. 
51 More on Molotov-Ribbentrop and its effect on the occupation of Poland, see: Halik 
Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, 
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Soviet zone.52 The Russian plan sent nearly 1.7 million people, many of the intellectual 
and wealthy classes, to Siberia. Overall, the Soviets were suspicious of anyone who 
amassed wealth or held significant property. Beyond the criteria of “class enemy,” which 
served as pretext to expel large numbers of the local elites, the Soviets sought to make 
use of the confiscated lands, produce, and animals.53 By 1941 almost half of the Polish 
exiles died in the gulags. In June 1941 Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, in the 
now infamous Operation Barbarossa, ending the 1939 agreement. Following this 
invasion, Stalin joined Britain against the Axis countries and the new alliance began 
planning the invasion of Iran. Together with the British government, the exiled Polish 
cabinet, based in London, engineered a plan to support the British war effort. The plan 
allowed the exiled Polish citizens to leave Siberia and settle in Iran and conscripted the 
healthy and capable men among them into the Polish Anders Army under British 
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command.54 This was the background of a highly significant wave of migration that Iran 
absorbed from 1941 to 1943. Among the Polish refugees were thousands of Jews; notably 
there were more than 700 Jewish orphans who came to be known in Hebrew as “Yaldei 
Tehran” (the children of Tehran).55 One of them was Simon Rosenthal, a Swiss-born 
Jewish orphan who stayed in Iran and became Simon Farzami, a prominent journalist in 
one of Iran’s most important newspapers, Ittila'at, and editor of the Iranian French news 
agency Frans-Pars.56  
 There were other implications to the sudden entrance of Iran to the war. The 
deposing of Reza Shah signaled the dawn of what came to be known as the “Liberal Age” 
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in Iran.57 After almost two decades of iron-fisted rule by Reza Shah (1925-1941), great 
social, cultural, and political transformations were given the space to flourish. The 
presence of over one million recent arrivals, including the Allied troops, migrants, and 
refugees in Iran surely helped the transformation unfold more broadly and quickly.58  
Immediately after signing the resolution, the British and Soviet armies, along 
with the governments and relief organizations, started arranging the exodus of Poles from 
Siberia. Wartime was not easy in Iran. There were food shortages and, once in 1942, 
bread riots erupted in Tehran, but overall the Iranian people generously welcomed the 
refugees, which was noted by all of the relief organizations. The Christian and Jewish 
communities established crucial local relief committees to help their coreligionists settle 
in and adjust. The International Red Cross, the Polish Red Cross, and the American Joint 
Jewish Distribution Committee were authorized by the British and Soviet authorities to 
work with the refugees. Implementation of the resolution was conditional, not allowing 
organizations to only assist the refugees who were co-religionists; that is, the Red Cross 
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could not give assistance only to Christians, and the JDC not only to Jews.59  Refugees 
arrived in large numbers and exceeded most of the early estimates of the Allies, the 
Iranian authorities, and the involved relief organizations. The refugees entered Iran 
through Bandar-i Pahlavi on the Caspian Sea (known today as Bandar-i Anzali). They 
were welcomed there usually by British officials. In her memoirs, Irena Beaupre-
Stankiewicz describes the horrors of the journey from the Soviet territories to Iran, as 
well as their arrival at Bandar-i Pahlavi:  
The port of Pahlavi was an oasis; it was happiness. That same pitiless sun was not 
so terrible, because there was the sea and palm-leaf mats supported on poles, 
which gave us shade. We lived under those mats for two weeks, in quarantine. I 
remember, after leaving the ship, the sympathy on the faces of the British soldiers 
in charge of the baths. For our first steps on Persian soil led us towards the baths. 
We washed away the dirt and lice, the last signs of that inhumane land; our rags 
were taken away and we received clean clothes. The delight of sea bathing, the 
pleasure of eating our fill, peace, rest, the wonderful feeling that there was 
nothing to threaten us: here in Pahlavi we were on the road to restored health, a 
renewal of soul and body, that road, in the end, led me to Isfahan.60  
                                                
59 “Letter to Mr. Pearlstein,” March 8, 1943, 1933/44/712, JDC; There is also 
documentation of the JDC involvement in Lend-Lease policy, as a circular dealing in 
regard to the refugees. For example see: “Letter to George T. Washington Esq.,” June 25, 
1944, 1933/44/712, JDC. 
60 Beaupré-Stankiewicz, Waszczuk-Kamieniecka, and Lewicka-Howells, Isfahan- City 
of Polish Children, 63. 
 44 
 
The Iranians were generally happy to help the refugees, and all noticed their 
hospitality.61 Stanisuawa Jutrzenka- Trzebiatowska, one of the Polish refugees who came 
to Iran from the Soviet Union right before Easter 1942, recounted:  
Our arrival in Tehran was full of surprises because it was Good Friday prior to 
Easter. All kinds of cakes, as well as hard-boiled eggs in great baskets had been 
brought in large quantities to both the enormous barracks and the air-force 
buildings. These had been vacated to us—homeless and hungry people. As we 
made our way through the streets of the town, the Persians threw bunches of 
flowers from balconies into the trucks, accentuating the friendly welcome. It was 
not surprising, therefore, that there were tears of emotions and joy, discreetly 
wiped away, in that pleasant, friendly atmosphere. 62 
The Iranian authorities, however, were not always informed regarding the unfolding 
developments. As early as March 1942, the estimates of the number of refugees needing 
to be resettled seemed inaccurate. In one week (March 27- April 3) more than 40,000 
refugees arrived at Bandar-i Pahlavi.63 This number, for example, was initially the 
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estimated total of all the refugees that were expected to enter Iran. The Jewish 
community in Tehran quickly established a Jewish relief committee that genuinely 
reflected the changing tapestry of the local Jewish community. The members were local 
Iranians like Loghman Nahorai, prominent Iraqi Jews like Sasson A. Kashi, Chaseri 
Bachash, and Salem Moshy, and even included Ashkenazi representation by Mr. and 
Mrs. Hirsch Sand.64  
One of the soldiers/refugees who came to Iran during this time was Roman. 
Roman was born in Poland in 1924, not far from the German border. In 1940, at the age 
of 16, he escaped to the Soviet part of Poland and was promptly arrested for not having 
Soviet citizenship. “I was sent to a Gulag in Siberia because of not having Soviet 
citizenship, and after a year or so, it was not clear what was going to happen next.”65 
Following the announcement on the establishment of Anders Army, Roman decided to 
join the army, as a means of rescue:  
In 1941 I was a year too old to be counted among the orphans [Yaldei Tehran] 
and too young to join the Polish army. I arrived to Tashkent and caught the 
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typhus; I lost weight but made myself look healthier when it was my turn to 
appear in front of the military committee. We had to pass two committees: a 
Polish and a Soviet. Being a Jew did not help me much in the process, and I was 
rejected twice. The third time I got there they told me: ‘Jew, you are lucky. We 
are leaving for Persia tonight.’ When we arrived to the shores of the Caspian Sea 
we saw stores with food products. We gave military equipment in exchange for 
foodstuff and flour. I, for example, found a kilo of margarine and ate it all at once. 
I passed out immediately.66  
A few days later Roman woke up in Dr. Sapir’s hospital in Tehran: “I later learned that 
they first sent me to a military hospital, but after being bathed by the nurses they noticed I 
was a Jew [because of the circumcision] and they transferred me to the Jewish hospital. 
There were many Poles and Jews there.” After recovering, Roman joined the Polish 
Anders Army.67 The Anders Army had about 115,000 soldiers, 4,500 of whom were 
Jews. One of this army’s most notable alumni is Menachem Begin, who would be Israel’s 
Prime Minister. 
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Illustration 1: Polish Refugee. Abolqasem Jala, 1943.68 
In the middle of 1942, more than 100,000 Polish refugees already lived in Iran, 
most in Tehran and Isfahan; 13,000 of these were children, primarily orphans.69 The 
Polish and the British administrators decided to send them to a place with a better climate 
and air quality than Siberia, such as Isfahan, to regain their health. The Christian religious 
establishment provided essential care for the children, and it is possible that Isfahan was 
chosen because of the well-developed network of Presbyterian and Catholic missionaries 
that existed there alongside the thriving Christian Armenian community. In a short time 
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“Polish Isfahan” came into being with more than twenty Polish establishments such as 
schools, Polish scouts, choirs, and churches.70 The children, it seems, thought of Isfahan 
as their home. In her diaries Irena Beaupre-Stankiewicz recollects:  
We left there [school field trip] at six a.m. and already at about 11 o’clock we 
welcomed, with a loud and happy shout the sight of the majestic silhouette of 
Kuh-Sofe. “Oh Isfahan… Oh Isfahan!” We were so happy to come back home. 
For so long Isfahan had been a home to us, that in the end it truly is our home.71  
The vast majority of them left Isfahan in 1945, following the end of the war. 
Given this optimistic view of Isfahan and the sense of security these Polish children had 
at the time it is understandable how difficult it might have been to leave the city only a 
few years later. Again, Irena recounts the heartbreaking event of leaving Isfahan, as it 
was for many of the other children:  
I finally left Isfahan on Monday 23rd July 1945. The last day was not pleasant or 
happy, merely very sad. My nerves let me down completely, and everything else 
as well—I had a fever, headache, and physically and mentally worn out […] in 
front of the branch office they loaded us onto a lorry in record time, there was not 
a moment to say goodbye properly in the confusion; we had out last look at Kuh-
Sofe, at the blue domes, the green trees of Chahar Bagh, and it was over. Isfahan 
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was behind us, a long (when one is young, everything seems long) three year 
period of life rich in experiences and attainments.72 
The British army’s trucks transported the majority of refugees from Bandar-e 
Pahlavi to Tehran. In Tehran they were initially placed in former military camps, which 
now became refugee camps. Being settled in refugee camps did not deter the new 
arrivals. Stanislaw Milewski recalled, “I remember that we were warmly greeted by the 
Persian people with gifts of food, dates, and clothes. We were simply amazed by the sight 
of smiling people and a bustling city full of open shops and traffic.”73 The plan was to 
house them in the outskirts of the city, thus allowing the relief organizations and the 
military commanders better control over the refugees who might morally corrupt the local 
population with their habits and leisure activities that involved, among other things, 
consumption of alcohol and dancing.74 Refugees found ways around these rules, 
however: “To get outside the camp we needed a pass, often however we managed to get 
out through the holes in the fence,” says Stanislaw Milewski.75 Moreover, part of the 
agreement was that the Polish government would maintain only refugees who lived in the 
refugee camp and provide them with housing, food, clothing, and cash allowance.76 Only 
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a short time had passed until the refugees started to leave the camps and moved into the 
cities. After all, following two years in Soviet gulags and a tough journey to Iran, they 
now had better control of their lives.77 It is not hard to imagine what such an influx of 
migrants (in addition to many other foreigners) could do to a city, such as Tehran, which 
at that time was still, to a large extent, underdeveloped. Given their high—almost 
aristocratic—social status prior to the forced exile, the Polish refugees expected certain 
amenities from their new town of residence.  
Contemporary writers accounts reveal the Poles’ development of a distinct 
culture, through community centers, libraries, factories, and places of leisure like 
restaurants, bars, cabarets, and beauty salons. In fact, some of the younger generation 
adamantly looked for a way out of the refugee camps. In a report written following a visit 
to the refugee camp in Dawshan-Tappah, an Iranian Jewish community leader 
vehemently complained about the immorality of some “young women” who became 
waitresses and bar maids, despite coming from respectable families.78 The same sense of 
immorality existed for some time among other Iranian observers; however, shortly 
afterward, the Iranian urban elites began to adopt some of the leisure activities the Polish 
refugees had brought with them.79  
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The new business and cultural endeavors served not only the Polish refugee 
community but also a myriad of soldiers and military personnel. In his memoirs 'Abd al-
Rahim Ja'fari, a prominent Iranian publisher and intellectual, recalled scenes in which 
Polish widows and younger women “go around with” American and British soldiers in 
the areas of cafes and cabarets. He also pointed out the Iranian nationalists’ critical view 
of the moral depravity of these activities.80 In downtown wartime Tehran, in a basement 
that houses a chocolate factory today, was “Polonia”, a bar where Allied service men 
mingled with Polish girls. Not far from there, behind the British embassy, Polish 
prostitutes attracted clients in the alley.81 Cafés, ballets, and theatres surfaced in Tehran 
from the 1920s, and non-Muslim Iranians, mostly Armenians, overwhelmingly 
dominated their development. This urban transformation of Tehran as a city connected to 
the Pahlavi vision of the capital. However, the emergence of cabarets as a phenomenon 
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resulted from the social and cultural transformations following Iran’s involvement in 
WWII.82 
Joel Sayre, a member of the American forces that participated in the Persian Gulf 
Command, wrote about the Polish community in Tehran. According to his description, 
while many Polish men joined the British army and deployed to other theatres of war, the 
women stayed in Tehran and ran businesses and pursued other opportunities, some of 
which helped to develop the cosmopolitan environment that characterized the city by the 
late 1940s. For example, Polish women famously opened a doll factory; others opened 
successful and popular beauty salons that catered mostly to Iranian women.  
In one of these instances, Sayre describes an incident in which an Iranian 
policeman wanted to confiscate a beauty salon owned by four Polish women because of 
the questionable legality of the business and the women’s migration status. One of the 
salon’s Iranian clients helped the women to understand the basis of the claims. The four 
women who ran the parlor took advantage of Muslim Iranian law which allows a man to 
marry up to four women and they all married a young Iranian bachelor and legalized the 
business immediately. The parlor, according to Sayre, grew more prosperous than ever 
before.83 The story exemplifies the cultural fusion or comingling of the period. 
After the WWII era, Iranian intellectuals continued to explore the Polish past of 
the country, or the role played by Iran in the war. In the 1983 film Lost Requiem, 
Khosrow Sinai, an Iranian documentary director traces the legacy of Polish life in Iran 
                                                
82 Ida Meftahi, “Body National in Motion: The Biopoiltics of Dance in the Twentieth-
Century Iran” (University of Toronto, 2013), 12. 
83 Joel Sayre, I Served in the Persian Gulf Command (Isfahan, 1945), 5–6. 
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during that period. He adds to our understand of how the Polish women were viewed at 
the time: “Polish maids were sought by well-to-do Iranian ladies who wanted to learn 
makeup and Western fashions from their servants, who often had better backgrounds and 
education than the employers themselves.”84 This documentary follows the footsteps of 
the refugees around the country; for example, Sinai visits the Campolo district in 
Ahvaz—the name is short for Camp Polonia. The documentary depicts “the destiny of 
Polish people in Iran; how they arrived, how they lived, how they died, how they 
married, and where they left to… And, now, what has remained from them, and what 
they remember from Iran and Iranians. And, then: What they don’t remember, what they 
wanted to forget; what their children know about them, and what they don’t want to 
know!”85 
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Illustration 2: Polish refugees. Abolqasem Jala, 1942. 
By March of 1943 there were approximately 150,000 Polish refugees in Iran, 
and the influx continued.86 The JDC envoy reported some 1,800 Jews among the Poles 
and an unknown number of Jews who were not registered as such on March 8th.87 The 
                                                
86 As both Iranian and JDC documents show, the Polish representative in Russia and the 
Russian forces administering this operation on the Russian side had no clear idea of how 
many refugees and Polish military personnel were still to cross the border to Iran. In 
some instances the crews on the Iranian side had to deal with sudden arrival of thousands 
of refugees a day when they expected none. Karimi and Karimi, “Lahistaniha-yi muhajir 
dar iran,” 12–13. 
87 “Letter to Mr. Pearlstein.” 
 55 
JDC contingency in Iran still expected to transfer some 5,000 Jews recently rescued from 
Nazi occupied Bulgaria and the Balkan states.88 In fact, the Jewish authorities knew very 
little in regard to what to expect. In an internal report they wrote: 
The presence of 1,800 Jewish refugees in Teheran, 75% of whom are certificated 
for Palestine, is in itself not a serious problem. The hundreds of thousands of 
Jewish refugees still in Russia- whether they remain there or eventually are 
evacuated- this is the problem. While there are fairly reliable estimates of the 
number of Polish refugees still in Russia 200,000-300,000 of whom are 
preponderant majority is in southern Asiatic Russia (Turkestan).89 
 
Most of the Jews were in transition to Palestine as part of a three-way 
collaboration between the JDC, the Polish Red Cross, and the British government, which 
issued visas to the Palestine-bound migrants.90 The rest of the refugees, however, 
prepared for a long stay in Iran. The terms of their stay were not entirely clear, and their 
status in their newly imposed homeland was constantly negotiated. Amidst the available 
solutions for the refugees, a growing number of them decided to work toward making 
Iran their permanent country of residence.  
While accurate numbers are hard to obtain, partial reports from all of the 
organizations involved are available. For example, in March 1943 word reached JDC 
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headquarters that out of 500 [Polish] Jews surveyed in Tehran “about 50 of the refugees 
have established themselves and were seeking permission to remain in Persia.”91 This 
data suggests that approximately ten percent of the Polish Jewish refugees may have 
wished to stay in Iran instead of taking advantage of the opportunity to move to Palestine. 
A similar ratio among non-Jews would have meant that 10,000 to 40,000 refugees may 
have sought settlement in Iran.  
In the 2007 documentary My Iranian Paradise, director Katia Forbert Petersen, 
who is the daughter of a Danish engineer and a Polish refugee, goes back to her 
childhood community in Tehran.92 She was born after WWII in Denmark but grew up in 
Tehran in the environment that was created by these refugees. This film visits her 
parents’ friends who married Iranians, settled in Tehran, and never left. These immigrants 
talk about the cultural life they created there and the fact that Iran has been their home 
and their safe place. Petersen herself left Iran in her twenties after the 1979 revolution. 
An AP reporter who also visited survivors of this community tells about a meeting with 
Anna Borkowska, one of the Polish refugees. Especially interesting is the depiction of her 
living room—a cheap piano on which she played Polish songs, a pile of Polish 
magazines, and the photos on display present Ayatullah Khomeini, the Polish Pope John 
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92 Katia’s mother arrived to Tehran in 1942, through Bandar-i Pahlavi and joined 
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Paul II, and portraits of Jesus and Mary. The choice of pictures and images presents the 
range of identities she (and her personal history) contained.93 
One more example of the temporary integration of Polish and other European 
refugees and immigrants comes from Portrait Photographs from Isfahan. This album 
documents the development of studio photography in Isfahan in the twentieth century. 
Among the hundreds of portraits from the city, about two dozen individual and family 
portraits stand out. In those photos we see Polish and Russian immigrants in school, 
scouts, homes, and clubs. The photographer documented Russian prostitutes and captured 
some of the cultural scene that emerged around the immigrants’ presence in Isfahan.94 It 
is compelling to argue that finding the Poles, Russians, and other nationals as subjects of 
photography that took place during wartime in Iran perpetuated their impact on their 
surrounding and renders the place they occupied in the perception of local Iranians, as 
being part of the cities’ changing views. 
In 1945, after the war ended, most of the refugees left Iran. Some returned to 
Poland, while others planned to begin their lives elsewhere, whether in South Africa, 
New Zealand, or Latin American countries. A minority decided to stay in Iran and rebuild 
their lives in the country that rescued them twice: once from the horrors of the Nazis, and 
a second time, from the hardships and horrors of the Soviet Gulags.  
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Conclusions 
While the 20th century is largely perceived as the age in which the minorities in the 
Middle East diminished (especially after WWII), this chapter demonstrates the radical 
difference in the Iranian case.95 Following Iran’s involuntarily involvement in the war 
and the turmoil in other countries in the region, the minority communities changed 
dramatically. They grew and became more diverse than ever before and they saw 
increasing involvement of foreign organizations, such as the JDC and different 
missionary branches. This influx of migrants and refugees changed and facilitated urban 
transformation, especially in Tehran and Isfahan. The presence of military personnel, and 
refugees from different regions (in Europe and the Middle East) influenced the minority 
communities and made long-lasting impacts on them and the rest of Iranian society. 
Europeans were present in Iran in large numbers during the reign of Reza Shah as well, 
as they were involved in the infrastructure projects. In this case, however, they were 
concentrated mostly in remote areas and developed distinctive culture that was visible, as 
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shown by Hamid Naficy, but did not trickle to the big cities, as happened later with the 
refugees and the military personnel. 
This chapter also elaborated on the role Iran played during the war, usually 
characterized as a passive one. While major powers did not always consult the Iranian 
government or the society itself on significant issues—such as allowing a great number 
of refugees in, or directing resources for war efforts, both Iranian officials and common 
people usually were welcoming and understanding of the unique circumstances that 





Chapter 3: Minority Identities and the Iranian Political Sphere 
This chapter examines the political basis and paradigms in which Jews 
participated in the public sphere beginning with the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-
1911 and carrying the analysis on through the Pahalavi period. I examine three main 
political organizations in which Jews participated: The communist Tudeh party, which 
was a political home to Jews as well as other minorities, especially Armenians; the 
National Front, which invited all Iranians to take part in the ongoing discussion on Iran’s 
national interests and national character; and Zionist movements. This chapter examines 
Zionism as a possible radical option for Iranian Jews. Many scholars and writers of 
Jewish-Iranian history, such as Habib Levy, Meir Ezri, Haim Tsadok, and others, have 
attributed Zionism to Iranian Jews before but without dismantling and questioning the 
different interpretations and definitions of Zionism. 
The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 popularized the notion of a public 
political sphere in Iran in many ways. It created a new notion of citizenship, granted the 
minorities elected representation, and released them from the nominal dependency on the 
shah (the Qajars, at the time) to protect their rights and communities. Subsequently, 
minority communities became increasingly politicized. Electing nominees, conducting 
selections and election procedures, submitting petitions, and contributing to the definition 
of Iranian national identity—all came out of the revolution and the accompanying 
political process. As in many other places, in the Middle East and elsewhere (especially 
Europe),96 minorities supported parties, usually with community or radical leftist 
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affiliations that tried to eliminate the role of ethnic or religious identities in articulating 
the national one.  
 The constitutional revolution, the last nail in the Qajar coffin, symbolized the lost 
power of the dynasty and the infiltration of modern political ideas regarding state, 
citizenship, and nationalism. These notions were to varying degree of European origins, 
but also took root in nearby nations, like Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt, for that matter. While 
the revolution empowered Iranian citizens, and for the first time granted representation in 
a parliamentary system, it was still in most ways an undelivered political promise. 
Following this period of opening and experimentation, which was in turn followed by a 
decade of political strife and instability, in 1921-1925 Reza Khan established his dynasty 
with clear ideas about the progress and modernization he wished for his country. He 
removed anything that stood in his way, including political opposition, beginning an iron-
fist rule that lasted nearly twenty years. In 1941, after Reza Shah’s abdication, the 
political sphere experienced new freedoms, including freedoms of organization for the 
communist party, for example, which was deprived of such a right before. The political 
sphere in Iran diversified into a wide array of ideas ranging from fascist ideologies to 
communism. Nazi propaganda, which served as a pretext for the Allied occupation, 
continued to thrive in the margins of the discourse.  
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The Tudeh Party: The Party of Minorities 
Proto-Communist endeavors appeared in Iran at the turn of the twentieth century, but 
they were minor and scattered. Most disappeared during the reign of Reza Shah, when 
governmental suppression left little room for political discourse or activity. Official 
government mechanisms dictated new codes that nurtured state ideals and banned large 
parts of the political spectrum. Of all political groups, the Communist factions probably 
suffered most under this system.  
Reza Shah viewed Communism as a major threat to the monarchy and to the 
social order he tried to instill. Therefore, he forcefully fought any attempt to establish a 
Communist party or organizations sympathetic to Communism. The foreign political 
influences that came with the emerging Cold War were also critically important. He also 
adopted the ‘Aryan Hypothesis’ as official ideology and moved closer to emerging 
Fascist forces in Europe—first and foremost in Nazi Germany.97 The Aryan Hypothesis 
manifested one sort of Iranian nationalism, one that hardly reflected Iran’s highly diverse 
society. As part of his policies, Reza Shah revoked school licenses from the Armenians, 
Azeris, and other linguistic minorities under the pretext of the Iranization of the education 
system, which in effect meant Persianzation. The shah’s notion of a non-inclusive, 
homogeneous Iranian identity was at odds with any potential notions, that might consider 
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Iran’s many ethnic and religious minorities integral parts of the nation. Historian David 
Yaghoubian analyzes the discourse from within the Armenian Iranian community. 
Yaghoubian exposes the contradictions of Zohrab Saginian, the Armenian representative 
to the Majlis (the Iranian parliament):  
It was paradoxical that Zohrab was himself an Iranian nationalist. He considered 
himself an Armenian-Iranian, and was beholden and loyal to the Iranian nation. 
He was supportive of most of Reza Shah’s secularizing reforms as well as his 
policies to modernize and strengthen Iran… For Zohrab, the nation would only be 
cohesive when the state recognize and celebrate the contributions and loyalty of 
its diverse population.98   
 
Essentially Zorhab’s version of nationalism celebrated the multi-ethnicity of Iran and 
viewed it as a strength rather than as a weakness, as the shah’s nationalism implied. 
However, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s ascendance to the throne in 1941 radically 
changed the political situation. The political vacuum created by the elder Shah’s 
departure, combined with the chaos of wartime, and the lack of effective foreign 
imposition of a singular political ideology, opened the political spectrum to many, and as 
a result, a wide spectrum of political parties started to appear. Hundreds of new 
newspapers, political journals, and pamphlets emerged, as well, heralding the beginning 
of the ‘Liberal Age.’ This period saw the beginning of one of the most influential parties 
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in Iranian modern history, the Communist Tudeh Party, which translates as “the party of 
the masses.” 
The Soviets in the north and the British in the south occupied the country and 
divided into two spheres of influence. As time passed, the Nazi and Fascist threats 
became more urgent, and based on the nominally simple division of liberal versus 
Fascist, a new political sphere emerged in Iran. These parties also began to reflect the 
ethnic and religious diversity of the Iranian population. The Tudeh Party appealed to the 
anti-Fascist forces in Iran. The local intelligentsia and workers’ unions spearheaded the 
movement, and indeed many of the minority groups found a political home in the Tudeh 
Party for years to come. In a short time, Jews and Armenians assumed prominent roles in 
the party. As historian Ervand Abrahamian mentions, minorities’ massive engagement 
and the party’s even wider popularity among minorities gained the party the reputation of 
being the party of Armenians, Jews, and Caucasian émigrés.99 As was the case in many 
other countries, minorities found a way to become involved in the nation’s political and 
social life in communist parties, which at least nominally, adhered to universalist 
ideologies.  
One such moment of involvement occurred in 1946 when oil workers in the 
Abadan refineries called the first large-scale strike with the active support of the Tudeh 
party. British officials quickly represented the strike as a “Jewish-communist plot to 
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sabotage the AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company).”100 This response illustrates the extent 
of Jewish (or rather minorities’) involvement in the party’s affairs. The two comments 
above show an interesting nature of the criticism against the Tudeh; from within Iran and 
from outside. In order to discredit the party they focused on a visible element that was 
also understood to be controversial, namely the prominent Jewish presence.  
The Tudeh Party was one of the oldest political organization with which Jews 
sympathized and which they actively supported. Iranian Jewish involvement in leftist 
parties dates back to the pre-WWII era, when a group of Iranian Jews formed an anti-
Fascist front. The Tudeh party vocally opposed Fascism and for years published articles 
and editorials denouncing Fascist inclinations of nationalist groups in Iranian society, 
openly criticizing the prevailing anti-Semitic climate in Iran.101 The Tudeh party’s 
enduring defense of the Jewish community and its message of equality to all, regardless 
of ethnic or religious identity or social-economic status, attracted many young Jews from 
the Iranian middle and lower-middle classes.102 Iraj Farhoumand, a prominent Jewish 
Tudeh activist, explained that high Jewish participation in the party was connected to 
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developments in Europe, Iran’s proximity to Russia, and the party’s inclusiveness.103 He 
mentioned the vast Jewish participation in the 1940s and 1950s, and even tells of Jews 
who were members of the party’s central committee.104 In those decades many Jews 
became committed communists for many reasons, not merely because of a strong 
investment in communist ideology. The specific Iranian context is discussed below, but 
other global trends played a role as well. First, a generational effect, not exclusively 
Jewish or minority-related, was a global phenomenon and directly connected to World 
War II. Tony Judt explains that the image of the victorious Red Army in the war and the 
brave resistance put up by communist parties seduced and convinced this generation to 
support communism.105 Many Jews also felt that the Red Army and Communism saved 
them from the horrors of the Holocaust. Jews in the Middle East knew about the events of 
the Holocaust at that point, and combined with the local social promise of equality and 
creating new secular nationalist societies, the glory of the communist ideology was 
alluring to them. The second reason is more deeply connected to the region, and occurred 
a few decades earlier in Europe among European Jewish youth. Communist activism and 
ideology offered young Jews not only a path to enter the local society as patriots like their 
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Iranian peers, but also the opportunity to rebel against tradition, tight family structure, 
and religion. Sami Mikhail, a renowned Israeli- Iraqi novelist who grew up in Iraq and 
then fled to Iran en-route to Israel, counts the youth rebellion against tradition and 
patriarchal order as a major reason for Jewish Iraqi youth to support communism, or even 
to join the party, but he also cites the adventure and the realization that communism was 
an antidote to fascist and ultra-nationalist tendencies that began to spread in the early 
1940s.106  
Pinhas was born in 1931 to an impoverished lower class family in Hamadan. He 
had eleven siblings, and went to a Jewish school until 6th grade. “I don’t remember if I 
finished 6th grade or left in the middle of it,” says Pinhas. He recollects his first encounter 
with the Tudeh party: 
I left school because we were many children in the house and one income was not 
enough. I had to get out and earn some money. I had a cart from which I sold 
anything I could find and a regular spot on the street. Across from where I was 
standing there was a building with a sign Hizb-i Tudeh, so one day after work I 
walked in. Inside there were many people—young and adults—and there was a 
tennis table. They invited me in, and I played for a while. After I finished they 
invited me to stay for a lecture. I started to go there on a regular basis. To play 
ping-pong and listen to lectures. They talked about equality and basic economy 
and taught us all the Marxist and leftist ideals. Until this day, almost seventy years 
later, I still play ping-pong and I still believe in all these ideals.107 
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The party’s club provided an opportunity for people of all walks of life to socialize and 
become active, in what they deemed as the mission of their generation. Part of the charm 
was the opportunity to get to know some of the most influential intellectuals of Iran at 
that time. Interestingly, another part of the appeal apparently relates to the entertainment 
opportunities offered by playing ping-pong. 
Doctrinally speaking, Tudeh was not a typical communist party. Although secular 
by nature, it applied religious terminology when needed and lacked some of the 
communist’s most recognizable signifiers; the party’s bylaws, for example, never 
mentioned the famed Marxist slogan “workers of the world- unite,”108	  an omission that	  
arguably points at the party’s local national goals, which it prioritized over the grander 
global scheme. Unlike other communist parties, Tudeh appealed to people of all social 
classes. Indeed many industrialists and those who in other countries might have been 
considered bourgeoisie joined the party’s highest ranks. The Tudeh party did not emerge 
out of class struggle, and most of the party’s supporters in the early years were indifferent 
to Marxism, to say the least. As historian of the Iranian left, Sepehr Zabih, remarked:  
Up to the dual crisis of Azerbayjan [sic] and Soviet Union-Iran relations from 
1944 to 1947 it was not, organizationally or ideologically, a true communist party. 
While it generally supported the Soviets the support was given when the Western 
countries (led by the United States and Great Britain) fighting Nazism were 
closely aligned with the Soviet Union and were actively involved in an enormous 
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war effort to enable the Soviet Union to resist the Nazi invasion, crush the 
German war machine, and terminate hostilities in Europe. Thus, supporting Soviet 
policies at that time could not be equated with espousing Marxism-Leninism.109  
Zabih decouples here any kind of support for the Soviet Union during the war years with 
dogmatic identification with Marxist theories. The Iranian left demonstrated independent 
thinking in many other instances and, despite self-identifying as a communist party, paid 
much more attention to local politics, and prioritized Iran’s interest over Soviet 
interest.110 
Habib was born in Tehran in the early 1930s and currently lives in North 
America. He is a former activist who joined the party at the age of 16 and remained an 
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active member for more than three decades. His political activity landed him in the 
Shah’s prison a half-dozen times before he left Iran. He says: “I knew nothing about 
Marx or Marxism when I joined the Tudeh. I joined because this was the only place that 
they did not call me ‘Johud’ (a derogatory name for Jews). I learned Marxism in Qasr 
prison, shortly after I joined the party.” Habib’s story is by no means unique. Many 
minorities joined the party to combat the social exclusion they experienced in their larger 
societies. “We [the Jews] were attracted to Tudeh in order to become more Iranian, and 
the Armenians also had cultural ties to Russia (the Soviet Union) so they already 
recognized the political language,” concludes Habib.111  
David Yaghoubian provides several explanations for the Tudeh appeal among 
Christians and especially Armenian communities. Referring to Ervand Abrahamian’s 
seminal work, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Yaghoubian mentions Tudeh’s 
commitment to reopen Armenian and Assyrian schools after the 1938 decree.112 The 
party also championed other minorities’ rights (such as adding another Assyrian Majlis 
deputy), opposed Reza Shah’s policies, and led the movement to offer full citizenship and 
true equality to ethnic and religious minorities.113  
Possibly, migrants and refugees from the Soviet Union and Nazi-occupied Europe 
were more susceptible to adopting radical leftist and Communist politics as a reaction to 
their experiences of the horrors of the Nazis and Fascists. Moreover, the Soviet Red 
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113 Yaghoubian, Ethnicity, Identity, and the Development of Nationalism in Iran, 202. 
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Army occupied northern Iran; while attending to the refugees, they may have also 
provided ideological training. We do know, in fact, that the Soviets were involved in the 
elections of eight to ten Communist representatives to the Majlis from 1942 to1948.114  
 The opportunities given to minorities, first by the Constitutional Revolution 
(1905-1911), and then with the deposing of Reza Shah (1941), helped them to position 
themselves as leading figures in their communities and beyond. Armenians, thanks to 
their professional training obtained in community institutions, assumed leadership 
positions in the workers’ unions, which became a natural base of support for Tudeh in the 
1940s and 1950s. When the opportunity arose to voice their protest against the prejudiced 
tendencies in Iranian society, minorities came together behind the party’s leadership. 
Being the leader of almost all the unions gave the impression of Armenian over-
representation in the party. Jewish involvement was prevalent in other fields as well. The 
education they received in community schools, such as Alliance Israelite Universelle and 
Ettefaq,115 enabled them to master needed languages, such as Persian, Arabic, French, 
and English, and to write eloquently in them. These language skills were put to use in 
several fields, including international commerce and journalism. Many Jews started 
writing for the Iranian press and, as a result of their high rate of participation in the field 
and their tendencies to support the Tudeh party as part of the anti-Fascist, anti-racist 
                                                
114 The Soviets actively supported and funded candidates to the Majlis and intervened in 
the elections of the Armenian representative as well. See: Ibid., 198; Abrahamian, Iran 
between Two Revolutions, 186. 
115 A detailed discussion about the schools will be brought later on. 
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front, they positioned themselves as practically exclusive in-house journalists of the 
party.     
The importance of minorities in leadership positions was especially apparent in 
the output of the party’s newspaper. The official newspaper, Mardum, published anti-
racist editorials and op-eds and had Jewish writers among the regular staff. Shumuel 
Anvar, a Jewish journalist and Tudeh activist, also established and edited a semi-official 
weekly newspaper, Nissan. Prominent Jewish writers including Ibrahim Faiz-Jav and 
Muhandes Ibrahim Iran-Mehr contributed to both Nissan and Mardum.116 Nissan 
consistently defended minorities’ rights. During periods when Mardum was banned, it 
presented the views and opinions of the party’s leadership. Nissan enjoyed wide exposure 
and was widely distributed.117 Shahbaz also flew the anti-Fascist flag. Established in 
1943 by the prominent intellectual, Zabihullah Safa, Shahbaz printed the work of Jewish 
writers and journalists like Rahim Namvar. He also participated in the Tudeh party and 
succeeded Safa as editor in 1948. By that time the newspaper had gained a reputation of 
voicing leftist nationalist opinions. This newspaper aligned itself with Jibhah-i Azadi 
(The Freedom Front)—a coalition of socialist and nationalist parties and organizations 
led by the Tudeh party. Shahbaz rapidly became one of the most popular newspapers of 
                                                
116 Nissan was not officially connected to the Tudeh party. Its status, as semi-official 
newspaper, stems from Anvar’s proximity to the party’s leadership and his ability to 
communicate their messages efficiently when Mardum was censored. 
117 Jaleh Pirnazar, “Yahudiyan-i Iran, huvviyyat-i milli va ruznamahnigari,” in 
Yahudiyan-i Irani Dar Tarikh-i Mu'asir, ed. Homa Sarshar (Beverly Hills  Calif.: Center 
for Iranian Jewish Oral History; Jewish Publication Society, 2000), 25–26. 
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its time.118 Bani-Adam was another Tudeh newspaper whose readership was primarily in 
the Jewish community, and while it is hard to assess its popularity or influence, it is 
nonetheless worth mentioning.119 
 
Jibhah-i Milli: The Nationalist Option 
All of these newspapers reflected the high involvement of Iranian Jews in the public and 
political spheres in Iran. Comprised of activist and progressive factions, the newspapers 
presented a nationalist ideology that focused on issues such as stabilizing the Iranian 
government, dealing with the British control of Iranian oil and the highly problematic oil 
concession. After the war years, another Jewish journalist joined the thriving community 
of new nationalist newspapers and journals. Mushfiq Hamadani was an educated officer 
in the Iranian army. In the mid-1940s he became the chief editor of the Iranian daily 
newspaper Kayhan, but in 1949 he left the popular newspaper to start his own venture. 
Hamadani established the independent journal Kaviyan, which quickly became the most 
ardent supporter of the newly emerged political coalition Jibhah-i milli (The National 
Front).  
The National Front (established 1947) was a broad coalition of left-leaning parties 
along with right-wing parties and strong religious elements. Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq, a 
veteran of the Iranian political elite, led the secular wing and nationalist cleric Ayatollah 
Kashani headed the religious segments. The party gained prominence following the 1949 
parliamentary elections. It won only a few seats in the Majlis, but even this result 
                                                
118 Ibid., 26–27. 
119 Pirnazar, “Yahudiyan-I Iran, huvviyyat-i milli va ruznamahnigari.” 
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demonstrated the front’s pivotal and undeniable impact on political discourse. Hamadani 
made his journal an avenue through which the National Front could reach a wide 
readership and gain supporters. In 1951 the Iranian Majlis elected Mosaddeq to be prime 
minister and subsequently passed the law nationalizing the Iranian oil industry, including 
its main component the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). When the bill became law, 
the cover of Kaviyan celebrated the law and took some pride in helping win the hearts 
and minds of the people in this achievement of nationalization. Mosaddeq apparently 
celebrated Kaviyan, too. On his famous trip to the United Nations (with some stops in 
Europe and Egypt) Mosaddeq took only three journalists with his delegation, one of 
whom was Mushfiq Hamadani.120 While Kaviyan was the most important media outlet 
for both the National Front and Mosaddeq, it was not the only newspaper in the Jewish 
community that actively supported Mosaddeq. Kaviyan was not bound to the Jewish 
community but a second newspaper, Daniel, was aimed at a Jewish readership. Jewish 
journalist Yaaqub Orayan published and edited Daniel with the express purpose of 
deepening Jewish support for the National Front in the Jewish communities.  
                                                
120 Mushfiq Hamadani, Khatirat-i Nim-i Qarn-i Ruznamahnigari, n.d., 276. 
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 Illustration 3: Iran piruz shod- Kaviyan sar buland ast- Iran 
won and Kaviyan is proud. Kaviyan newspaper front page following the nationalization 
bill in the majlis. 
At the time, the west portrayed the National Front as a fanatical party; as such, the 
international community dismissed or overlooked many of its social programs. Because 
of Mosaddeq’s political partnership with Abu al-Qasim Kashani, who was arguably anti-
Semitic, no one seriously attempted to examine the base of support for Mosaddeq in the 
Jewish community or even the state of the relationship of Mosaddeq’s Iran with Israel in 
his years as premier. Hamadani’s support of Mosaddeq allowed a wider confidence in the 
Jewish community in Mosaddeq and his political enterprise. In 1952, when Iran slid into 
a financial crisis because of the British boycott and sanctions following the 
nationalization of oil production, Iran sold government bonds in order to operate the 
AIOC. The Jewish community’s leadership decided to deploy all the communities’ 
resources in order to facilitate the nationalization. On February 4, 1952 students from 
three Jewish schools in Tehran and one from Shiraz participated in a demonstration in 
Tehran in support of Mosaddeq’s government. In his memoirs Hakham Yedidia Shofet, 
the Chief Rabbi of Iran, provides many details about the Jewish support of Mosaddeq:  
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Jews of Tehran and other cities that supported the nationalization of the oil 
industry and Dr. Mosaddeq’s policy in implementing the national economy plans, 
purchased government bonds. This support was even in the levels of school 
students like Alliance and Koresh that also came to support. Many photos of 
Jewish student demonstrating in support of the government that were taken in 
Bahman and Esfand 1330 (February and March 1952) appeared in the country’s 
newspapers.121 
 
Shofet added that the community institutions decided that every teacher would contribute 
200 Riyals from their salary toward an organized purchase of government bonds. At the 
same time two of the communities’ richest men, Morad Aryeh and Hajji Habib 
Alqaniyan, announced that they would donate 50 million Riyals each toward the 
purchase. “In those days it was dependent upon the people to prevent the country’s 
bankruptcy. For the homeland and maintaining its independence we must act with speed 
and dedication.”122   
                                                
121 Goel Cohen, ed., Bar bal-i khirad: jami'ah-i yahudiyan-i iran va haftad sal rahbari-
yi mazhabi, gam bah gam ba Hakham Yedidiya Shofet Dar Kashan, Tehran, va Los 
Angeles. (Los Angeles, CA: The Educational Foundation of Hacham Yedidia Shofet, 
2010), 372–373. 
122 Ibid., 373. 
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 Illustration 4: Students from 
Alliance school in Tehran walking in support of Mosaddeq’s government and the 
bond purchasing plan (source: Bar bal-i khirad. P.372) 
Between August 14 and August 19, 1953, the CIA and MI6 tried multiple times to 
execute a coup d’état. In those days millions of Iranians took to the streets representing 
the different parties and organizations active in the country with the National Front and 
Tudeh Party front and center. The Jewish quarter was also the site of such events. 
Ardeshir was born in 1944 in the mahallah, the Jewish quarter, in Tehran. Although he 
was only nine years old when the coup took place, he remembers vividly the days before 
August 19: “I remember five or six of our next door neighbors, who were Tudehists, 
working in the mahallah to get the youth involved. Their little brothers went to Alliance 
with me, and it was very exciting.”123  
Hakham Shofet visited Mosaddeq one more time before his ultimate deposing on 
August 19, 1953. Before the successful attempt to overthrow him, the CIA and MI6 
failed once on August 13, 1953. A day later, on August 14, Hakham Shofet gathered a 
delegation of Jewish leaders to come and congratulate Mosaddeq for what later appeared 
                                                
123 Interview with Ardeshir, 17 November 2013. 
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to be his temporary victory. Shofet conveyed the support of his community and wished 
Mosaddeq well. On August 19 the coup forces succeeded in overthrowing Mosaddeq, and 
reinstalled the shah’s regime. In the aftermath of the coup Ardeshir went to his classroom 
in the Alliance school in Tehran and acted in accordance with what he thought was right. 
“We knew that something big happened. My dad was Mosaddeq’s sympathizer, and so I 
went to class and wrote on the blackboard: “U.S. go home!” The teacher was furious at 
me, because the school was supported by American donations. This event left its mark on 
my political consciousness.”124 
This reaction was another instance of the Jewish participation the Iranian public 
and political spheres. Often, Jewish writers portray this period as the dark years before 
the dawn of the “Golden Age,” mostly because of the major role Ayatollah Kashani had 
in the National Front, and due to the fact that Mosaddiq severed diplomatic relations with 
Israel. However, the story of Jewish support of Mosaddiq and other national movements 
was merely another example of the  multiple forms of Jewish integration into the Iranian 
society at this crucial juncture in Iranian history.  
                                                
124 Interview with Ardeshir, 17 November 2013. 
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 Illustration 5: Hakham 
Yedidya Shofet and a group of Jewish community leader in a meeting with Dr. 
Mohammad Mosaddeq. 26 Mordad 1332/ 14 August 1953 (source: Bar bal-i khirad, 
p.365). 
 
Zionist Organizations and Zionism in Iran  
“On the 5th of November [1917], the Jews of Iran were informed of the Balfour 
Declaration by a telegram sent by the Zionists at Petrograd. This telegram was passed on 
to the religious leader of Tehran by ‘Azizallah Tizabgar.”125 Thus begins Habib Levy’s 
description of the first encounter of Iranian Jews with political Zionism in his 
comprehensive history book. Earlier in the book Levy discusses religious Zionism, 
                                                
125 ̣Habib Levy, Comprehensive History of the Jews of Iran  : The Outset of the Diaspora 
(Costa Mesa  CA: Mazda Publishers in association with the Cultural Foundation of Habib 
Levy, 1999), 510. 
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pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and some nineteenth century emigration of Iranian Jews, mostly 
to Safad and Jerusalem.126 Levy describes Hebrew classes that began to be taught in the 
synagogues and associations established to promote Hebrew teaching and a possible 
massive exodus to the Holy Land. While the movement ostensibly aimed to prepare all 
the Jews to move to Palestine and establish their new homeland on their ancestral Holy 
Land, it eventually focused on the Iranian youth and sought to empower them locally, 
rather than relocate them.127 Local political leaders established Zionist organizations of 
many types, such as Ha’khalutz (The Pioneer). As a whole, Iranian Zionism had 
connections with the World Zionist Organization (whenever the budget allowed, an 
Iranian representative travelled to participate in meetings). Meir Ezri, who later became 
the Israeli ambassador to Iran, wrote extensively on his experiences as a Ha’khalutz 
leader in Iran and the great excitement of his fellow Jews towards Zionist activities.128 
Haim Tsadok echoed some of these sentiments in his account, although he emphasized 
the difficulties Zionism encountered in the early years because of the nature of the 
                                                
126 Ibid., 508–509. 
127 It seems like the affiliation to a broader association, and the empowerment that was 
inherent to learning, and being able to organize, already opened more options for Jews to 
negotiate their place in the Iranian Society. Sorts of harassment that in the past had been 
left aside to avoid conflict were taken to the police and authorities when the Zionist 
organization interfered. Ibid., 516–518. 
128 Ezri, Mi va-Khem Mi-Kol ’Amo, 17–51. 
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community’s dispersal throughout the country.129 Amnon Netzer further explained that 
“Iranian Jewish youth is not only Zionist (Hovev tsiyon), but really is a lover of Zion 
(Ohev tsiyon).”130  
While we can understand what stopped Iranian Jews from emigrating en-masse 
before 1948 and the founding of the state of Israel, what then stopped them from doing so 
later? The Iranian regime was lenient toward Israel and even granted it a de-facto 
recognition in 1949. Zionist organizations operated openly in Iran and could have 
arranged certificates to whoever wished for one. So, why, despite what the predominant 
Zionist narrative tells us, did the overwhelming majority of Jews choose to stay in Iran 
even in the heyday of Zionism, post-1948?  Between 1947 and 1951 about 30 thousand 
Iranian Jews immigrated to Israel, which make a little less than a third of that community. 
Even though the Iranian Jewish community was ostensibly hyper-Zionist, only a 
relatively small proportion chose to fulfill the Zionist aspirations.131 A theme that has 
reoccurred in this research is the different interpretations of the term “Zionism” among 
Jews and other Iranians and also the possible hybrid identities in the social-political 
atmosphere of mid-20th century Iran. A young Jew in Tehran could be simultaneously an 
Iranian patriot, an avowed Tudehi, and a wholehearted Zionist. Others could combine any 
other components of identity, be it ethnic, multi-religious, or political. No inherent 
                                                
129 Tsadok, Yahadut Iran bi-tekufat ha-shoshelet ha-Pahlavit  : Yehude Iran ve-Erets 
Yisrael (1935-1978), 30–41. 
130 Amnon Netzer, Yehude Iran Be-Yamenu (Jerusalem: HUJI Press, 1981), 10. 
131 30 thousand Iranian Jews came to Israel in those year and another 17 thousand of 
Iraqi Jews came through Iran at the same time, Ezri, Mi va-Khem Mi-Kol ’Amo, 51. 
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contradiction existed within the different components. Pinhas, who sees himself to this 
day as both a non-Stalinist socialist and a Zionist, explains: “At the same time [that I 
went to the Tudeh activities] I went to Ha’khalutz. The three ideals they instilled were 
Hebrew, hard work, and self-defense. We learned Hebrew with a book titled Yesodot 
(foundations), we worked in the community gardens—mostly behind synagogues—and 
practiced self-defense.”132 Ha’khalutz and Tudeh complemented each other, in a way. In 
the late 1940s and up until 1967 the Iranian left (as did many other movements) viewed 
Zionism as a postcolonial movement, and considered Israel a legitimate partner in the 
nascent “Third World.”  
To understand the unique place Israel and Zionism occupied in the Iranian 
worldview, one should consider Iranians who wrote about Israel. Jalal Al-e Ahmad, a 
prominent Iranian thinker, may best convey the transformation of Israel’s representations 
in the Iranian public sphere. Al-e Ahmad, a one-time member of the Tudeh leadership, 
gained leftist-internationalist credentials with the publication of Gharbzadegi (1962), in 
which he criticized the tendency of broad segments of Iranian society to blindly mimic 
the West.133 Gharbzadegi lamented the inevitable loss of Iranian culture and identity to 
Western models and paradigms. His publication influenced a later generation of Iranian 
revolutionaries such as Ali Shariati and the current supreme leader, Sayyid Ali 
Khamenei. 
                                                
132 Interview with Pinhas, 15 May 2014. 
133 This book appeared in several translations under different titles. Another popular 
translation of the term is: Westoxification. Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis: A Plague 
from the West, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1984). 
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Given Al-e Ahmad’s remarkable place in both the evolution of the Iranian Left 
and the development of contemporary political ideologies, one would not expect that he 
should name Israel as a model society. Yet, Al-e Ahmad, as with many other Iranian 
intellectuals before 1967, claimed that Israel in its essence was a cultural and political 
ally. 
Two years after the publication of Gharbzadegi, Al-e Ahmad and his wife, Simin 
Daneshvar, visited Israel. Al-e Ahmad’s travelogue, Safar bih vilayat-i Israil (Journey to 
the State of Israel, 1964) attests to the profound impression Israel left on him.134 The 
critical thinker wrote about Israel in nothing less than admiring terms. He described in 
detail a visit to Yad Va’Shem, the Holocaust memorial museum and expressed his 
fascination with the “resurrection” of the Jewish people after the horrors of the 
Holocaust. Later, he broadly discussed in positive terms the Kibbutz in Israel and the 
state’s socialist ideology. 
During their visit, Al-e Ahmad and Daneshvar stayed in Kibbutz Ayelet 
Ha’Shahar in Northern Israel. He described the Kibbutz for the Iranian reader as follows: 
“[…] these people in Israel had already laid the foundation for the socialization of the 
means of agricultural production in a part of the world which had been inspired by the 
Russian Social-Democratic movement and not by Stalin.” Thus, Al-e Ahmad associated 
Israel with the “correct” side of communist ideology, as the contemporary rift in the 
Tudeh party also created another communist opposition to Stalin’s legacy. Given Al-e 
Ahmad’s public status, this travelogue certainly impacted Iranian perceptions of Israel.  
                                                
134 The book recently has been published in a new translation, titled: The Israeli 




Illustration 6: A photo of Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Simin Daneshvar’s writing from 
Kibbutz Ayelet Ha’Shahar Guest book. Al-e Ahmad: “Regardless of the 
hospitality, I saw here people I have never expected to meet. Learned people, 
understanding and open-minded. In a sense, they are implementing Plato. 
Honestly speaking, I always identified Israel with the Kibbutz, and now I 
understand why.” Daneshvar: “As I see it the Kibbutz is the answer to the problem 
of all the countries, including our own.” Thanks to the archive of Kibbutz Ayelet 
Ha’Shahar and archivist Noa Herman for help in recovering this image. 
 
Conclusions 
The invasion of the Allied Armies in 1941, the deposing of Reza Shah, and the more or 
less coercive opening of the political and journalistic spheres invited Jews, among others, 
to take an active part in shaping their country’s new identity. Some of their choices 
resulted from ill treatment under the majority group of the society in Iran and signs of 
anti-Semitism, as well as Fascist or even Nazi propaganda. The message of citizenship, 
Iranian identity, and egalitarian society, convinced many Jews to join left wing parties. 
Toward the end of the decade, when the struggle for negotiating a better oil concession 
came to the fore, many Jews gathered behind Mosaddiq and embraced his national 
project.  
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 Throughout this period the Zionist movement took root in Iran, as well. Members 
of this movement worked to bring Jews from Iran to Israel, but others worked to teach 
Hebrew and to strengthen the existing religious sentiment, which could be called a non-
nationalistic form of Zionism.  
Although many of the political leaders of the Iranian Jewish communities 
sympathized with the Zionist cause, most Iranian Jews remained indifferent to it. In fact, 
many joined leftist movements in Iran and eventually assumed leadership positions in 
them, demonstrating that their political allegiances belonged first and foremost to Iran. 
Naturally, this situation caused major frustration in Israel, a state whose existence was, 
and still is, premised on the notion that the destinies of world Jewries and the state of 
Israel were inexorably intertwined. 
The predominant Iranian Jewish interpretation of Zionism differed from the 
political Zionism espoused by the Israeli establishment at that time. The former did not 
necessitate the existence of a Jewish state but rather reflected a religious sentiment and an 
emotional-cum-spiritual attachment to Zion, the biblical name of Jerusalem. This division 
was not unique to Iranian Jewry. Rather, it was common among Jews across the Middle 
East. It, however, remained relevant only to Iranians, as the other communities for the 
most part ceased to exist post 1948-1956, because of the political fallout resulting from 
the early Arab-Israeli wars. While many Iranian Jews had relatives in Israel and had 
visited Israel, Israel as a nation was not part of their Jewish identity, and they did not see 
themselves leaving their beloved homeland for any other country–including Israel. They 
did maintain the same spiritual relationship to Israel and Jerusalem that potentially 
expands the definition of Zionism. Overwhelmingly, they did not share the political 
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interpretation of Zionism with the Zionist movement and Israel and did not tie any 






Chapter 4: Jewish Education for the Benefit of the Nation 
 
In 1961, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi wrote of his father: 
Reza Shah did more for Persian education than to construct buildings, train 
teachers, and send people abroad for study. He transformed the whole spirit and 
philosophy of our educational system. As he saw it, education must first of all 
serve to create the patriotic devotion […] He understood that the country’s 
genuine Westernization and modernization required much more than factories and 
paved streets; of far greater importance were changes in the basic Persian culture 
and psychology […] He was energetically reshaping our thinking and action to 
meet the challenge of the present and the future.135  
This text reveals the central place education occupied in the Pahlavi nation-building 
project. Mohammad Reza Shah, just like his father before him, realized that the human 
components of the nation’s infrastructure are as important as the material and industrial 
ones. However, while Reza Shah pursued a unified curriculum with Persian instruction 
only, Mohammad Reza allowed communal systems to thrive; private schools could 
operate freely as long as they met a required standard. This chapter argues that Jewish 
educational systems were indispensable, both for the Jewish social mobility, and for the 
                                                
135 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission for My Country (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1961); David Menashri has written the most comprehensive history of education in Iran 
to date. His study lays out the philosophy and evolution of the school system in Iran. 
David Menashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1992), 123. 
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success of Mohammad Reza Shah’s national projects, such as the rapid modernization 
project, known as the White Revolution (Inqilab-i sifid).136 This chapter focuses on the 
educational institutions because of the pivotal role education played in Iran in this period 
and the significant place it held in the eyes of the Jewish community. Jewish schools 
shaped the identity of the community and later helped to shape the ways in which non-
Jews viewed the community. It also undeniably graduated the leadership of the next 
generation of Jewish Iranians and instilled the ideas which they, the graduates, carried on 
into the next phase in the revolution, and promptly thereafter. This chapter explains how 
the functioning of these schools resulted from the transformations discussed in the 
previous chapters, and at the same time was pivotal in shaping the generation that came 
of age in the decade leading up to the revolution. 
 By the mid-twentieth century several educational networks operated in Iran, each 
with a specific target crowd or mission. The most prominent among them were Alliance 
Israelite Universelle, ORT (Obshestvo Remeslenofo zemledelcheskofo Truda, in Russian; 
The Society for Trades and Agricultural Labor), Ha’khalutz (The Pioneer), Otsar 
Ha’torah (The Treasure of the Torah), and Ettefaq (Agreement, in Arabic).  
These schools exemplify the diversity of experience that was offered to Iranian Jews. Let 
us now explore different backgrounds and missions of these institutions, in order  to 
understand how they became so important. 
                                                
136 The White Revolution of Iran, on which the shah embarked in 1963. The core of this 
program was to turn Iran into a global military and economy power. Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, The White Revolution (Teheran: Kayhan Press, 1967). 
 89 
Alliance Israelite Universelle (AIU) in Iran: “Correction” of Jews in the Orient 
Since 1860 
If you believe that a great number of your coreligionists, overcome by twenty 
centuries of misery, of insults and prohibitions, can find again their dignity as 
men, win the dignity of citizens; if you believe that one should moralize those 
who have been corrupted, and not condemn them, enlighten those who have been 
blinded, and not abandon them, raise those who have been exhausted, and not rest 
with pitying them… if you believe in all these things, Jews of all the world, come 
hear our appeal.137 
This appeal within the Alliance charter reveals the stated moral grounds of enlightened 
civilization on which this newly established organization claimed to operate. In fact, 
although AIU would eventually become the biggest network of Jewish institutions in the 
Middle East the context for the emergence of AIU is the European Enlightenment. 
During this period the emancipation movement ended practices of legal discrimination 
against European Jews and now they wanted to pass this legacy onto their Middle Eastern 
brethren. AIU was established in France, which is not surprising given that French Jews 
accomplished their emancipation before their coreligionists elsewhere in Europe, thanks 
to the French Revolution. However, soon after achieving their civil rights, French Jews 
were occupied not so much with their European brethren, but rather with their North 
African ones.  
                                                
137 “Appel a tous les israelites” brought in: Aron Rodrigue, French Jews, Turkish Jews: 
The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860-
1925, The Modern Jewish Experience (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), xi. 
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One of the first major encounters between French and Algerian Jews took place 
promptly after the French conquest of Algeria in 1830. The Jewish elite in France, 
composed of bankers, intellectuals, and notables, deemed education the main means for 
regenerating Jews everywhere and creating a new better Jew, a “useful” one.138 Soon 
after the conquest, French Jewish leadership tried to reach out to Algerian Jews, but the 
French government was not interested in assisting. In 1842 things began to change when 
two Jewish politicians proposed a comprehensive report on Algerian Jews. In a nutshell 
this report detailed how reforming Jews in Muslim countries might make them 
intermediaries between the metropolis and the indigenous Arab populations.139 
Establishing AIU schools seemed like the first necessary (and efficient) step to correct 
their “backwardness.”140 By 1914 AIU counted 183 institutions with 43,700 students 
attending them from Morocco to Iran. The teaching language in most of AIU schools was 
French and it celebrated French culture; in some cases, however, Alliance schools had to 
adapt to the local regulations and needs of the communities. Another significant attribute 
of AIU is that, as mentioned above, it aimed to create what it described as “a new useful 
                                                
138 Ibid., 7–8. 
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140 Rodrigue raises the “Jewish Eastern Question” that started to appear around the mid 
nineteenth century. The continuous exposure of Europeans to North Africa and the 
Muslim Mediterranean caused the European Jews embarrassment because they feared 
identification by association with the Middle Eastern Jews. This anxiety prompted the 
extensive operation of AIU. Aron Rodrigue, Jews and Muslims: Images of Sephardi and 
Eastern Jewries in Modern Times (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 8–10. 
 91 
Jew,” one that would be enlightened, educated, productive, and European by virtue of 
education if not by origin. As such, AIU was at odds with the Zionist movement, because 
AIU aimed to integrate the Jews into their local societies, while Zionism necessitated 
migration to Israel/Palestine and establishment of an independent society there. While 
there were Alliance schools in Ottoman Palestine, the curriculum of the organization left 
no space for Zionism.141 
In 1898 Alliance Israelite Universelle opened its first schools in Iran. The first 
institutions were separate primary schools for boys and girls, both in Tehran. By 1930 
there were 16 schools in the major cities with significant Jewish population.142 At first the 
teaching language was French, just as in most of the other AIU schools across the region, 
but in 1933-1934 Reza Shah issued a decree of Iranianization of the schooling system. 
From that year French ceased to be the principle language and Persian became the main 
teaching language for the first time. Reza Shah’s decree also nearly eliminated Judaic 
studies. Avraham Cohen, the historian of Jewish education in Iran, asserts that following 
this transformation AIU became more relevant to the young Jews’ life in the present, and 
                                                
141 Avraham Cohen, “Tmurot Mahutiyot Ba’hinikh Ha’yehudi Be’paras,” in Yehudei 
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to their future as “Persian citizens,” with more emphasis on languages and humanities 
that relate to their life in Iran.143 
 
ORT: A New Jew is a Laboring Jew 
By redefining their core mission, Alliance Israelite Universelle fulfilled a pivotal role in 
the socialization process of Jewish Iranians. But Alliance was not alone in the field of 
Jewish education in Iran in the twentieth century. 
Unlike Alliance, which envisioned creating a new enlightened Jew, well versed in 
French and intellectually belonging to the European circles, ORT taught Jews useful 
trades and crafts so they could contribute to the awakening industry and agriculture in 
Russia.144 ORT was established in 1880 in Tsarist Russia; within a few years it became a 
famous establishment among Russian Jews and opened branches throughout Russia and 
among other Eastern-European Ashkenazi communities. In 1922 ORT began 
collaboration with the JDC that made it financially stable and turned it from a relatively 
concentrated network into a global operation.145 ORT tried to follow the footsteps of 
Alliance in many ways and in some ways collaborated with AIU schools to complement 
teaching professions that Alliance teachers could not offer. That was the background for a 
combined operation in 1942, after the Allies occupied North Africa. ORT and Alliance 
                                                
143 Cohen, “Tmurot Mahutiyot Ba’hinikh Ha’yehudi Be’paras,” 74. 
144 Leon. Shapiro, The History of ORT  : A Jewish Movement for Social Change (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1980), 1–5. 
145 Ibid., 216–223. 
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offered dual programs that eventually cemented ORT status as one more option for 
Jewish professional education in the Middle East and North Africa.146  
 By the early 1940s ORT had independent schools in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, 
and many other Muslim countries, and in 1950 the first ORT school opened in Tehran. In 
the beginning many of the students were Iraqi and Kurdish Jews awaiting their 
immigration to Israel. By 1951 new ORT schools in Isfahan and Shiraz attended to over 
1,000 students. Just like Alliance, ORT preached for radical social changes in the life of 
the Iranian Jews. ORT schools taught skills that enabled employment not only in the 
Jewish community, but rather the general Iranian community.  
 
Otsar Ha’Torah: The Orthodox Jewish Alternative 
Otsar Ha’Torah was another foreign network of schools that first appeared in Iran in 
1947. While Alliance and ORT were indifferent to the Jewish religion, to say the least, 
Otsar Ha’Torah appealed to traditional communities among the Iranians, those that 
previously sent their kids to the Maktabkhanih (in Persian: school. Frequently used with 
religious school connotations). The Jewish philanthropist Itzhak Shalom established 
Otsar Ha’Torah in New York as an Orthodox religious anti-Zionist organization.147 After 
WWII Shalom and the JDC decided to introduce Otsar Ha’Torah in Iran to address the 
needs of the Jewish Ashkenazi refugees in Iran. They appointed Rabbi Meir Levy the 
                                                
146 Ibid., 304–305. 
147 Many Ultra-Orthodox Jews opposed Zionism as they considered the exile a divine 
punishment, and only a clear sign from God (the coming of the Messiah) can restore the 
Jewish sovereignty in the Holy Land. Zionism, hence, was categorized as heresy.   
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director of Otsar Ha’Torah in Iran. Rabbi Levy belonged to Agudat Israel, an Ultra-
Orthodox party, and he was anti-Zionist and very much anti-Israel.  
Otsar Ha’Torah operated in Iran in several capacities and in relation to other 
educational organizations. In some communities, which demanded Jewish religious 
education Alliance and ORT outsourced religious studies to Otsar Ha’Torah. Among the 
more religious communities Otsar Ha’Torah opened independent schools.148  Otsar 
Ha’Torah became a somewhat controversial institution, for some communities in Iran 
saw it as foreign to the Jewish-Iranian nature, and others complained about the low level 
of teachings in the organization’s schools. While it had almost as many students as 
Alliance schools did by the 1960s, its constituents came mostly from the lower classes of 
the Jewish population, because Otsar Ha’Torah schools were found in impoverished 
neighborhoods and far from the urban centers, and most students did not have to pay 
tuition (an attractive feature to those who wished to get Jewish education and could not 
afford paying for community and private schools). Nevertheless, it still impacted the 
Jewish Iranian discourse about Jewish identity and Jewish life in Iran.  
 
Ettefaq: Iraqi-British Education in Tehran 
One of the most fascinating educational endeavors in Iran was the Ettefaq School. It was 
established in 1948 by Mayer Abdallah Basson, a wealthy Baghdadi Jew who had come 
to Iran only a few years earlier, as part of the migration wave of the 1940s discussed in 
                                                
148 Cohen, “Tmurot Mahutiyot Ba’hinikh Ha’yehudi Be’paras,” 75. 
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chapter 2.149 The Iraqi community took pride in the education system left behind in Iraq. 
It had been fully coordinated with the British Ministry of Education curriculum and 
exams, and therefore allowed its graduates to pursue academic studies in England. When 
these Jews arrived in Iran they felt that the Jewish institutions that existed could not meet 
their expectations, and Mayer Abdallah decided to endow this school and attached 
complex. In addition to the school, the complex included a synagogue that adhered to the 
Iraqi Jewish tradition, and an event hall.150 It housed the Iraqi Youth Club and addressed 
all the needs of the Iraqi-Jewish community in Tehran.  
 Interestingly, after completion of the complex the school’s board erected a 
dedication wall near the eastern entrance of the synagogue that reflects the school’s 
mission. The top of the wall features Mayer Abdallah Basson’s carved portrait with a 
short biography in the bottom in Arabic and some Persian mixed into the text. In the 
middle is carved the endowment charter in Hebrew. 
 “Mazkeret Netsah,” for eternal memory, reads the title of the charter. "This land 
with all its buildings and equipment were bought with the blessing of the great 
philanthropist Mayer Abda[allah] Basson and handed it to the Iraqi Israeli Community in 
Iran with the following conditions.” The text of the charter then spells out some of the 
entailed conditions. For example, the third paragraph emphasizes the importance of the 
                                                
149 In fact, Basson first arrived in Iran in the 1930s as part of his job as contractor. 
However, Tehran became his permanent residency only in the 1940s.   
150 Opening an event hall as part of the school’s complex generated revenues that helped 
the school access cutting edge technology and remain independent of the community 
budgets.  
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school’s financial independence: “School's expenses will be taken from tuition or 
revenues from different usage (ventures) of these buildings.” This article secures the 
future of the school for as long as there is a community to use it. The fifth article 
highlights the school’s unique academic program: “The school's curriculum will include 
Jewish religious studies and Hebrew, along with Persian and Arabic languages and other 
living languages, in addition of necessary sciences.” In fact, Ettefaq’s students studied 
with British textbooks and many of the teachers came from England. English was the 
principal language, but literature and philosophy were taught in Arabic and other classes, 
like economy and science were taught in Persian. The next article reads: “It is permissible 
to build new buildings on school property. All revenues will belong to the school, and so 
are revenues from other events and weddings that will be conducted in the school.” When 
the school was built in 1947-1948 it had only 10 classrooms that served the needs of the 
Iraqi community at the time. Basson did not want to limit expansion potential and made it 
possible to add more space as the need arose, as indeed happened in the 1960s. The final 
comment clarifies the superior status of Arabic over any other language when the 
administration needed to turn to the charter for guidance it was to be determined by this 
article: “The Arabic version of the charter will be superior in the event that any of these 
conditions need clarification.” Even though Ettefaq was a place of many languages it was 
still an institution of a proud Iraqi community. At the end of the plaque all the members 
of the Iraqi Jewish committee in Iran signed as witnesses.  
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 Illustration 7: Ettefaq’s dedication 
wall (source: 7dorim.com)  
      There were other schools in Iran in addition to these four organizations. Many 
of them excelled in training students, but these were regular schools operated by the 
Jewish establishment, that offered not much more than other Iranian schools. AIU, ORT, 
Otsar Ha’Torah, and Ettefaq offered a different educational experience. They were built 
nearby Jewish neighborhoods, and rather than complying with requests from the 
community (for example, of certain Jewish education or more teachings of Hebrew) 
aspired to transform the community. The only parallel is probably the elite missionary 




From Jewish Schools to Iranian Elite Schools 
The Jewish educational institutions were established for the benefit of the Jewish 
population in Iran by international Jewish organizations. Each organization had a 
different view of its respective mission. They did not share views regarding Israel and 
Zionism and were anywhere on the spectrum from supportive to indifferent to opponent. 
One thing we know for sure is that their academic standards were high and they carefully 
kept it this way. All these institutions wanted Jews to transform themselves and to elevate 
their status to a level much higher than the one they had in the late 1940s. There was a 
clear policy of how this operation had to be executed, which was articulated by the JDC 
and the organizations’ leaderships. Schools had to be in the geographical area where 
needed. That is, if the target crowd was, for example, the poor Jews in the Mahallah, then 
the school had to be built there.151 The facility should be of the highest quality possible, 
with no compromise on the size, cleanliness, and hygiene.  
 The JDC provided financial and professional support to many of these institutions 
and decided on many of the necessary amenities. One of the unique features in the Jewish 
schools was an infirmary with a permanent nurse. These medical resources regularly 
performed medical check-ups for the students.152 Raising awareness of hygiene and 
                                                
151 Stanely Abramowitch, “Letter from Stanely Abramowitch to A.J.D.C Paris, Re: 
A.I.U Ghetto School,” March 23, 1952, g 45-54/4/85/8/ OM.16, JDC. 
152 In this we can see the comprehensive check ups that were conducted in 1954, 
however earlier and later documents suggest a major involvement of health professionals 
in the Jewish schools. William M. Schmidt, “Letter from Dr. William M. Schmidt to Dr. 
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diseases helped combat infant mortality and other common chronic situations among the 
Mahallah Jews. The emphasis given to such topics in the Jewish institutions gained them 
immediate positive attention from the Iranian government. 
 Students attending those schools also had the opportunity to learn languages at the 
highest levels. In Alliance French teachers taught French, in Ettefaq British teachers 
taught English, and so was the case with ORT. Many of Ostar Ha’Torah’s teachers came 
from the United States. The schools’ cultures advanced the international flavor of the 
curriculums.  
 Fruits of this collaborative effort came in a short time for the Jewish community. 
School graduates passed the university entrance exams, ranking among the highest in the 
nation, and school reports suggest that government inspectors from the Ministry of 
Education followed these schools closely. Pursuing academic studies was not the highest 
priority of all these schools, however. For example, Otsar Ha’Torah prepared students to 
continue their religious and rabbinical studies in Yeshiva theological seminaries mostly 
in Tehran.153 ORT prioritized professional training and diplomas that would enable them 
to take their places in the Iranian economy as soon as possible. In the ORT girls’ school 
the students could learn several useful trades as in an English-Persian secretarial course 
that made them highly skilled for well-paying jobs that would ultimately help them climb 
the social ladder. Boys in ORT schools trained in technological fields like electricity and 
basic engineering. The historic turn of events played well into the role ORT designed for 
                                                                                                                                            
Herman, Re: School Health Service Med. File #43B7,” December 30, 1954, G 45-
54/4/85/10/ OM.25, JDC. 
153 “Jewish Schools and Education,” 1965, AR 65/74-0110, JDC. 
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them. By the mid-1960s oil revenues were the basis of the Iranian economy and there was 
ever-increasing need for more technicians and engineers. Instantaneously, ORT graduates 
became part of the technical elite and they easily found good wages both in private and 
state enterprises.154 
 
 Illustration 8: ORT Hairdresser diploma school, 
Tehran 1959. (source: JDC Archive) 
 Alliance schools continued to excel, graduating highly successful students, but 
then faced another problem. As their graduates moved to upscale neighborhoods, the 
target crowd changed. Tehran’s Mahallah neighborhood, which housed over 20 thousand 
Jews in the late 1940s, had only 2,500 by the late 1960s. The area of the Mahallah at that 
                                                
154 Shapiro, The History of ORT  : A Jewish Movement for Social Change, 310. 
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time had more Muslim residents than Jews.155 There were two options for the AIU in the 
Mahallah: to close down this establishment and reopen a school in one of the northern 
neighborhoods of Tehran with more Jews, 156 or to continue operating the school with no 
dramatic changes, attending to the new residents of the area. AIU and JDC chose the 
latter. The new community of Muslims in the Mahallah also showed great interest in the 
Jewish school. It appears that they viewed AIU as a vehicle of social mobility in Iran. 
Turning to the greater community was apparently the obvious choice. While AIU 
in the Mahallah faced this challenge out of necessity, Ettefaq School made a conscious 
choice to become an Iranian elite institution. As mentioned above, Ettefaq addressed the 
needs of the Iraqi community in Iran, but its high-end facility and academic program 
attracted many of the Iranian Jews as well. Like many other Jewish schools, Ettefaq had a 
tuition waiver program for people experiencing economic strain. By offering the same 
program to Iranian Jews they expanded their potential market.  
In 1967 the Ettefaq board turned to Barukh Berukhim, a professor at Tehran 
University, and offered him the position of school principle.157 Berukhim agreed but he 
had a vision in which Ettefaq would transform from a community school to a major 
educational institution. One of his terms was to double the student population and accept 
more non-Jewish students. Ettefaq was already undergoing expansion construction and 
                                                
155 The forecast according to this report is that by the end of 1969 there will be no more 
than 1,700 Jews in the Mahallah. “Social Welfare,” 1969, 25, AR 65/74-0110, JDC. 
156 Edna Weber, “JDC Program in Iran,” 1974, AR 65/74-0107, JDC. 
157 As far as I could find Berukhim was the first non-Iraqi to man this position. 
“Interview with Barukh Berukhim,” September 25, 1998, CIJOH. 
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indeed by the end of the decade it had almost 2,000 students, with many more on waiting 
lists. Berukhim brought as many university colleagues as he could to teach at Ettefaq and 
to prepare students for the university entrance exams. In very little time, Ettefaq ranked 
first among the schools in Iran.  
 
Approaches to Hebrew, Judaism, and Zionism 
As more and more non-Jewish students started to participate in these schools, the attitude 
toward traditional Jewish education and approaches to Zionism became secondary. 
Almost all the Jewish schools in Iran taught Hebrew and Jewish religious studies as 
optional courses. In some years, especially in the 1960s, due to pressure either from the 
community or the Jewish Agency, Hebrew and Judaism studies intensified. AIU and 
ORT had no interest in training their teachers to teach those subjects and had Otsar 
Ha’Torah teachers to teach them in their schools. Given Otsar Ha’Torah’s position on 
Zionism its presence in the schools provoked disagreements and mixed reactions. The 
Jewish Agency (JA) blamed the JDC for undermining JA activities, and for being anti-
Zionist because “JDC does its best to foster dependency and poverty in Iran.”158 In some 
of the schools the Zionist organization “Ha’Khalutz” received permission to operate 
after-school programs.159 There is no document showing whether this program was part 
                                                
158 It should be noted that in the late 1940s the JA accused the JDC for the exact same 
anti-Zionism by investing too much in their life in Iran, instead of convincing them to 
move to Israel. Merrill A. Rosenberg, “Relation between JDC & JA in Iran,” October 16, 
1974, AR 65/74-0107, JDC. 
159 Cohen, “Tmurot Mahutiyot Ba’hinukh Ha’yehudi Be’paras,” 75. 
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of a compromise between the JA, JDC, and the Jewish Iranian institutions. Usually there 
were tensions and allegations by Jewish Agency emissaries or Israeli officials, directed at 
the leaders of the Jewish community in Iran that they did not actively support Israel and 
Zionism, or encourage Zionist activity. One JDC report asserts that “Jewish leaders pay 
lip service” to the Zionist cause but do nothing to bring the assimilation to a halt, and that 
“thousands of years of living in a Muslim society have taken a toll.” Another report 
claims: “Emigration to Israel has been desultory for a number of year and is offset by the 
number of births. There is little impetus to leave, since the Jews enjoy all political and 
social rights of Iranian citizens.”160 
 Elias Eshaqian, teacher and principal of Alliance schools in Iran for over 25 years, 
wrote in his memoir: “Iran has been my homeland [vatan] and Jerusalem has been the 
source of my belief in God and the direction of my prayers [qiblah].”161 This quotation 
suggests yet again that many Iranian Jews had different interpretation of Zionism than the 
one the Jewish Agency and Israel advanced. Eshaqian was a role model for many 
Iranians and it is clear that his national Iranian identity did not interfere with his religious 
identity as a Jew. He proudly projected this combined identity throughout his career, 
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Conclusions 
In the late nineteenth century, when Jews had limited opportunities, they had to support a 
self-sustaining system. In terms of training and education, they established 
Maktabkhanihs for maintaining their religious identities, and training was confined to 
occupational positions, mostly inside the community. This system changed with the 
entrance of Alliance Israelite Universelle and series of political events. First and foremost 
it was the Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911), then the demise of the Qajar Dynasty 
and the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty, and lastly, the ascendance to the throne of 
Mohammad Reza Shah in 1941. These transformations opened up the community to the 
broader Iranian society. The international institutions that came to serve Iranian Jewry 
(AIU, ORT, Otsar Ha’Torah) had to go through a localization and adjustment process 
that made them “more” Iranian.  
 The programs’ initial service to the Jewish communities succeeded by serving 
both the ideals of the organization and the ultimate goals of the Iranian communities 
themselves. Iranian Jewish graduates of these programs became “useful” Iranians. They 
became the new Jewish middle class and moved up the social scale. Eventually, these 
schools become all-Iranian institutions that other minorities and even Muslims 
understood as effective vehicles for social mobility. As more non-Jews began attending 
the schools, they were still funded by Jewish organizations that overwhelmingly 
cherished the opportunity to facilitate assimilation between Jews and their non-Jewish 
Iranian compatriots rather than encouraging Jews to be more active Zionist.  
 The discourse over Zionism, hence, was conducted completely out of context to 
Iran and its Jewish population. Iranian Jews were products of their own educational 
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systems. Adopting Zionism as offered to them by the Zionist movement, was for the most 
part, unacceptable to them. For many of them their Iranian identity grew stronger with 
each achievement, but it did not come at the expense of the Jewish one, as they rarely 
withdrew from participating in Jewish institutions, such as schools, synagogues, youth 





Chapter 5: Too Integrated? The Unintended Consequences of Jewish Involvement 
in the Events Preceding the 1978-79 Revolution 
 
During the anti-Shah upheavals of 1978, wounded protestors calling for the establishment 
of an Islamic Republic found sanctuary from the clashes in a rather surprising place: 
many of them fled to the Sapir Hospital (Bimaristan-i Sapir), the Jewish hospital in 
Tehran. The demonstrations’ participants knew that the Jewish hospital would treat them 
well, unlike the government hospitals. Above all, the facility would not turn them over to 
the Shah’s secret service, SAVAK. This rescue apparatus became widely known thanks 
to the hospital administration’s close collaboration with Ayatullah Sayyid Mahmud 
Taliqani. Taliqani, who functioned during that time as Khomeini’s representative in Iran, 
was a popular leader of the revolutionary movements. Together, Taliqani and Sapir 
Hospital staff operated rescue teams for the protestors and played a meaningful role in 
Iran’s most significant twentieth century moment.  
 This chapter examines the political and social activities of Jewish groups and 
individuals, like the Sapir Hospital staff, during Iranian Revolution in 1978-79 and the 
events leading to the revolution from the early 1970s. By this time, Jews were fully 
integrated into the public sphere, and their identity politics of Judaism and Iranian 
nationalism played out in interesting ways during this upheaval. Although the Pahlavi 
period is considered to be the golden age of religious minorities in Iran, Jews 
overwhelmingly did not appear to support the continuation of the monarchy vis-à-vis the 
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imminent revolution.162 In some cases, they openly supported the rebellious factions, in 
ways that when juxtaposed with traditional history, may seem counterintuitive.   
Previous chapters of this project have noted several historiographical gaps, 
including shedding light onto the inner relatively high diversity among the Jewish 
minority communities, their running social and communal networks not just to attend to 
regular constituency but rather to facilitate better integration and assimilation, and taking 
an active role in shaping inclusive Iranian identity. This chapter addresses yet another 
historiographic challenge. As the first chapter has argued, minorities overall did not 
refrain from politics; this chapter narrates their active involvement in the revolution that 
overthrew the regime that benefitted them the most. This paradoxical outcome 
demonstrates the unintended success of the Shah’s most significant project; that is, the 
full integration of minorities into Iranian society allowed them to operate freely, 
regardless of the myopic interests of their communities.  
The common narrative holds that the Pahlavi era was the golden era for religious 
minorities in Iran, including Jews. Iranian nationalism at that time revolved around 
cultural roots, Persian language and ethnicity, and western-style secularism, which at 
                                                
162 As seen in previous chapters, Jewish Iranian historiography usually deem the Pahlavi 
era as a golden age, mostly because of the unrefutable progress Jews made during the 
reign of Mohammad Reza. This view has been reinforced by many leaders of the 
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least in theory allowed non-Muslim Iranians full membership in the national project.163 
The Jewish community did indeed flourish under the Pahlavi regime. Jews became high-
ranking bureaucrats, industrialists and merchants. They amassed wealth and climbed the 
social ladder, flooding the ranks of universities and professional organizations. The 
government allowed Jews to practice their faith openly. They also maintained many 
communal institutions such as schools, synagogues, newspapers, and hospitals. 
Nevertheless, it was the earlier Constitutional Revolution, as described in chapter 2, that 
had created a civic basis for participation that enabled the minorities a certain degree of 
assimilation. 
David Menashri, a prominent scholar of Iran and Iranian Jewry, notes, “[Jews] 
were overrepresented among the country’s student population and university faculty 
body, among medical doctors and other professionals. Although there were people of low 
income among them, the vast majority could be defined as middle class, or upper middle 
class. Some became very rich, taking full advantage of the freedom granted to them to 
reform programs, and the growing oil income.”164 In his 1985 research, David Sitton 
provided similar numbers, that repeatedly appeared later on: “[I]n 1979 two of the 
eighteen members of the Royal Academy of Sciences, 80 of the 4,000 university 
lecturers, and 600 of the 10,000 physicians in Iran were Jews […] the overwhelming 
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majority of Jews were middle class, 10 percent were wealthy and another 10 percent were 
impoverished… About half of the Jewish children of elementary school age attended 
Hebrew schools or received lessons in Hebrew. But the ever-growing Jewish 
intelligentsia took no interest in Jewish affairs and did not long for Zion. Most of them 
were radical left.”165 Sitton’s data shows the predominance of Jews in the Iranian public 
sphere, especially among the intellectual elites. As Chapter One shows, only thirty-seven 
years earlier the vast majority of the community members had been lower middle class 
and impoverished, and in less than four decades this reality had changed. 
This assimilation led the Jews into political activism that may seem first as 
counterintuitive. While much has been written about other sectors’ activities during the 
Islamic Revolution, particularly among students, political dissidents, and clerics, few 
resources document the activities of the Jewish population and other minorities.166 As 
Chapter Three showed, Iranian Jews have been involved in politics in Iran through 
different parties and championing different goals. Because of the dictatorship ban on any 
oppositional political activity, Jews remained active in student movements, underground 
Tudeh activities, and establishment of associations that engaged in politics from 
alternative approaches, such as community political action societies. As explained before, 
scholarship about Jewish political insufficiently covered the political participation, 
especially the oppositional one, so one can scarcely find information about such 
                                                
165 Sitton, Sephardi Communities Today, 184. 
166 Random anecdotal evidence appeared about Armenians protesters against the shah’s 
regime, but still there is much yet to be studied about political communal organizations 
affiliated with religious minorities in this era. 
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participation without going back to the activists themselves, sifting through old 
publications and memoirs, and reaching out to contemporary observers as well. At the 
same time, historiography of the 1979 Iranian revolution tends to focus on the clerical- 
religious nature of the movement, pushing aside other partner participants, hence creating 
a one-dimensional narrative of the revolution. This research is not attempting to overturn 
the meta-narrative regarding the Iranian revolution by attributing the event to Jewish 
involvement; rather it seeks to reveal an angle that current research has left undeveloped.  
 
A Generation of Jewish Revolutionaries 
“The word ‘opposition’ had become something students find appealing,” a KGB official 
memorandum explained during the wave of students’ protest in 1969.167 Indeed, 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s students led opposition movements around the globe. 
These movements, typically leftist with Maoist tendencies, criticized the bipolar Cold 
War policies, weak proxy governments, and injustice inherent to imperialism and 
colonialism.  
Iranian students, mainly in Europe, became political leftist dissidents and were 
organized as such since the late 1920s. They had strong ties with socialist and pro-Soviet 
activists in Iran, and many of them later became leaders of the Tudeh Party.168 During the 
                                                
167 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente 
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reign of Reza Shah they organized conferences, published newspapers in several 
languages, and generally publicized to the world the shah’s oppressive policies inside 
Iran. In this process the German Communist party supported the Iranian student 
organizations, a collaboration that encouraged a broad internationalist agenda among the 
future Tudeh leadership. Following the victory of the Nazi Party in Germany, most of the 
Iranian students previously based in Germany returned to Iran and tried to reorganize the 
Communist Party, a goal they achieved in 1941 with the establishment of the Tudeh 
Party. In 1949 Tudehist student organization was established in Tehran University, which 
positioned the party as dominant among the Iranian urban intelligentsia. Leaders and 
political thinkers such as Mihdi Bazargan and Mahmud Taliqani were members of this 
student body.169 They participated in protests against Mosaddeq’s trial and Richard 
Nixon’s visit later that year, among others.  
By the late 1950s Iranian students’ organizations appeared again in Western 
Europe and the United States, expressing similar views to Tudeh and Jibhah-ye Milli (the 
National Front). The Iranian student confederation in Paris, for example, enjoyed active 
support of the French Communist Party and the prominent intellectual Jean-Paul 
Sartre.170 Mohammad Reza Shah’s response to these confederations highlights their 
significance. After a huge demonstration against the shah’s visit to the American capital, 
which was organized by Iranian students, the shah avoided visiting countries that had 
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active Iranian confederations and in some instances asked the SAVAK to follow their 
activities.171  
These student organizations were part of a global movement and partook in 
struggles other than their own in the 1960s and 1970s. Iranian student associations 
participated in the struggles of their host countries’ students; however, with the 
reemergence of the opposition movement in Iran, and especially at Tehran University, 
they began to sync activities with local Iranian associations in Iran and abroad.172 At this 
period, one of the members of the secretariat was a Tehrani Jew, Parviz Ne’eman. Other 
members, who really illustrate the broad participation, were Abu al-Hasan Banisadr, the 
first president of the Islamic Republic, and Cosroe Chequeri a historian of the Iranian left 
and the Armenian-Iranian community.173 
In the 1970s, along with increased assimilation, Jews were immensely active in 
student organizations and other opposition movements.  Jews sympathized with their 
compatriots, setting aside their community’s alleged inherent support of the monarchy. 
This mindset of assimilation (and perhaps the feeling that it had arrived to its ultimate 
stage) could have stemmed from instilling the liberal nationalist ideals those 
organizations expressed and promoted. Also, it seems like these organizations, with the 
apparent religious and ethnic diversity allowed them to envision a multi-cultural society, 
in which they, the minorities, would have a central role. The result was growing 
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involvement in existing organizations, such as the Student Confederations and the Tudeh 
Party, and establishment of new organizations. The generation of Jews that came of age 
during the Shah’s White Revolution (post 1963) was already acquainted with socialist 
theories and politics and expressed its views loudly and clearly as the rest of Iranian 
society prepared for a revolution.  
The connections between the associations in Iran and abroad were very strong. 
Not only did Iranian students collaborate on operations in Iran and communicating 
activities to Western outlets, but many of them returned to Iran and became involved in 
the local chapters once they graduated from institutions in the West. Mihrdad, for 
example, studied in Europe, and was part of the European confederation.  He returned to 
Iran from Europe at the time when the opposition inside Iran became more active and 
more explicit:  
When I returned to Iran in 1975, I met an old friend who suggested to set up an 
organization for the younger generation, rather than the old attachment to 
synagogues. So we established an organization called: “Council of Advancement 
of Jewish Social and Cultural Activism” and it became very successful. We held 
our first events in a hotel, not a community center and it became an attraction for 
the newer generation. We had very interesting events and lectures, which were not 
religious or pro-Israel. It was more general on informative basis. We had 
intellectuals coming from the politically active community. Our events were full. 
Soon, the room given to us was not enough. It was the place for the young up and 
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coming Jews to meet each other […] it had become a big community. We were 
both Jews and part of the wider community.174  
 
This group’s worldview was holistic, that is they wanted to engage in every aspect of 
Jewish Iranian social life. The newly established council provided cultural and 
educational activities to as many Jews as it could find and recruit. Among other 
operations it ran a summer camp, which aimed to bring together Jews from all over Iran 
(and especially Tehran), regardless of socio-economic status:  
We organized the camp for 14-16 years old. We mixed Jews from South Tehran, 
the Mahallah, with Jews from North Tehran, and said there is a dress code: jeans 
and a T-shirt, and we provide the T-shirt, so there was no room for show off. For 
three summers successively, in 76-78, there were 1,000 kids going to this camp, 
and all the parents wanted their kids to come to this camp to get to know the 
others, because the ties within the community became looser and looser and they 
thought that this is it. Our success was that about third [of the campers] came 
from poor families of Tehran and we did not charge them anything, and charged 
the others double. 
This way the group addressed issues that received wide attention in Iran at that time, such 
as economic inequality, and in their community found a popular and working solution. 
While disparity was a much greater concern in the general public, having treated this 
issue inside the community must have been seen as a message of success to their leftist 
ideals.  
                                                
174 Interview with Mihrdad, 22 January 2013. 
 115 
The ultimate goal of this council was to connect Jews to broader social 
movements in Iran and bring them closer to political action. In its deeds the council laid 
the foundation for a far-reaching organization later that decade, when the revolutionary 
events started to take place. During the protests of the 1970’s, while the Tudeh party’s 
activity had been outlawed, two Jewish activists, Harun Parviz Yesha’ya and ‘Aziz 
Daneshrad, were jailed for anti-monarchial activity. After serving their time, they turned 
to political activity within the Jewish community.175 Loyal to their leftist tendencies and 
religious identity, they gathered a dozen like-minded comrades and established the most 
significant Jewish organization in late 1970’s Iran: Jami‘ah-i rawshanfikran-i kalimi-yi 
Iran (The Association of Jewish Iranian Intellectuals-AJII). Habib was a close friend with 
Yesha’ya and Danseshrad from their days in the Tudeh. He was also one of AJII 
founders: “We established our office in an apartment on Firdawsi Street. There were four 
of us, and we did not know where exactly we were heading.”176 They did not have a well-
thought plan, but they wanted to politicize the community and connect between Jewish 
values and ideas and the political program of the Tudeh Party. This organization’s 
significance is threefold. First, it organized the Jews under a Jewish ethnic banner to 
engage in revolutionary activity. Second, in 1978 it challenged the old-guard leadership 
of the community, which mostly identified with the shah’s regime and had connections 
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Semitism in Times of Crisis, ed. Sander Gilman (New York: New York University Press, 
1991), 360. 
176 Interview with Habib, 24 June 2013. 
 116 
with Zionist organizations, and gained control of the Jewish establishment.177 And third, 
its weekly publication Tamuz, named after the Hebrew month of July, quickly became a 
                                                
177 Yusif Kuhin provides another account of the events, which is interesting given 
Kuhin’s own affiliation with the “old guards” and his political position: “By the spring of 
1979, the legal term of the Jewish Association leadership was also coming to an end. The 
Jewish University Students Organizations, the youth and graduate societies had submitted 
a unified list of candidates among which were the names of only two members of the 
present Association. The rest of the Association members, those who were known as the 
”National Fund Group“ had produced their own list. After several meetings, seminars and 
other activities, finally the candidates of the former group won the majority, and the 
Community was faced by a new Association. In the new Association, Engineer Aziz 
Daneshrad who had been a member of the Association in the past was elected as the 
Chairman. The reason for the defeat of the ‘National Fund Group’ in a few words was 
that these gentlemen preferred connections over qualifications when recruiting their 
colleagues; instead of selecting experts and knowledgeable people they were after people 
who would obediently follow the head of the Fund. Also, by concentrating all the 
financial affairs and by controlling all the funds, they intended to ensure the obedience of 
all active organizations for themselves. The organizations on the other hand, and in 
particular the University Students and the youth, would not acquiesce anyway, and 
demanded that the National Fund disperse each organization’s respective expenses 
without conditions, according to their bylaws, without interfering with the leadership and 
the activities of the organizations.” For the block quotations from this memoirs I used 
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highly circulated magazine that aspired to be a bridge between the Jewish community and 
the Iranian people. As mentioned before, there were overlaps in some of the individuals’ 
affiliations, and so the “association” actively welcomed people with different political 
and organizational affiliations and became the main venue for leftist Jewish activists. 
In an article celebrating the third anniversary of AJII, a Tamuz editorial outlined 
the organization’s contribution to Jewish involvement in the revolution: “From the 
beginning of the year 1357 [1978] a group of the Iranian Jews has participated in the 
great movement against imperialism and dictatorship. From the very beginning we tried 
to collaborate with the revolutionaries, especially the Muslim clerics in different levels, 
and we have done this work ever since. And at last in the month of Shahrivar 1357 
[August 1978] a Jewish group joined the protest for the first time under an Iranian-Jewish 
banner, and this group, in the month of Azar 1357 [November 1978], met with the late 
Ayatullah Taliqani, and announced the[ir] common goals […]”.178 This quote shows that 
AJII was a much more sophisticated incarnation of the previous attempt. In November 
1978 these groups believed that the revolution was about to happen and that the shah 
would soon be overthrown, but it can still be regarded as a bold policy to approach for 
collaboration with a revolutionary figure, such as Taliqani and give publicity to such 
support. 
                                                                                                                                            
translations by Faryar Nikbakht with Aziz Kuhin’s permission. Kuhin, Yusif Kuhin: 
Guzarish va Khaṭirat-i Faʻʻaliyatʹha-yi Siyasi va Ijtimaʻi, 302. 
178 “Fa’aliyyat-i Sah Salah-i Jami’ah-i Rawshanfikran-i Kalimi-yi Iran,” Tamuz, 
September 25, 1981. 
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Indeed, AJII was formed to show Jewish discontent with the monarchial regime. 
The organization was established in March 1978, as revolutionary events were already 
unfolding. The group immediately began collaborating with other rebelling factions, 
including Muslim-Iranian activists (most notably with Ayatullah Taliqani): “We formed 
this group in order to show the rest of the people in Iran that we Jews were not woven 
from a different fabric of society than other Iranians, but that we also supported [the new 
government’s professed] goals for democracy and freedom,” says Sa‘id Banayan, one of 
the association’s founding fathers.179 AJII became the most vocal supporter of the 
revolution among the Jewish community. Hushang, a prominent figure in AJII and the 
Jewish community during the revolution, added: “AJII was the most important Jewish 
organization during the revolution. At the core of it were left-leaning intellectuals and 
students, and later many other Jews joined in.”180 Initially, the Jewish community did not 
welcome the new AJII leadership and tried to prevent them from gaining influence in the 
Anjuman, the traditional community organization. However, after the elections for the 
Anjuman’s council in March 1978, the new AJII leadership succeeded in establishing a 
                                                
179 I would like to thank Karmel Melamed for referring me to this interview and 
contributing from his own knowledge to this research; Karmel Melamed, “Escape, Exile, 
Rebirth: Iranian Jewish Diaspora Alive and Well in Los Angeles | Jewish Journal,” 
accessed June 22, 2011, 
http://www.jewishjournal.com/articles/item/escape_exile_rebirth_iranian_jewish_diaspor
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180 Interview with Hushang, 15 May 2011. 
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“revolutionary” committee to run Jewish affairs.181 Some AJII members had served time 
in the shah’s prisons during previous turmoil where they had become acquainted with 
other political dissidents who were later involved in the revolutionary movements. The 
most significant relationship was with Khomeini’s close ally, the popular thinker and a 
chief ideologist of the revolution, Ayatullah Sayyid Mahmud Taliqani.182  
 The AJII saw indifference, separatism, and corruption as the main obstacles to 
advancement within the Jewish community.  In order to win the hearts and minds of 
Jews, the association invested in many activities that correlated with their ideals. The 
association sponsored activities with Muslim activists during the revolution and 
established a lecture series hosted in local synagogues that featured presentations from 
secular Muslim advocates of the revolution and high-ranking clerics who were deeply 
involved in the revolution.183 For example, Hidayatullah Matin-Daftari, one of the 
National Front’s leaders, came to talk about the importance for the Jews to integrate into 
the revolution and participate in building a new Iranian society.184 
                                                
181 In any case, a few months later, in the summer of 1978 they failed to be reelected. 
Amnon Netzer, Yehude Iran Be-yamenu (Jerusalem: HUJI Press, 1981), 21. 
182 Read more about Taliqani and his pivotal role in the revolution in: Hamid Dabashi, 
Theology of Discontent (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 216–272. 
183 Netzer, Yehude Iran Be-yamenu, 22; Editorial, “Fa’aliyyat-i sah salah-i jami’ah-i 
rawshanfikran-i kalimi-yi iran,”  Tamuz (Tehran, 25 September 1981), 6. 
184 Amnon Netzer, “Yehudei Iran, Yisrael, Ve-ha-republiqah Ha-islamit Shel Iran,” 
Gesher 26 (Spring-Summer 1980), 48. 
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 The official AJII bylaws reflect hybrid identities that were, in many ways, unique 
to Iran.  The bylaws involved sentiments of nationalism, radical socialism, all mixed with 
Muslim and Jewish religiosity.  Some of the articles in the AJII bylaws expressed this 
approach with a call for political action and Iranian social solidarity. Article Three, for 
example, reads: “[We encourage] active participation in the social life of the Iranian 
people, and the creation of a Jewish society that will struggle shoulder to shoulder with 
our Iranian brothers for the ultimate victory of the revolution and the building of a free 
and progressive Iran.” Article 4, for example, presents the utopian vision of creating a 
new society: “efforts to preserve the fruits of the revolution of the Iranian people in 
regards of the social and personal rights and including those of the Iranian Jews in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.” Article 5 comes to distinguish between Jews and Zionism, 
since during the revolution there were factions that intentionally conflated the two: “war 
against imperialism, and any form of colonialism, including Zionism, and revealing the 
relationship between Zionism and world’s imperialism. War against any sort of racial 
discrimination, racism, and anti-Semitism.” Article 6 talks once again about the 
revolutionary utopia: “adopting to the new reality in Iran, by enjoying all the 
opportunities to have better conditions to religious and cultural life and welfare of the 
Iranian Jews.”185 These bylaws articles efficiently reflected the mindset of the leftist 
movements in Iran during the revolution. They envisioned a sort of a model society in 
which universal values of solidarity would yield a just and open society, and in which the 
Jews would be equal partner citizens. 
                                                
185 Ibid., 49. 
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AJII clearly envisaged a utopian republic of endless opportunities, possible only 
through disposing of the monarchy and establishing the Iranian republic. The vision of a 
republic that emphasized fraternity, solidarity—particularly with Palestinians—and 
freedom for minorities comprises the cultural identity that AJII members aspire to create. 
This cultural identity is primarily Iranian but expands to include the Arab Middle East 
and Third-World countries. By positioning the organization as anti-imperialist and anti-
colonialist AJII became relevant not only to the Iranian context, but even to the broader 
Middle East.   
 
Illustration 9: Jews in the Demonstrations during the Revolution (source: Tamuz). 
 
Sapir Charity Hospital, the Revolution, and Ayatullah Taliqani 
 
AJII pulled members from a variety of political endeavors; state employees, merchants, 
industrialist, community activists, and Sapir Hospital staff too. Some of the senior 
officials in the hospital were involved to some extent in AJII, sympathized with its 
causes, and assisted the revolutionaries for various reasons.  These facilitators included, 
Gad Naim, who was part of AJII leadership and a senior administrator in Sapir 
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hospital,186 Doctor Manuchihr Aliyasi, who was also among the hospital’s senior staff 
and AJII sympathizer,187 and Harun Parviz Yesha’ya, who was among the founders of 
AJII and Tamuz and became the hospital director after the revolution.188  
On 8 September 1978, mass demonstrations erupted in Tehran. The shah sent the 
army to shoot live ammunition at the crowd of protesters. This event became known as 
“Black Friday” and coincided with the active involvement of the hospital in events. “That 
Friday the head nurse, Ms. Farangis Hasidim, called me and told me that they are 
bringing many casualties to the hospital,” recalls Dr. Jalali, one of the senior officials in 
Sapir Hospital at that time. “I drove to the hospital but the Zhalah [avenue] was blocked, 
so I went by foot and there was shooting […] since I was friendly with the ambulance 
services people, almost ninety percent of the injured people came to Sapir hospital, where 
we treated all of them in our four surgery rooms.” At this point Dr. Jalali indicates the 
growing involvement of Ayatullah Taliqani and his personal relationship with him, which 
proved to be essential later on: “Five months prior to the revolution (Following ‘Black 
Friday’) I had a building next to my office, I dedicated it to ‘Taliqani Support Group,’ (in 
Persian: Guruh-i imdad-i Taliqani) […]. after ‘Black Friday’ he called me and told me 
                                                
186 “Ma Yahudiyan Mizrakhi Hastim va Fiqh Ghani Darim,” accessed July 7, 2011, 
http://www.iranjewish.com/Essay/Essay_36_mizrakhi.htm. 
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188 Interview with Dr. Jalali, 15 May 2011. 
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how he appreciated all the humanitarian work we did there. And yes, everybody knew 
about it.”189 
Guruh-i imdad-i Taliqani became an important apparatus of first response to the 
wounded protestors in the big cities, especially Tehran. According to the Iranian press 
there were two first response groups reporting to Taliqani. They had a relatively large 
staff of volunteering physicians, nurses, ambulances, and other staff, and their 
contribution to the continuity of the protests cannot be overrated.190   
The acquaintance of Taliqani with Jewish leaders in Tehran extends beyond his 
friendship with Dr. Jalali. Upon Taliqani’s release from prison, a group of prominent 
Jewish figures went to visit him and stayed in close contact with him until his death in 
1979. Taliqani became one of the foremost advocates for minority rights in post-
revolutionary Iran.191 Although Jalali was politically affiliated with AJII, some of the 
doctors were not. The story of the hospital is mostly a humanitarian one. 
  
                                                
189 Interview with Dr. Jalali, 15 May 2011. Yusif Kuhin remembered the day very 
similarly. Given that Kuhin was at odds with Dr. Jalali, I believe it validates the account. 
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 Illustration 10: Sapir 
Hospital’s Staff after the Revolution (source: Tamuz). 
 
 On 11 December 1978, one of the largest demonstrations against the shah took 
place in Tehran. Newspapers called it a “demonstration of millions” and it set a milestone 
in the struggle against the shah’s regime. Jewish participation set records as well; 
according to some sources, five thousand Jews participated in these protests.192 Other 
estimates were much higher. Hushang, a long-time leftist activist in the Jewish 
community and AJII, helped organize the massive Jewish appearance that day: 
“According to press reports close to twelve thousand Jews participated in these protests 
that day,” He says. “The Jewish religious leaders marched in the front row and the rest of 
the Jews followed them, showing great solidarity with our Iranian compatriots.”193 The 
religious leadership sided with the young radical group, and in a sense “legitimized” 
                                                
192 Netzer, Yehude Iran Be-Yamenu, 22. 
193 Interview with Hushang, 15 May 2011. 
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them. “From the first days of the revolution we had considerable support from religious 
leaders. Hakham Yedidya Shofet, Hakham Uriel Davidi, Rabbi David Shofet, Hakham 
Yosef Hamadani Cohen, and others attended and supported […] other key figures were 
Parviz Yesha’ya, ‘Aziz Daneshrad, Ya‘qub Barkhurdar, Hushang Melamed, Dr. 
Manuchihr Aliyasi, and Ms. Farangis Hasidim, all played a major role” Hushang says.194 
According to him the activities of AJII helped to reduce tensions between the Muslim 
majority and the Jewish minority. However, not all of the religious leaders that joined 
that day did so wholeheartedly. “It was my assignment to convince Hakham Shofet to 
join us, to get him in the picture,” said Mihrdad. “He was sympathetic to the cause but 
felt heavy hearted. He was reluctant to come and we told him that it for the sake and 
safety of the community. We even found rabbinic writing and Halacha ruling that say that 
if they community requires you to so such and such you do it not because this is your 
belief but because the decision would be for the good of the community. So he said he 
would come out.”195 Shofet, then, participated despite early reservations, which makes 
him a unique case in this story. Loyalty to both the Shah and to the community meant a 
great deal to him. He came out that day and afterward not because he looked to facilitate 
integration of the community into the broader society but rather to seek protection for the 
community in a rapidly changing reality.  
Habib’s memories of this demonstration help us to understand the profound 
impact it had on the participants: “We met by Darvazah-i dawlat synagogue in south 
Tehran and joined the main demonstration from there […] our signs and chants were: 
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Yahudi- musalman hambastigi-i mubarak (Jewish- Muslims Blessed Solidarity). It was so 
exciting, I could not stop crying,” says Habib. Hakham Shofet’s recollections of this day 
express the same sentiment:  
In every place we live we must respect the majority’s opinion and to approve and 
respect their leadership [not necessarily the elected or ruling leadership]. Because 
of this rule, in those days, with respect to these people, we joined them in 
marching for the Tasu’a in 19 Azar Mah 1357 (9 December 1978) Muhandis 
Daneshrad and other members of the Jewish Community (Anjuman) board were 
on my side […] It was constructive and inspiring. Many of the Muslims that led 
this great march and were responsible of it, welcomed us warmly, among them 
were many Shi’i clerics.196 
This memory of Shofet is interesting especially because of the fact that he did not openly 
oppose the Shah. There are multiple accounts of Shofet positively commenting on the 
Shah’s period as unprecedented for the Iranian Jews, and his fear of the unclear future. In 
an interview one of the people that made Shofet join the march said that he would do it 
for the sake of the community, but he should know that every Saturday when he is 
offering prayers for the health of the Shah- he means it.   
Muslim protestors greeted the Jewish group by chanting: “Jewish Brother, 
Welcome, Welcome” (Baradar-i yahudi khush amadi, khush amadi).197 When they passed 
                                                
196 Cohen, Bar Bal-i Khirad: Jami’ah-i Yahudiyan-i Iran va Haftad Sal Rahbari-yi 




by Madrasah-i ‘Alavi198 they chanted: Rahbari-yi Khomeini asas-i vahdat-i milli 
(Khomeini’s Leadership is the Basis of National Unity). “That day,” Habib says “we all 
had tears of happiness. We were all in support of democracy, and freedom, and the 
revolution.”199 
 Despite the national unity presentation of the demonstration, given past 
experiences, it was obvious that the protest was not about to end peacefully. Sapir 
Hospital’s personnel were well prepared for the events of Tasu’a and ‘Ashura day. “That 
morning they called me from Madrasah-i ‘Alavi and asked to keep all the staff and 
doctors for the day. I received seventy or eighty percent of the injured from all over the 
city. All of them went either to Sapir, Kurush-i Kabir as it was called back then, or the 
Imperial Medical Center, this situation lasted for seventy-two hours,” recalls Dr. Jalali.   
In its second issue, Tamuz published a two-page story titled “Sapir Hospital 
during the Revolution” (Bimaristan-i Sapir dar jarayan-i inqilab) that described the 
services provided by Sapir Hospital to the revolutionaries: “In the turbulent months of 
our revolution, Kurush-i Kabir hospital, which after the revolution was renamed after Dr. 
Sapir, became one of the places that, through taking personal risks for the sake of the 
revolution, treated and facilitated the revolution.”200 The article cites anecdotes from 
senior hospital officials, such as the head nurse, Farangis Hasidim, who, speaking about 
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the events of Black Friday and ‘Ashura, said, “This day unfolded in unexpected ways. I 
went to see a rebel that arrived with a bullet injury in his leg, and he was bleeding. I 
immediately took him to the surgery room. I had not finished treating him, when another 
patient came in, and every minute more and more injured arrived. For many hours the 
hospital looked like the frontlines of a war zone.”201  The hospital staff also had to cope 
with the shah’s security officers that came to search for rebels in hiding: “One day we 
heard great noise from the hospital’s back yard and I saw myriad of people in uniform 
and plain clothes (i.e. secret police) looking for rebels […] for twenty-four hours guards 
circled the hospital, but we did not hand them anyone.”202 “During the Tasu‘a and 
‘Ashura the entire hospital staff stayed in the hospital for more than twenty-four hours. 
The hospital’s ambulances cruised the streets to pick wounded protesters and bring them 
to the hospital to get treatment.”203 
 Following these events, in late 1978 a delegation of the Jewish community went 
to Paris to meet the leader of the revolution, Ayatullah Ruhullah Khomeini. The tacit 
purpose of this trip was to ensure that Jews would not be regarded as enemies of the 
revolution but rather as its supporters. This meeting was the first of many between the 
Jewish leadership and Khomeini.204 Shortly after, the hospital received its first 
recognition from Khomeini: “For this reason (the humanitarian help) Imam Khomeini, 
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before his return to Iran, had sent a letter of gratitude to the director of the hospital, 
recognizing his help and support for the wounded revolutionaries,” said Dr. Moreh-
Sedegh, one of the hospital’s leaders. In an interview he described the assistance given to 
the revolutionaries, and confirmed, once again, the story of the shah’s army siege in 
1978.205 Receiving Khomeini’s recognition is not a small feat. In many ways it secured 
the future of the Jews under the leadership of the revolution. 
 
“Jews are not Zionists,” Said the Imam 
Throughout the revolutionary events there was a continuing attempt by both 
revolutionary factions and the Jews to draw a clear distinction between Jews and Zionists. 
This would be a theme ushered in well into the early revolutionary period, but even from 
the time of the protest there were multiple occasions where revolutionaries and non-
revolutionaries provided explanations and ways to tell the difference.  
On September 1978, a few days before the escalation of “Black Friday,” Yusif 
Kuhin, then the Jewish representative in the Majlis, accompanied by another member of 
the parliament Ahmad Bani-Ahmad met the Grand Ayatullah Muhammad Kazim 
Shari’atmadari. The purpose of this meeting was to have the respected Ayatollah 
stopping the incitement against Jews, which was becoming a problem in some of the 
provinces in Iran. 
At 1:30 in the afternoon of that September 1st, Bani-Ahmad called me and said, 
“Cohen! Put on your clothes and come to me immediately. Bring your documents 
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with you.” Those days, Bani-Ahmad was in danger, because he was seriously 
opposing the Shah’s regime. I took the address of his secret location, which was 
the home of one of his fellow Azeris, and took off immediately. Outside the 
house, a group of tough Azerbaijanis were standing and I could tell they were 
armed. I asked Bani-Ahmad what was going on. ”We want to go visit His 
Eminence Ayatullah Shari’atmadari,” he answered. In any case, all the issues 
were humbly reported to him on that day in Qum. The Ayatollah was inclined to 
proclaim that the lives of Jews were protected unless if they were agents of Israel. 
Bani-Ahmad recommended that “even though this is correct but mentioning it 
will cause the malefactors to take the life of any Jew they want and then claim 
that he had been an Israeli agent. It would be better if His Eminence issued a 
general, unconditional and unambiguous command.”  Many reporters and 
correspondents from major international news agencies were constantly on the 
alert at Shari’at-madari’s house with their cameras, because that location was the 
epicenter of Iranian politics, which was of interest to the whole world. That 
evening, the Iranian radio and television broadcasted this proclamation of the 
great Source of Emulation of Iranian Muslims: 
“Reports are reaching us that a series of written threats against religious 
minorities who are recognized by the Constitution and respected by the Iranian 
Nation, have begun under the name of the Clergy and the banner of Islam. Iranian 
minorities, have all the liberties and the rights imaginable for the people of Iran. 
On the other hand, according to the ruling of Islamic commandments, personal 
rights of all the people of the world and even the human rights of our enemies 
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have been recognized. Religious Minorities, which have been identified in the 
Constitution, have been shoulder to shoulder with the struggle of the Iranian 
nation as far as I remember. They accompanied the people in every step of the 
momentous events of the Constitutional evolution. I shall never accept the 
smallest threat or intimidation against them under the name of Islam. In fact I 
consider such actions as an anti-Iranian and anti Islamic conspiracy. We must 
know that irresponsible people with missions of sabotage are on the prowl and are 
hoping to spread the seeds of hate and disunity.”206 
Such a proclamation from a prominent religious leader like Ayatollah Shari’at-madari 
was a major achievement for the Jewish leadership and in fact, was crucial at the 
moment, when Israel was brought up more often as part of the anti-shah slogans, and 
some Iranians could not tell the difference between Jews, Zionists, and Israelis.  
 Later that month, during the events of “Black Friday” it was rumored that the 
shah deployed Israeli soldiers to confront the protestors. This rumor, of course, had no 
basis but it was promptly became an issue demanding attention on behalf of the Jewish 
leadership. 
In the 2013 documentary Before the Revolution- the Untold Story of the Israeli 
Community in Iran, Nissim Levy, one of the Israeli Embassy’s security officers, recalls 
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that as he drove through the streets of Tehran right before the ultimate victory of the 
revolution he saw graffiti that read: “Kill Every Israeli- But Do Not Harm the Jews.”207 
  
Immediate Aftereffects of the Revolution 
Shortly after the ‘Ashura events the revolution took a dramatic turn when on January 15, 
1979 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi left Iran for good. “Shah raft” (the Shah left) announced 
the newspapers the next day, and less then a month later they announced that the Imam 
has arrived (Imam amad). All major minority groups came to the airport to welcome 
Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini back to Iran. The Jewish delegation coordinated their 
participation another prominent leader of the revolutionary movement, Ayatullah 
Bihishti. “Bihishti knew Yesha’ya from the time they were in jail together and helped to 
bring the Jewish community on board of the welcome ceremony.” This acquaintance 
facilitated bringing the Jewish representatives into the reception plans.208 
 After the installation of the new regime the hospital encountered controversy. 
“One night after the revolution they called me to tell that a group of people from the 
regime came and changed the name of the hospital to ‘Khusraw Golisurkhi Hospital.” A 
member of the left, Golisurkhi had been executed by the shah.209 It took us a long time, 
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 133 
together with Parviz Yesha’ya to change it back to ‘Dr. Sapir Hospital.’”210 Simin, Dr. 
Sapir’s niece, explained how they petitioned the government to have the name changed to 
Dr. Sapir: “I collected evidence from people that got treatment in the hospital, collected 
newspaper stories, letters from clerics about the hospital during the revolution, and gave 
it to them in a big box. After a short discussion they pronounced him a Shahid, a martyr 
of the revolution, and ordered to have the name changed to Dr. Sapir Hospital.”211 This 
episode of the name change became significant as the Jewish community retained 
management of the hospital and the government acknowledged the role the hospital had 
played during the revolution.  
Politics continued to play out in the Jewish community after the revolution. The 
cooperation between the hospital and the AJII was reaffirmed in early 1982. AJII held 
weekly meetings open to the public, which often included a guest lecture, either on 
revolutionary topics or Jewish topics during the Jewish high holidays. In January 1982, 
the executive board of Sapir Hospital came to participate in the weekly meeting. The next 
day’s issue of Tamuz reported on the visit, depicting the recent history of the hospital and 
their plans for the future. Dr. Mansur Sharim, the director of the hospital told the paper 
that, as always, Sapir Hospital continued to serve the Iranian people regardless of their 
faith.212 
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 Jews were active, as seen, in all-Iranian organizations—such as the Tudeh—and 
of course in sectarian explicitly Jewish frames, such as the AJII. However, Jews 
participated even in almost exclusively Muslim organizations, such as the Mujahidin-i 
Khalq (The People’s Mujahidin of Iran). The Mujahidin-i Khalq was established by 
prominent clerics and highly religious non-clerics that were the intellectual elites of the 
nationalist opposition factions. Ayatullah Mahmud Taliqani and Mihdi Bazargan (the 
future prime minister) were among its prominent members. This organization employed a 
fascinating combination of Marxist and Islamist discourse in articulation of a 
revolutionary ideology.213 The Mujahidin was one of the key opposition organizations in 
the 1970s until the revolution.214  
One of the Jewish activists in Mujahidin-i Khalq was Edna Sabet. Sabet was born 
in 1955 to a Jewish Kermanshahi family that lived in Tehran. Her family belonged to the 
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middle class in the city and many of her family members were American educated 
engineers and industrialists. During her college years, in Ariyamihr Technical University 
in Tehran, Edna became politically active and joined an underground organization, 
Paykar. She promptly became a member of its central committee in Tehran. In Paykar she 
met Ghulam Husayn Salim Aruni, with whom she married later.215 Aruni was Muslim 
and became attracted to the Mujahidin-i Khalq.216 Soon he joined the organization and 
Edna followed suit. They were both prominent activists in the movement and their story 
was widely circulated among the Tehran groups. 
 The institution of the interim revolutionary government prevented the Mujahidin 
from participating in the April 1979 elections. As a result, the group turned against the 
newly forming Islamic Republic government. Iran’s new revolutionary guards arrested 
(and even executed without trial) the Mujahidin members who only a short time before 
had fought with them against the shah’s oppressive regime. In 1981 Sabet’s husband, 
Ghulam Husayn Salim Aruni, was captured, arrested, prosecuted, and executed in the 
infamous Ayatullah Khalkhali’s court. Edna Sabet was arrested a few months later. 
Evidence later showed that Sabet never faced court on any charges. She was tortured in 
prison but remained resilient and confident. She was executed on February 12, 1982, 
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when she was only 27 years old. A fellow comrade from her days in the Mujahidin said: 
“She was everything the new Islamic regime feared: A brave woman, a Jew, a leftist 
fighting uncompromisingly against the very core of the Islamic Republic.”217 Edna Sabet 
was one of the Jews that were members in an almost- exclusively Muslim organization. 
Despite her tragic ending Sabet’s story illustrates yet another facet of the complex 
identities and allegiances that characterized many of her generation. Her affiliation with 
the Mujahidin and the story of Sapir Hospital during the revolution exemplifies the 
breaking of the traditional frameworks of this communities’ assimilation. These instances 
show yet again that in the late 1970s most of the Jews favored their countrymen’s 
interests over their own good or narrow communal benefits.   
Illustration 11: Edna Sabet (source: Iran Human Rights Memorial 
Website) 
Conclusions 
The same events, wars, philosophies, and ideologies that shaped revolutionaries 
elsewhere in the world inspired the generation that came of age in the 1970s in Iran. It 
was the time where American students demonstrated against the war in Vietnam, Sartre 
and Foucault incited European students and supported various goals of Third-World 
identities. At the same time that many countries experienced their first moments of 
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independence, the Iranian students’ local project was struggle against the American-
backed monarchy in Iran, and instituting a functioning socialist republic instead. This 
kind of republic, obviously, would be founded upon ideals of egalitarian society were 
religious or ethnic affiliations play no part. The promise, thus, was creating an Iranian 
multi-ethnic-religious society. 
 The involvement of the Jews can be explained in a level of assimilation that they 
reached in this crucial moment. Whereas the generation of the parents in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s spent their own youths paved the way to leave the ghettos and the Jewish 
traditional life, and pursue education and careers in private and public sectors, their 
children did not feel they had to fight for their status as a marginal minority, but rather for 
a better society for Iran. The Jewish identity at that point served as another component 
and possible affiliation in the greater social tapestry of minorities in Iran.  
 Jewish participants in the Students movements, both in Iran and abroad, belonged 
at that point to the nationalist bourgeoisie, whether they recognized it or not. Their 
assimilation efforts were fruitful, and Jewish culture and identity were just additional 
labels they carried and perhaps rooted them deeper into the Iranian soil. In this context 
we can see the establishment of AJII, initiatives such as the ones involved Sapir Hospital 
during the revolution, or the participation of Jews in Muslim revolutionary movements. 
These all represent the entire spectrum of national belonging.  From AJII by professing 
Iranian nationalism as Jews, to Sapir Hospital in this case- as partnership through 
humanitarian assistant (again, even when some of the collaborators evidently supported 
the shah), and Edna Sabet’s instance as assimilation through adopting of all the identifiers 
of Iranian and Islamic symbolism and rhetoric.  
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 The large participation in the demonstrations may suggest that the majority of the 
Jewish population, while not taking active role in the events leading to the revolution, 
once realizing its inevitable victory embraced the opportunities and bless it might bring to 
the community and its future in its homeland.  
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Chapter 6: What is the Place of Non-Muslims in the Islamic Republic? Post-
Revolution Dilemmas  
“Revolutionary crises are not total breakpoints in history that suddenly make anything at 
all possible if only it is envisaged by willful revolutionaries,” wrote Theda Skocpol, 
referring to popular revolutions and the sobering moment after the revolution itself when 
utopian visions face reality.218 The Iranian revolution definitely experienced such a 
moment. Even though the nascent regime and elites aspired to replace the old corrupt 
order with a new idealized one, the transformation was difficult at some points and 
impossible at others.219 The removal of the Pahlavi dynasty and the establishment of the 
interim government opened the Iranian political sphere and heralded an attempt to create 
a new society, established on the same ideas as the revolution: equal society, freedoms, 
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rights, and democracy. However, chaotic struggles between rebelling parties ushered in 
this transitional period.  
It was obvious that the fighting factions, from communists and Marxists to 
nationalists (various offshoots of the National Front) and religious Islamists, would soon 
face a struggle over the character of the revolution, and, ultimately, the character of 
Iranian society. After the revolution the Iranian nation found itself once again defining its 
boundaries and identity. Jews had to find yet a new way to deal with changing national 
ideals, which were now defined by the new revolutionary elite.  
Unlike under the Pahlavi regime the inter-communal relations in the post-
revolutionary society were in disarray. Different parties inside the Jewish community 
encouraged their peers toward different political allegiances, while a myriad of ideologies 
continued to thrive among the Jews, such as socialism and religiosity. Many opted to 
temporarily leave the country until things returned to normal; Zionist agencies helped 
those who wished to move to Israel, and Jewish organizations assisted with migration to 
the U.S.). The political activists that steered the community during the upheavals made 
the first calls. While they remained the spokespersons for their organizations they had to 
understand how to navigate in the new political order.  
The post-revolutionary journey began for the Jews shortly after the shah left the 
country. On 13 February 1979, upon Khomeini’s return to Iran, the Jewish leadership 
showed support en masse for the revolution and welcomed the country’s new leader.220 
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AJII members were involved in the movement so deeply that they attended some 
historical milestones of the revolution. For example, on February 27, 1979 the keys of the 
former Israeli embassy on Kakh Street were given to the PLO representative, Hani al-
Hassan. AJII members were there to welcome al-Hassan and later that day, in a reception 
in the prime minister’s office, they delivered a written statement in support of the PLO 
and against Israel and Zionism.221 The Palestinian struggle against Israel occupied a fair 
amount of space in their rhetoric at that time, a move that drew a clear distinction 
between the AJII and any representation of Israel. They identified the Palestinian struggle 
as one of the issues the Iranian regime should support strongly and emphasized their 
stance on this matter.   
Another way for AJII to position itself in opposition to Israel was to show that 
Zionism had long forgotten and abandoned any kind of Jewish ideals. AJII’s official 
newspaper, Tamuz, continued its correlation between radical socialism and Jewish 
religiosity. On November 22, 1979, Tamuz published an expanded interview with Rabbi 
Ovadia Yosef.222  Ovadia Yosef was the Chief Rabbi of the Mizrahi or Sephardic Jews. 
He was born in Baghdad in 1920 and served as a Chief Rabbi in Egypt and then in Israel. 
He was known for his relatively progressive rulings, and in many cases advanced the 
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Mizrahi cause by opposing the line he was expected to follow, namely Zionism. In this 
interview Ovadia repeated his most recent ruling at that time, that “in order to prevent 
bloodshed [Israel] is allowed to retrieve occupied territories.”223 The significance of such 
a ruling stems from the Zionist and (to some extent) Jewish theological understanding 
that the territories occupied in 1967 are part of the “forefathers’ land” that modern-days 
Jews inherited through birthright.224 Menachem Begin, the right wing leader, headed the 
Israeli government, and his official stance was that the territories gained in 1967 had the 
same legal status as those that belonged to Israel after 1948. Yosef’s ruling, therefore, 
illustrates both pragmatism (by leaving the ultra-Zionist camp) and religious tolerance 
(by agreeing to give up parts of the holy land)—two qualities AJII was happy to 
emphasize. 
Initially, AJII was well coordinated with the new regime. Yet any hope for Iranian 
Jewish-Muslim rapprochement was quickly snuffed out. Just a few months after the 
revolution, on 9 May 1979 one of the Jewish community’s philanthropists and leaders, 
Hajji Habib Elqanian, was executed after being accused of spying for Israel and acting 
against Islam and the revolution. Many Iranian Jews suspected that the revolutionary 
court and the new government had framed Elqanian, and they feared a new era of 
persecution against Iran’s Jewish population. Many Jewish supporters of the revolution 
felt betrayed by their Muslim compatriots. Three days later, a small delegation, led by 
Hakham Yedidya Shofet, traveled to Qom to meet with Ayatollah Khomeini. Iranian 
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media widely reported the meeting, which successfully established ground rules 
regarding the relationship between the Muslim majority and the Jewish minority. 
Khomeini distinguished between Judaism and Zionism, allegedly ending the widespread 
speculation that all the Jews were undercover Zionist agents. In his proclamation, 
Khomeini acknowledged the deep roots of the Jewish community in Iran, underscored the 
elements of monotheism present in both Judaism and Islam, and distinguished between 
Zionism and Judaism: “We know that the Iranian Jews are not Zionist. We [and the Jews] 
together are against Zionism […] they [the Zionists] are not Jews! They are politicians 
that claim to work in the name of Judaism, but they hate Jews […] the Jews, as the other 
communities, are part of Iran, and Islam treats them all fairly.”225 
A detailed article in the nationally distributed newspaper Ittila‘at reported that a 
Jewish delegation came to meet the Imam in Qom, citing the mutual proclamations of the 
Jewish leaders and Khomeini. Dr. Jalali was also among those leaders “We consider the 
Jewish community to be non-Zionist,” heralded the title of the article. The following day, 
Elqanian’s execution and the meeting of the Jewish leaders with Khomeini were still in 
the headlines of the newspapers. Ittila‘at’s editorial on May 14 discussed the harm 
Zionists were doing to the Iranian Jews. “The Zionists are shedding crocodile tears over 
the Iranian Jews,” the headline of the article announced. “The truth is that the Muslim 
community in Iran has never had a dispute with its Jewish brothers, and their 
collaboration during our protest and revolution against the dictatorial regime, is one 
example of this.” In addition, the author singled out Israel as having double standards, 
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pretending to care for the Jews while profiting politically when they suffer.226 Another 
story related to Elqanian’s execution might illustrate the complex identity of those 
juggling Iranian, Jewish, and Communist affiliations. Shortly after Elqanian’s execution 
Professor Amnon Netzer met Hakham Yedidya Shofet and asked him who was caring for 
Elqanian’s corpse and funeral arrangements. Shofet replied that since many of the 
community feared the consequences the only one that came to care and said Kadish over 
the body (a highly religious burial ceremony) was an AJII leader, the communist ‘Aziz 
Daneshrad.227  
This confusion between Zionism and Judaism ignited a sort of fascination in the 
early post-revolutionary public conversation. The need of the broad public to understand 
the difference between the two was great. Mehrdad, one of the AJII founding members 
recalls: 
During the first 3-4 months after, on state television whenever they had a [talk 
show] program they tried to bring one of the members of Jami’ah-yi 
Rawshanfikran. We were in half of the programs, which was way too much. The 
first event was in Pessah [Passover] after the revolution they wanted to compare 
Pessah to the Iranian New Year, that was few days earlier, and to know how Jews 
celebrate it at home […] while it was not taken over by the Islamists there was a 
very big reception of the fact that Jews were part of the movement.”228  
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This recollection attests to the increased interest of Iranians in the Jewish Iranian culture, 
and demonstrates acceptance of Iranian Jews as a piece of the new Iranian puzzle.  
Another instance developed rather differently. A few months later, on June 29, 
1979, another talk show hosted two prominent Jewish leaders that were known to be in 
the circles of Jami’ah-yi Rawshanfikran: Rabbi David Shofet and ‘Aziz Daneshrad. The 
show invited the two to speak about Zionism. Shofet, who was the son of Hakham 
Yedidia Shofet and the first Iranian Rabbi to be ordained in the U.S., intended to talk 
about religious Zionism. Shortly after the show aired, Tamuz provided an account of the 
televised roundtable: “On Friday 8/4/1358 the second television roundtable debate about 
Zionism took place. Rav David Shofet and Mr. Muhandis ‘Aziz Daneshrad provided 
valuable observations on differences between Judaism and Zionism.”229  
In the program Shofet explained that the name Zion stems from a name of a 
mountain in southeast Jerusalem that is a holy place for Jews because it was the location 
of the temple. He provided the biblical context and quoted from the biblical scrolls of 
Ezra and Nehemiah that contextualize the Babylonian exile and Zion. Furthermore, he 
explained that the Jewish religion requires no action by humans in regards to the creation 
of a Jewish center in Zion. Shofet pointed out that the religious Jewish vision of the 
Messiah’s return includes not only Jews, but all humanity.230 Ishaq, a member of the 
Jewish community in Tehran and active in the religious establishment, who remembers 
the debate vividly, added: “[T]he interviewer asked Rav Shofet if it is true that all the 
Jews are Zionists, he waited a second and answered: Jerusalem, Zion, for me is like 
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Mecca for you! Jerusalem is the place to which I make pilgrimage, a place I address my 
prayers to. If this is what you may call Zionist- then I am a Zionist.”231 
Yet again one can see the fluidity of the term Zionism. While the conventional 
wisdom defines the term as political Zionism as professed by Israel, we see here (as we 
saw in other chapters, especially in chapter 4), that the definitions of the term yield 
several interpretations. The one here espouses religious sentiments to Jerusalem and the 
word Zionism, completely detached from the political context. 
Later in the discussion, the host asked ‘Aziz Daneshrad about political Zionism. 
Daneshrad explained that Zionism emerged in Europe alongside European classic 
nationalism and as a solution to tragedies such as the pogroms in Tzarist Russia. 
Daneshrad explained: “[T]he Zionist movement suggested that the liberation for Jews is 
impossible with their compatriots, but that they all have to go and gather in one land 
(then Palestine was chosen), and establish a state.”232 This message resonates clearly with 
Jami’ah-yi Rawshanfikran’s priorities: to have an influence on shaping post-
revolutionary Iran, to act for equality, unity, and to construct a democratic society with 
their Iranian compatriots.233  
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The Assembly of Experts and the Draft of the First Constitution 
AJII’s efforts to be part of the rebuilding process came to partial fruition when Daneshrad 
was appointed to the Assembly of Experts and the constitution drafting committee, 
representing the Jewish religious minority. In July 1979 general elections for the 
committee took place, and the committee subsequently began its work. Four out of 
seventy-three representatives were elected on behalf of minorities filling the quota of one 
representative for every recognized religious minority (with the exception of one 
representative for both Assyrians and Chaldeans). In addition to Daneshrad, Sargon Bayt-
i Ushanakugtappeh represented the Assyrian and Chaldean communities, Hara’i 
Khalatian represented the Armenians, Rustam Shahzadi from the Zoroastrian 
community.234 Daneshrad was a longtime political activist and the head of the Jewish 
community at that time. He was also well connected with some of the revolution’s 
leaders and had been appointed the Jewish representative to the Majlis. During the 
meetings of this assembly Daneshrad tried to change the precedents for minorities’ 
representation in the parliament. The Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911) established 
that every recognized religious minority would receive seats in the parliament according 
to population size, one representative for every 100,000 people. Jews and Zoroastrians 
received one representative each, the Armenians had two, and a single seat represented 
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both Assyrians and Chaldeans.235 This measure intended to assure minorities that the 
government would never disenfranchise any recognized minority group.    
Minorities’ representation in the new constitution remained a conversation among 
Jews in Iran during the work of the committee. Tamuz, thus, became the venue of debates 
among the Jewish leadership regarding the direction and reactions to the new 
constitution. The different opinions were brought forth in columns and op-eds by 
Daneshrad and others who were involved in it. Shortly after the constitutional assembly 
first convened, on July 4th 1979, Daneshrad published his lengthy proposals for amending 
the constitution. In particular, he identified articles he thought should do more to 
emphasize equality for the religious and ethnic minorities. The article “Nazariyat-i 
Jami’iah Rawshanfikran Yahudi Iran Dar Barayi Qanun-i Asasi” (AJII’s Observation of 
the Constitution) details the historic situation of minorities in Iran and religious 
minorities in particular before predicting the effects of the coming constitution. 
Daneshrad tried in this article to articulate the argument for the Jews, and began with 
historic background and the dominant Iranian identity of the Jews and their complete 
integration: “Iranian Jews trace back to the eighth century B.C when groups of them were 
brought by the Assyrian government… bigger groups were brought by the Babylonian 
government and they settled in different Iranian cities. These groups effected social 
transformations that took place during the centuries and have been transformed by the 
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different communities in Iran.”236 He later presented the articles in-dispute of the 
constitution and his proposal for revisions. In many instances the corrections merely 
stressed the equality of all citizens regardless of their faith, race, social, and economic 
status before the law. However, Daneshrad’s egalitarian vision for the government 
received attention in this article too:  
In article 50 of the constitution it is written that Zoroastrians and Jews of the 
country will have one representative elected, and Christians will elect two 
representatives. This proposition is drawn from years of tyranny and strangulation 
and the being of the country dependent upon identification of the religious 
minorities and the national majority… AJII believes that every Iranian, of any 
religion or ethnicity or race, must have the right to vote for every competent 
Iranian of any ethnicity and race. This right must be implemented by mutual 
understanding between all ethnic groups and followers of all the religions in the 
country.237 
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The Jewish revolutionaries envisioned a democratic republic for the new Iranian nation, 
one that needed no protected quotas of representations. Hoping to have a democratic 
society, which eliminated religious or ethnic distinctions, Daneshrad suggested ridding 
the minorities of special representation and allowing full and equal participation by all 
citizens in the general parties. Mihrdad, who advised Daneshrad in his capacity of a legal 
scholar, recalls:  
We went to [Mihdi] Bazargan and told him we do not want the secured member 
in parliament. He told us that we [the Jewish community] are too small, and that 
we will never be represented. So we said that we want to have equal rights; if we 
are good enough we will be elected and have more than one representative in the 
parliament, but we do not want to be disenfranchised otherwise, having one 
member representing us.238  
This conversation between the Jewish leaders and the sitting prime minister indicates that 
the latter had more doubts regarding the direction of the revolution, or the possible 
shortcomings of major amendments to the proposed constitution. While the Jewish 
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leadership was optimistic about Jews’ chances to remain represented in the framework of 
existing parties, without quotas, Bazargan was more skeptic, and more aware to the 
dominant factions in the post-revolutionary provisionary government.  
 Because of these debates, in the assembly’s debates Daneshrad did not broach this 
topic again. He continued to participate in debates regarding Article 64, which has been 
revised twice for matters not directly related to minorities. However, Daneshrad did not 
limit himself to dealing with minorities’ issues exclusively and his political and 
ideological background served him well in discussion on social and economic issues. 
Daneshrad argued and fought to establish the state’s social responsibilities towards the 
workers and the poor, and protection of national and cultural assets as well.239During the 
debates on Article 14, which makes the recognition of religious minorities official, the 
deputy from Baluchistan, Molavi Abdol-Aziz argued against Iran’s recognition of Israel’s 
and American’s (nominally enemies of Iran) official religions, while not recognizing his 
Sunni Islam. Daneshrad asserted that “the Israeli government is a government of no 
religion and its foundation is not based on religion but on the politics of usurpation which 
is hated by all believing Jews.”240  
                                                
239 See for example debates over Article 43, under the section: “Economy and Financial 
Affais.” Vari’i, Mabani va Mustanidat Qanun-i Asasi Bih Rivayat Qanunguzar, 311–324. 
240 Sanasarian also shows that during the period of the constitutional assembly both 
Ayatullah Muntaziri and Ayatullah Taliqani made clear in their Friday’s sermons that 
Jews are integral part of Iranian society, and any criticism should be directed at Israel and 
Zionism and not Iranian Jews. Eliz Sanasarian, Religious Minorities in Iran (Cambridge; 
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Illustration 12: Aziz Daneshrad’s personal record (source: 
Majlis-i khubrigan website) 
 
Brothers in Arms: Challenges during Iran-Iraq War 
With the outbreak of the war with Iraq in August 1980 the post-revolution took another 
turn. Now the war became a galvanizing experience and put to test the loyalty or the 
citizenry of the minority groups. Radical yet popular factions of the regime began treating 
Jews suspiciously and suggested that Iranian Jews were serving as agents for Israel. To 
prove their loyalty the Jewish establishment engaged in two activities almost obsessively: 
supporting the Iranian war effort against Iraq, and criticizing Israel while espousing a 
strong pro-Palestinian stance.  
 Iranian Jews expressed pro-Palestinian sympathies by attacking Zionism as a 
whole, providing critical analysis of Israeli society (mostly through Tamuz), and aligning 
with the Islamic Republic’s official policy. For example, the Jewish community 
organized demonstrations against Israeli air raids in Lebanon in the early 1980s and more 
                                                                                                                                            
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 63–64; Vari’i, Mabani va Mustanidat 
Qanun-i Asasi Bih Rivayat Qanunguzar, 232–235. 
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vehemently against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The critical analysis came in 
the form of interviews such as the one mentioned above with Rabbi Ovadia Yosef or in 
writing about Israel’s most recent population crisis as the number of Jews leaving Israel 
was greater than the number of Jews immigrating to the country. The Tamuz article on 
the issue was titled: “Reverse Migration from Israel: The Zionists are in Complete 
Deadlock.”241 The article analyses the identity crisis that ended the trend of Jewish 
migration to Israel. As for the alignment with IRI official policy regarding the Palestinian 
struggle, on Ruz-i Quds 1981 (Jerusalem Day) AJII published an announcement 
condemning Israel and endorsing the Palestinian people and the Iranian leadership in this 
campaign. The language used in this article is astonishing: “Zionists employ Nazi-style 
attacks on defenseless people,” reads one sentence. The article also indicates the 
disconnection between world Jewry and Israel and Zionism. The announcement ends 
with “Hail to the Heroic Palestinian People” and “Victorious Common Struggle of 
Muslims, Christians, and Jews against Imperialism and Zionism.”242 
The second part of this AJII strategy was the unequivocal support within Iran in 
the war effort against Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq war, AJII committed once again to 
connecting the Jewish community, especially the younger generation, to the ideals of the 
revolution. They published articles encouraging the community’s youth to engage in 
political activity or to join the combating forces. Relying on the blood covenant 
                                                
241 “Muhajirat Ma’akus Az Israil: Sahyunist’ha Dar bayn-i Bast-i Kamil,” Tamuz, 
November 19, 1981. 
242 “Bimunasibat-i Ruz-i Quds: I’ilmiya Jami'ah-yi Rawshanfikran-i Yahudi Iran,” 
Tamuz, July 29, 1981. 
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established during the revolution, several authors called on young Jews to help in the new 
struggle: “[…] Jewish Iranian youth, before and after 22 Bahman 1357, joined their 
[Muslim] compatriots in the struggle against the shah’s regime, and in this way sacrificed 
[members] for the revolution. After the victory of the Islamic revolution and the 
stabilizing of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Jewish youth has to go again to the field 
and participate with its Muslim brothers and sisters in the holy war against Iraq.”243 
Official numbers of Jews that joined the army are difficult to obtain, but judging by the 
articles in Tamuz and other unofficial sources, a growing number of Jews volunteered to 
join the army. On the home front, Sapir Hospital, once again, was recognized for the 
efficient first response it provided to wounded soldiers and civilians during the war.244 
Naturally, Jewish and other minority soldiers died in the war as well, and the 
revolutionary government erected a mural in their memory. The enormous mural shows 
the faces of five of the martyrs and presents a quote of Khomeini: “Religious minorities 
have special respect in Islam and essentially they are in one line with the Muslims in 
serving the country.” Irony, however, may have played a role in the location of the mural. 
The mural sits at a visible intersection of Vali-asr Avenue and Mirdamad Street in North 
Tehran, across the road from a famous business and residence complex buildings, the 
Eskan project. The shah built the entire complex through the Israeli contractor company 
                                                
243 Editorial, “Nasl-i javan-i kalimi-yi Iran bidar shudah ast,” Tamuz (Tehran, 6 May 
1982), 3. 
244 Approximately 15 Jews were killed in the war with Iraq. “Iran’s Jews Feel Very 
Much at Home | The National,” accessed June 20, 2014, 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/irans-jews-feel-very-much-at-home. 
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Solel Boneh. The site is thus reminiscent to the flourishing relations between Israel and 
pre-revolutionary Iran.245  
Despite becoming bitter enemies, Iran and Israel continued to pursue—to a large 
extent—the same geopolitical policies that they had pursued before the revolution.  The 
countries negotiated military connections and large-scale arm deals with active 
involvement of the United States. Israel continued this relationship partly because the 
country believed that Khomeini’s revolution would not last long. Iranian Jews who 
migrated to Israel and the U.S. successfully convinced policy makers in Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem that this revolution contradicted Iranian national DNA and therefore would not 
take root in Iran’s culture.246 
The nation-building project of post-revolutionary Iran challenged the minority 
groups. Soon after the revolution some believe that the revolution ceased to be “Iranian” 
and became “Islamic” instead. The spaces or positions minorities aspired to claim had to 
be found in the midst of post-revolution chaos, due to domestic tensions between 
competing factions and external concerns, with the war taking place. The actions of AJII 
in regards to the war coincided with the policies it professed before the revolution. That 
is, to assimilate to any form of society would be shaped after the success of the 
revolution, be it an Iranian republican society or Islamic state.   
                                                
245 The building of the complex began in 1972 and ended in 1979, just after the 
revolution. Neta Feniger and Rachel Kallus, “Israeli Planning in the Shah’s Iran: A 
Forgotten Episode,” Planning Perspective, forthcoming. 
246 See Trita Parsi’s excellent account of this period: Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The 
Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S, 91–126. 
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  Illustration 13 and 
14: Eskan project in Tehran and the Mural for the Minority Martyrs of the War (source: 
Jewish Community in Iran website) 
 
Conclusions 
Building the post-revolutionary society entailed certain challenges no one had foreseen; 
the Islamic movements that got the upper hand, did so despite earlier convictions that 
post-revolutionary Iran would become an inclusive society based on social justice and 
indifference to religious or ethnic identities, or pre-revolutionary social status. The new 
nation-building project privileged religion over political ideology and pushed religious 
minorities to the social periphery again, thus reversing the minorities’ achievements in 
the past three decades.247  
                                                
247 The story with some of the ethnic minorities was different. Many of the post- 
revolutionary clerical elite were Azeris, that flourished in the new society. Among them 
one can find the current Supreme Leader, Sayyid ‘Ali Khamenei and the Prime Minister 
during the war with Iraq, Mir Husayn Musavi. 
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However, the reality was that the place minorities had already obtained in public 
life and the public sphere was not easily taken by any government. Moreover, the post-
revolutionary government encouraged this participation by reserving seats in the 
committee that was trusted to create the founding document of the new Iran, the 
constitution. As this chapter showed, when discussing the character of the society, 
government-social affairs, and the economy, the religious identities played a small role, if 
any.  
When the war with Iraq erupted it was perceived as a galvanizing moment for the 
post-revolutionary government as well as for Iranian society. The Jewish leadership 
instantaneously showed solidarity and called the Jewish youth to join the army and 
support the war effort. This was another manifestation of strong national identity, which 
does not contradict the religious affiliation.  
The subject that remained most problematic for Jews was the association with 
Zionism in the broader Iranian consciousness. While alternative interpretations for 
Zionism, as a concept, were put forth by Iranian Jews it was still a shadow hanging over 
their loyalty to Iran and put it in question. Even in their hour of crisis, most of the Iranian 
Jews did not leave for Israel, and the overwhelming majority of those who left, decided 
on the United States rather than Israel. Another fact that is always worth considering is 




Chapter 7: Conclusions 
It is rare in history that interests of global super powers, local political elites, and 
minority groups converge to serve all three communities equally. When coming to 
describing that moment of the Allied armies invasion in August 1941, however, this 
converging of interests fits best. The Allies needed to remove Reza Shah to confront 
whatever Nazi influence existed in Iran, and to access transportation routes and much 
needed oil between central Asia and the Persian Gulf freely. The then crown prince, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, wanted to preserve the dynasty his father established and to 
resist public demands among the Iranian political elite the to restore the Qajar monarchy 
or even to turn Iran into a republic. The minorities, while not fully aware to the 
possibilities of the hour, that would include unprecedented political and personal 
freedoms, happily overturned some of the policies instituted by Reza Shah, such as the 
Iranianization of the minorities’ schools. 
 The Iran the Allied Armies left in 1945-6 was utterly different than the one they 
had occupied only a few years earlier. By the mid 1940s Mohammad Reza shah had 
already lifted many of the bans on political organizations and freedoms of press,and a 
massive urbanization process swept the country. This dissertation examined the social 
transformations Jewish individuals and institutions in Iran experienced during this period. 
The political and social changes influenced Jews just like their non-Jewish compatriots. 
They took advantage of the freedoms offered, but more than that, they took advantage of 
their improving legal status and the changes in the ethos of Mohammad Reza Shah’s 
nation-building.  
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 This ethos detached religious or ethnic affiliation from the politics of national 
belonging and removed many of the official and social obstacles that prevented Jews 
from fully integrating until that point. As Jews began their integration into the general 
society, they also started building new allegiances. Now they were not only connected 
“vertically” to the shah and the government, but also “horizontally” with their fellow 
Iranians.  
 Besides political activism and urbanization, the main vehicle for grander 
amendments was the educational system. Jewish schools provided first and foremost for 
Jewish communities, but by the 1960s Jews’ educational and professional success 
encouraged non-Jews to take the same route and increasingly enroll in the Jewish 
schools. Once again, these developments opened up the Jewish institutions to broader 
collaborations and deepened the connection between Jewish and non-Jewish Iranians. As 
this connection progressed, religious affiliations weakened. The shah disconnected Islam 
from the nation, forcing secularization and westernization. He emphasized pre-Islamic 
elements in the Iranian culture and connections between the country and  the West. Jews 
adapted this process to challenge the older (and more religious) guards of the Jewish 
establishment and their communities began to politicize.  
 The radical politicization became evident as Jews participated in the oppositional 
student movements, the underground Tudeh organizations, and internal Jewish 
organizations, such as afterschool activities in a socialist oriented camp and the 
Association of Jewish Iranian Intellectuals (AJII). AJII was instrumental in creating the 
hybrid identity that played out so clearly in the events leading to the revolution in 1979.    
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The Iranian Revolution of 1979 encompassed all strata of Iranian society, 
regardless of education, religion, vocation, and economic class, excluding only the 
political elite. The Jewish community was mostly divided in its support of the revolution.  
On the one hand, they possessed a great deal of freedoms under Pahlavi. On the other 
hand, many of them participated in professional unions and truly sympathized with their 
fellow revolutionaries. The AJII led the way among Jewish revolutionary sympathizers. 
This revolution became a watershed moment in the Jewish history of Iran. For the first 
time Jews acted in an organized way to support a national cause that exceeded the narrow 
goals of the community. Not all of those who aided the revolution did so on ideological 
grounds. Many accounts indicate that participants acted in the name of universal 
humanitarian values and personal relationships.   
This episode in Iranian history suggests unintended consequences of Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi’s nation building project. This project aimed to create a unified nation that 
would make Iranian national identity stronger than any communal belonging, and indeed, 
as can be seen from much of the evidence, many of the participants did rank their Iranian 
identity and national identity higher than any other component of identity. When the time 
arrived they prioritized standing shoulder to shoulder with their compatriots rather than 
advancing myopic community needs or goals. Jewish groups’ contribution to the 
revolution remained somewhat obscured, however, partly because key Jewish leaders did 
not want to attract too much attention to the seemingly vulnerable community in Iran. 
Nevertheless, they played a part in the Islamic Revolution and thus Iranian history.  
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In the post-revolutionary period Jews adjusted once again to a new Nation 
Building project, now better equipped with a higher social status that eased the effect of 
the new government’s Islamicization policies. 
The same ideals and allegiances that led many Jews to participate in the 
revolution drove them to actively shape the new Iran after the 1979 revolution. Jews 
faced many challenges after the turmoil but held on to their achievements of the previous 
decades. The Jewish leadership felt responsibility to support the new regime and to 
influence policy changes from within the government. The writing of the new 
constitution, and Jewish support of the 1980 war with Iraq,  highlighted the stakes of this 
responsibility 
Spend ten minutes with an Iranian Jew and he will not hesitate to tell you that 
Jewish existence in Iran goes back 2,700 years before the Islamic republic appeared. Jews 
want to preserve this status in their homeland. “Jews here have great Iranian roots – they 
love Iran. Personally, I would stay in Iran no matter what. I speak in English, I pray in 
Hebrew, but my thinking is Persian,” says Siamak Moreh-Sedegh, the Jewish deputy in 
the Majlis and a prominent leader among the 25 to 35 thousand Jews still living in Iran.248 
This sentence demonstrates the deeply rooted connection Iranian Jews feel to their 
country, after a World War, expansive social developments, and even more than three 
                                                
248 Charles London, Far from Zion: In Search of a Global Jewish Community, 1st ed. 
(New York: William Morrow, 2009), 192–226; “In Ahmadinejad’s Iran, Jews Still Find a 
Space - CSMonitor.com,” accessed August 12, 2013, 
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decades after the revolution. 
 
Moving Towards a New Historiography 
“The Iranian Jews are the most researched non-Muslim religious minorities in Iran,” 
asserts Eliz Sanasarian.249 While his claim may be empirically correct, my research finds 
that the majority of scholarship within this historical genre limits itself  to a single meta-
narrative that describes the Jewish minority as an isolated community with very limited 
interactions. However, as this dissertation proves, the studies of the Iranian community 
have not considered the Jews’ environment and broader society, major social changes and 
trends that transformed the Jewish community and Iranian society as a whole. The 
historiographical solution is to conduct research that does not confine itself to isolated 
analysis of the Jewish community in Iran, but rather explores the different groups that 
together comprise the Iranian society. This study, rather than examining only Jewish life 
and inner-communal interaction, allows a critical gaze of the Iranian general society.
 To carry out this kind of research, scholars must continue to locate new sources. 
The type of sources that revealed much of the structure was of the relief organizations’ 
archives. Involvement of so many organizations in the re-shaping of the society 
introduced many new forces from within the Jewish community and uncovered the ways 
Jewish institutions operated in collaboration with non-Jewish institutions.  
 Ultimately, this project opens a space for revisiting histories of other religious and 
ethnic minorities currently excluded from the Iranian national story. The most similar, I 
                                                
249 Eliz Sanasarian, Religious Minorities in Iran (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 44. 
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believe, would be the situation of the Christian minorities which developed alongside the 
Jewish development timeline. Christians too had institutions, such as the missionary 
schools, hospitals, youth movements, and transnational connection with Western 
advocates. There is place to examine more closely informal educational organizations, 
both Jewish and Christian, such as youth clubs, youth movements, and earlier forms of 
student organizations, in addition to the formal one examined here. This future analysis 
will contribute to understanding of Iran as an hybrid, multi-cultural, and inclusive 
society. Doing this work will demonstrate that the Iranian society is much larger than the 
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